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Interest groups and campaigns intent on spurring political participation often 
focus on highlighting potential threats in order to engage their target audiences.  
However, the use of threat in this approach is at times immobilizing because it diminishes 
the extent to which people feel equipped to respond.  In this study, I re-assess the 
hypothesis that exposure to threatening political messages is a necessary and sufficient 
condition to encourage one’s political activism among Latinos.  I focus on Latinos in 
particular because the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of 
restrictive immigration environments as the primary catalyst driving political 
participation within the Latino electorate, suggesting that threat best stirs the Latino 
“sleeping giant.”  Political elites seeking to increase civic participation may be more 
likely to engage individuals if they couple threat with an opportunity frame that 
emphasizes policy initiatives a group can aspire to accomplish.  My findings are based on 
an original online survey experiment of 1,015 Latino adults in the United States and secondary 
analyses of Latinos in the American National Election Study (2008, 2012).  I find that a 
message combining elements of threat and opportunity is a significant catalyst of various forms 
of participation, including intended and observed forms of civic engagement.  These effects are 
moderated by gender, with women being especially receptive to the coupled threat-and-
opportunity message.  In sum, there is room to delve more deeply into the motivating effects 
behind paired messaging alternatives within the field of political science where social 
 xvii 
movements, like that of immigration, give rise to a dynamic set of policy options, some of 






Revisiting Threat as the Dominant Catalyst 
 
Introduction 
Edmund Burke asserts in The Sublime and The Beautiful, “No passion so effectually robs 
the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear” (as cited in Altheide and Michalowski, 
1999).  Yet, political mobilizers often seek to garner support and encourage participation by 
pointing to the looming catastrophe at hand, often triggering a sense of urgency (Alinsky 1971). 
Interest groups and campaigns intent on encouraging participation believe that appeals to threat 
represent an effective means of capturing their audience’s attention and potential political 
activism.  However, threatening appeals may be a double-edged sword that triggers action 
among some even as it immobilizes others because it diminishes the extent to which people feel 
equipped to respond to the crisis (Vasi and Macy 2003; Soroka and McAdams 2015).  Is it 
possible that threat cues do not spark action among certain segments of the populace?  Instead of 
only relying on a threatening message, mobilizers seeking to spur greater levels of political 
participation may be more effective if they couple this approach with an opportunity message 
that emphasizes the possibility of more desirable policy goals (Alinsky 1971). 
In this study, I re-assess the hypothesis that exposure to threatening political messages is 
a necessary and sufficient condition to encourage political activism among Latinos.  I focus on 
Latinos in particular because the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of 
restrictive immigration environments as the primary catalyst driving political participation within 
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the Latino electorate, suggesting that threat best stirs the Latino “sleeping giant.”  For instance, a 
dominant thread in the extant Latino politics literature focuses heavily on the role of threatening 
immigration policies that were widely perceived as undermining the interests of this community 
in the late 1990s in California and nationwide in the spring of 2006 (Ramakrishnan 2005; Portes 
and Rumbaut 2006).  From February to May of 2006, an estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos 
protested in more than 350 demonstrations held in over 160 cities in the United States (Bada, Fox and 
Selee 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Zepeda-Millán 2014a).  The 
unprecedented activism seen in 2006 has been characterized as a direct response to concerns 
surrounding a punitive immigration bill—House Bill 4437 (H.R. 4437) (Barreto, Manzano and 
Ramirez 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2008; Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 
2008).  If passed, H.R. 4437 would have increased penalties on undocumented immigrants by 
criminalizing their status in the U.S. as well as penalizing those who employed and provided them 
shelter (Bada et al. 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014). Some of the punitive 
ramifications of H.R. 4437 included criminal penalties up to 5 years in prison for knowingly assisting 
any undocumented immigrant “to reside in or remain” in the U.S., which affected assistance provided 
by educators, hospitals, clergies, families, etc. (Bada et al. 2006; Wallace et al. 2014). 
Previously, scholars found that similar propositions, such as those seen in California in the 
1990s, spurred record naturalization rates and voter turnout among Latinos across the state  (Pantoja, 
Ramirez and Segura 2001; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; 
Ramakrishnan 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ramirez 2013; Wallace et al. 2014). For example, 
amid a statewide recession and growing political rhetoric against immigrants in California, Proposition 
187 in 1994 was aimed at denying public services to undocumented immigrants, including prohibiting 
access to non-emergency health care, public education and other public services.  This proposition also 
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required public officials, including doctors and schoolteachers, to report immigrants suspected of being 
undocumented to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Pantoja et al. 2001). Aside from the 
more restrictive efforts of Proposition 187, there were additional propositions that contributed to 
the racially divisive and threatening environment in California (Bowler et al. 2006). For instance 
Proposition 209 in 1996 outlawed affirmative action in public domains and Proposition 227 in 
1998 outlawed bilingual education in California. These 3 statewide ballot initiatives were seen as 
examples of racial/ethnic animus toward Latinos and other minority groups (Pantoja et al. 2001; 
Bowler et al. 2006). The majority of Latino voters in California saw Proposition 187, which received 
support from Republican Governor Pete Wilson, as an attack by Republicans on all Latinos (Michelson 
2003a).  In fact, these restrictive propositions are thought to have been the largest contributors to the 
dramatic reversal in the state’s political landscape from Republican to Democratic, particularly as the 
share of Latino voters grew from 8 to 13 percent between 1988 and 1998 (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler 
et al. 2006; Johnson, Reyes, Mameesh, and Barbour 1999; Scott 2000).  Furthermore, the California 
Field Poll concluded that, of the 1.15 million new voters added to California’s electorate in the 1990s, 
87 percent were Latinos (Marinucci 2000). 
Thus, the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of restrictive 
immigration environments as the primary contributor to political participation within the Latino 
electorate, a group that has largely felt “under attack” by such policies (Pantoja et al. 2001; 
Barreto et al. 2009; Ramirez 2013; Wallace et al. 2014; Ybarra and Sanchez 2015; Michelson 2003a; 
Rodriguez 1999; Michelson 2005; Michelson 2006).  Does the reliance on threatening cues to spur 
activism remove the role of other stimuli? The dominant narrative in Latino politics may lead us 
to believe that policy-oriented threats are the primary ingredient driving Latino political 
engagement.  Furthermore, the focus in the Latino politics literature on crisis and threat, and the 
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limited attention devoted to opportunity appeals, is not simply an academic issue.  By focusing 
on negative cues, scholars may have unwittingly encouraged political activists to adopt one 
strategy for mobilization to the exclusion of other strategies.  Threats often paint a grim political 
outlook, and may stall efforts to create a more engaged citizenry in the polity, leading more 
people to be too scared, or too despaired, to partake in other forms of civic engagement as well.   
There are at least three limitations in the existing literature.  First, there is the failure to 
grapple with alternative explanations for Latino political participation—such as exposure to 
messages designed to advance the status quo rather than to derail it.  In fact, legislative proposals 
aimed at expanding immigrants’ rights (e.g. sanctuary cities and access to driver’s licenses), may also 
engage and motivate people to take action.   Given that some could be exposed to simultaneously 
threatening and appealing messages, this raises a number of interesting questions.  Are threat 
appeals more likely to motivate people to take action when coupled with more appealing 
opportunity appeals? My research questions aim to re-evaluate and expand the hypothesis that 
threat incites Latino political participation.  I do not dispute that threat can play an important role 
in one’s political motivation.1  However, I argue that this characterization is, at best, a partial story.  
That is, threat appraisals do not only consist of one’s careful thought-processing of the risk or 
danger posed by a threat, but they may also involve an appraisal of the opportunity messages, 
and the potential promises, surrounding this particular debate. 
A second, and equally important, limitation in the extant literature is the overreliance on 
aggregate measures to assess threatening contexts. That is, threat is often measured by objective 
measures at the aggregate level (e.g. based on living in a state or city with punitive immigration 
politics) rather than relying on individual level measures (Zepeda-Millán 2014a).  For example, 
                                                
1 In fact, threat may also be a catalyst for opportunity appeals from the opposing side of an issue, as seen 
with a social movement and its countermovement (Tilly 1979), as has been seen with controversial immigration 
debates surrounding restrictive legislation (Barreto et al. 2009). 
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Pantoja and his colleagues (2001) assess threat by simply determining if Latinos lived in one of 
three states (California versus Florida and Texas).”  Although existing observational studies have 
allowed us to account for the interplay of state political contexts and individuals, (Ramakrishnan 2005; 
Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003), there are 
still a lack of measures accounting for the simultaneous policy goals in one’s political environment. 
Thus, by focusing solely on threat or the absence of threat, it is difficult to conclude that threat alone 
motivates previously observed peaks in political activism (Ramakrishnan 2005; Pantoja et al. 2001; 
Bowler et al. 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003; but see Okamoto and Ebert 
2010; Barreto et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán 2014a; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Garcia Bedolla 
2005).  Finally, though untested, there is a presumed link between the policy environment and the 
levels of political participation among Latinos.  My experiment design will allow me to test the 
causal inference behind this expectation in the existing literature.  
In departure from previous efforts, this dissertation will build on, as well as challenge, the 
literature on political context by exploring the influence of multi-faceted political cues in encouraging 
heightened levels of political participation among Latinos (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto et al. 2009; 
Felix, Gonzalez and Ramirez 2008; Benjamin-Alvarado et al. 2009; Pantoja and Segura 2003).  I rely 
on general principles of collective action, persuasive communication and the study of fear appeals in 
social psychology to expand upon recent theoretical and empirical research on the motivating effects of 
a coupled message approach involving threat and opportunity cues. 
 
Why the Focus on Latino Political Behavior?  
Latinos serve as an ideal population to test the coupled threat and opportunity messaging 
strategy on first, not because they are more susceptible to this coupled strategy, but because the Latino 
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“sleeping giant” has been predominantly construed as an electorate particularly stirred by restrictive or 
threatening immigration policy shocks.  It is implied that a casual relationship exists between a 
restrictive immigration environment and Latino political behavior, particularly as seen in terms of 
expressing a need to protect their resources, perhaps out of fear of losing to certain services or status, 
through naturalization, voter turnout and protest participation (Pantoja et al. 2001, 731; Scott 2000).  
This causal relationship has not been tested thus far.  Thus, it is important that the social movement 
literature account for the mixed signals people receive regarding immigration policy.  It is also 
important that we re-examine the positive and negative effects of exposure to appeals designed to elicit 
fear. Furthermore, this rapidly growing electorate is heavily sought after by Republican and Democratic 
campaigns (File 2013), but also continually excluded and included, being repeatedly exposed to 
numerous threat and opportunity messages.  Finally, Latinos represent a large immigrant-based 
community, a community that has felt especially targeted by immigrant legislation and the immigration 
policy rhetoric in the U.S. at the federal and state level (Huntington 2004; Okamoto and Ebert 2010; 
Ramírez 2013; Latino Decisions 2015; Vargas, Sanchez and Valdez 2017).  Because Latino 
immigrants make up the largest portion of undocumented immigrant populations in the U.S., Latinos 
experience the largest impact from the nation’s contentious immigration policy discourse (Chavez 
2001, 2013; Garcia 2011; Latino Decisions 2013a, b; 2014; 2015).2  Finally, if a more 
representative democracy consists of more equal participation from all groups, and not just the few or 
most affluent (Hansen 1985; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), grasping a better stronghold on the 
motivating effects of one’s political context is essential to our democracy. Understanding what better 
drives political activism among Latinos, one of the largest growing populations and most low 
                                                
2 Although Mexican and Central American immigrants make up two-thirds the share of all unauthorized 
persons, 94 percent of those deported since 2005 have been almost exclusively Latino (Rugh and Hall 2013; Passel 
and Cohn 2014). 
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participating groups in the U.S. (File 2013), would make great strides in creating a more representative 
democracy. 
Along with the economy and jobs, immigration policy has ranked as a top five issue of 
concern to the Latino population for the past decade (Latino Decisions, June 2013).  In an 
“entrance poll” for the 2016 election, a poll co-led by the National Association of Latino Elected 
Officials (NALEO), Noticias Telemundo and Latino Decisions, found that immigration emerged 
as the top policy issue for Latino voters in the first five weeks of the poll, although creating more 
jobs later tied with passing comprehensive immigration reform as the top issue (Pantoja, 2016).  
When asked to state what are the most important issues facing the Hispanic/Latino community 
they think Congress and the President should address, immigration—particularly passing 
comprehensive immigration reform—rises to the top in large part because this issue personally 
affects a large proportion of Hispanic voters (though they are by definition U.S. citizens) 
(Pantoja, 2016).  In fact, according to a Latino Decisions June 2013, 67 percent of Latinos report 
knowing someone that is an undocumented immigrant. Among the 67 percent in the June 2013 
poll, half said this connection was someone in their family.   
Due to all these connections within their social networks, scholars explain that Latino 
constituencies that protested, voted, sought naturalization and resisted the passage of restrictive 
immigration bills in the 1990s and 2006 took action against the anti-immigrant threats in their 
environments (Ong 2011; Ramirez 2013; Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto, Ramirez and Woods 2005; 
Wong 2006; Scott 2000; Bada et al. 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Barreto 
et al. 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado et al. 2008).3  It is implied that a casual relationship exists between a 
                                                
3 In terms of perceptions of feeling targeted by such restrictive immigrant legislation (Vargas, Sanchez and 
Valdez 2017), polls administered through Latino Decisions in June 2011 and March 2015 reveal that Latino voters 
are conscious of a tense, and broader anti-Latino, political context surrounding anti-immigrant policy concerns. In 
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restrictive immigration environment and Latino political behavior; however, “correlation is not 
causation” (Barnard 1982, 387).  Thus far, Latino politics scholars have not precisely identified 
whether threat messages, or (simultaneous) alternative messages, spark Latino activism.  Instead, 
researchers have made numerous assumptions about the perceptions and subsequent behaviors 
generated by one’s political context without directly assessing whether Latinos are motivated by threat 
or opportunity messages, or a combination of the two working hand in hand.  Furthermore, by ignoring 
opportunity appeals, previous Latino politics studies have also suffered from omitted variable bias and 
thus offered partial depictions of the kinds of political cues that are more likely to spur political action 
among individuals more broadly.   
One could argue that the 2006 protests were not just a series of demonstrations against 
restrictive immigration legislation proposed in Congress but also an effort to mobilize in support of 
more desirable policies (Johnson and Hing 2006; Gorman, Miller and Landsberg 2006; Pantoja, 
Menjivar and Magaña 2008). While engaging with the grievances posed by the anti-immigrant 
movement, the pro-immigrant countermovement advocated for different policy goals and issues, a 
trend that is characteristic of social movements and countermovements more broadly (Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996).  As opposed to simply protesting a punitive bill, H.R. 4437, Johnson and Hing 
(2006) explain “the protesters sought nothing less than justice for immigrants and supported legislation 
allowing undocumented immigrants the opportunity to regularize their immigration status” (100). This 
quote is indicative of overlooked opportunity policy appeals motivating Latino political behavior more 
broadly.   
The contested politics surrounding the immigration policy movement serves as a helpful 
domain for which to test the simultaneous effect of policies signaling threat and opportunity.  
                                                                                                                                                       
fact, approximately 75 percent of respondents perceive the political rhetoric in recent years as being anti-immigrant 
and anti-Latino more broadly (Latino Decisions, March 2015).  
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Furthermore, immigration policy is central to the nation’s identity, especially as the United 
States is seen as a  “nation of immigrants and a gatekeeping nation” (Lee 2004, 121)(as seen in 
Steil and Vasi 2014). Additionally, “immigration is a prominent issue from the culture wars 
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009)” (as seen in Nicholson 2011), especially as native-born residents 
attempt to protect their political dominance through more restrictive or gatekeeping immigration 
policies (Steil and Vasi 2014). However, according to the Pew Research Center (2012), the 
American general electorate is almost evenly split when asked whether “the growing number of 
newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values”—46 percent 
agree and 48 percent disagree with this statement. This divide in the public creates a research 
opportunity to study the simultaneous effect of restrictive and expansive immigration policy cues 
in one’s environment. Ramirez (2013) and Barreto et al. (2009) explain that constituencies that 
protested, voted, sought naturalization and resisted the passage of restrictive immigration bills, in 
effect, took action against these perceived threats (Ong 2011; Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto, 
Ramirez and Woods 2005; Wong 2006).  In addition to the motivating effects of resisting 
threatening immigration policies, the pro-immigrant movement has also pushed for gaining 
access to rights not previously enjoyed by immigrants (e.g., the right to vote in school board or 
other local elections, the right to drive with a valid driver’s license, a pathway to citizenship, 
etc.) (Tilly 1979; Steil and Vasi 2014).  Thus, the nativist movement fighting against immigrants 
and the countermovement attempting to create a more integrative environment have been 
working hand-in-hand (Tilly 1979; Steil and Vasi 2014). 
There has not been enough emphasis on the efforts devoted to signaling the public’s attention 
to policy alternatives during these threatening political environments. Because there were restrictive 
and expansive policies proposed during the time of these protests, I focus on the influence of both pro 
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and anti-immigration messages. For example, the immigrant countermovement in 2006 used 
mobilizing messages that combined an awareness of threat (e.g., exposure to H.R. 4437) as well as the 
need to push for policy alternatives using opportunity appeals (e.g. “Legalization Now”, “Today We 
March, Tomorrow We Vote,” etc.) (Ramirez 2013; Hin 2008).  More specifically, other policy 
alternatives being proposed around 2006 included sanctuary city ordinances, amnesty, paths to earned 
sentiments, scholars have not taken into account the effects citizenship, and other conditional forms of 
citizenship (Walker and Leitner 2011).  Although there were several signals regarding alternative 
policy opportunities amidst the threat of restrictive immigration policies, previous studies have not 
accounted for these different policy goals.  
 The existence of oppositional movements associated within the immigration debate 
creates a research opportunity to address the dynamic effects of restrictive and expansive policy 
cues on the political behavior of the targeted immigrant community of these pieces of legislation.  
Although much research focusing on immigration legislation has analyzed policy making at the 
congressional (Freeman 1995; Jacobson 2000; King 2000; Tichenor 2002; Ngai 2004; Wong 
2006; Newton 2008; Zolberg 2008) and state and local levels (Varsanyi 2010), the focus has 
often been on the importance of local political partisanship and framing of demographic changes 
as significant factors explaining the passage of these laws and their influence on public opinion 
(Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011; Valentino et al. 2008), 
especially focusing on the policy attitudes of the white U.S. electorate. Comparatively, few 
studies have considered the effect of these contested and simultaneous policy alternatives on 
Latino political activism beyond naturalization, voting and protests (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 
2001; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Bada, Fox and Selee 2006; 
Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Zepeda-Millán 2014a). 
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Addressing Existing Shortcomings 
Instead of only analyzing the isolated effect of threat appeals alone, I explore the 
influence of both threat and opportunity appeals as well as that of being jointly exposed to threat 
and opportunity messages.  By policy threat messages, I mean messages that emphasize 
proposed policies that are perceived to undermine a group’s interests—highlighting how the 
status quo may worsen.  By policy opportunity messages, I refer to messages that point to 
proposed policies perceived to offer potential gains to one’s group—highlighting how the status 
quo may improve.4  Previous work has not explored the coupled approach, or joint impact, of 
these two types of appeals.5  Second, as opposed to relying on aggregate measures of threat and 
opportunity, I rely on individual level self-reports.  Since these subjective assessments are the 
presumed link between the policy environment and the levels of political participation, this is the 
more appropriate indicator of threat or opportunity.  Lastly, in the experiment described in 
chapters 3 and 4, I randomly assign subjects to receive either threatening or opportunity 
immigration messages, or both.  This design allows me to rule out any other explanation for 
differential responses to theses appeals.  As a result, I will be able to draw more confident 
inferences than previous scholarship about the causal effects of different types of appeals.  
Overwhelmingly, threat appeals have often been operationalized as cues that undermine a 
group’s perceived interests (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Marcus et al. 2000).  The literature 
                                                
4 Admittedly, a few studies have focused on the effects of policy opportunities (Miller and Krosnick 2004; 
Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Albertson and Gadarian 2015), but they have not addressed the coupled message 
approach where respondents are exposed to both threat and opportunity messages.  Threat appeals run contrary to 
one’s preferences—or that of a salient group they belong to—as they are undesirable and potentially jeopardize the 
existing or future economic, social, broader values or their political circumstances (Gusfield 1963; Hansen 1985; 
Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Loomis and Cigler 1995; Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Miller et al. 2002; 
Marcus et al. 2000; Wallace et al. 2014; Sanchez 2006; Schildkraut 2005; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016; 
Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Tajfel 1982; Dawson 1994).  Opportunity appeals consist of policy changes that 
align with one’s desired interests.   
5 I refer to the coupled threat-and-opportunity approach or coupled approach or paired messages 
interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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typically operationalizes threat with the presence of negative valence emotions, such as anger, 
fear and anxiety (Brader 2002, 2005; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and 
Hutchings 2011; Folkman and Lazarus 1980; Marcus et al., 2000).  Typically, the expectation is 
that threat cues will shake individuals out of their usual ambivalence to politics and motivate 
them to become politically active (Hansen 1985; Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004).  
However, a few studies have found threat to be immobilizing (Miller 2005; Henik 2008), 
suggesting that of fear has an unreliable effect on political action (Valentino, Brader, 
Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings, 2011).  The coupled threat-and-opportunity message 
approach is especially critical because individuals who are exposed to a policy that they wish to 
see passed may be more task-focused and less distracted by negative emotions stirred by the 
threat message (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, Gruen 1986; Lazarus and 
Folkman 1984; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten 1993; Henik 2008). 
The delicate balance between alerting an individual to take action against a threat and not 
allowing them to be “scared stiff” can be alleviated through persuasive communication 
techniques (Vasi and Macy 2003; Henik 2008; Klandermans 1992; Fireman and Gamson 1979; 
Van Vught 1999; Miller 2005; Hutchings 2001; Valentino et al. 2011).  Vasi and Macy (2003) 
suggest that mobilizers can better spur participation, and consequently alleviate the “mobilizer’s 
dilemma” by issuing empowering messages in conjunction with crisis-oriented threat messages. 
By adding this empowering message, Vasi and Macy (2003) highlight the possibilities of 
collective action and affirm the importance of coordinated efforts (Klandermans 1992).  Thus, an 
ideal form of political communication will alert an audience to potential threats without 
demobilizing them. For example, Kern (1989) describes how producers create emotional news 
sequences known as “get them sick, then get them well” ads.  The first portion of the segment is 
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used to establish a negative emotion associated with some threat to the viewer.  In the second 
portion of the segment, the problem is resolved with a positive emotion associated with a story 
coming to the rescue.  Without this promise of a resolution, people could very easily be “scared 
stiff” (Kern 1989; Henik 2008).  Essentially, the threat captures the audience’s attention, and the 
resolution points to a positive and attainable objective to counter the threat (Tomaka et al. 1993).  
In the same spirit, the coupled threat-and-opportunity approach I propose has the potential to 
“get them sick” and then “get them well.”   Thus, for these aforementioned reasons, we would 
not want to rely on a mobilizing strategy that only emphasizes fear, especially if we want people 
to feel that they have the ability to ward off the danger and to avoid making them feel 
overwhelmed by their vulnerability. As political elites define what the public is supposed to fear 
(Robin, 2006), politicians and whistle-blowers often overlook offering policy alternatives to provide 
relief from the provoked threat.  This latter portion of the threat appraisal narrative and the political 
communication tactics surrounding it, which provides hope and relief, is missing in the existing 
scholarship on what spurs political behavior under contentious environments.  
A related line of research in psychology provides additional reasons to expect that the 
joint effect of threat and opportunity appraisals will enhance participation (Dienstbier 1989; 
Blascovich and Tomaka 1996; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten 1993).  Tomaka and 
colleagues (1993) and several other scholars (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Lazarus and Folkman 
1984) argue that threatened individuals perceive the potential for loss, with little, if anything, to 
be gained in the situation; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as 
well as loss.  Threats occur when the decision-maker experiences insufficient resources to meet 
situational demands (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten 1993).  When such resources are 
present (perceived or real), it becomes a challenge (Pang, Jin and Cameron 2007).  Thus far, this 
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distinction in the threat appraisal process, and its complexity, has been notably absent from the 
existing political science literature.  Those who may have more of the resources and civic skills 
to perceive the possibility of gains and losses while being simultaneously exposed to threat and 
opportunity messages may be heavily influenced by demographic factors related to their gender.   
I find that women are more responsive to the threat and opportunity condition. To make 
better sense of this, I turn to the existing gender and Latina politics literature. In fact, Latinas 
have spearheaded community organizing efforts, naturalization rates and record voter turnout in 
the Latino community (Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a, 2014b).  Thus, in subsequent analyses, I 
interact the treatment conditions by gender, allowing me to determine whether men and women 
respond differently to various messaging strategies. It is also worth noting psychologists have 
found people cope with contentious environments differently, particularly along gender lines 
(Ptacek, Smith and Zanas 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Folkman et al. 1986).  Interestingly, 
men tend to be more problem-focused and try to find direct solutions to the problems they face, 
whereas women tend to employ more emotion-focused methods, including seeking social 
support (Brems and Johnson 1989; Ptacek, Smith and Zanas 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; 
Folkman et al. 1986; Carver, Scheier and Weintraub 1989; Heppner, Reeder and Larson 1983).   
For instance, threat appraisal responses likely differ among men and women in my study, 
particularly as women might be more willing to engage in political acts that leverage their social 
networks (Taylor, Klein, Lewis, Gruenewald, Gurung and Updegraff 2000). In fact, sociologists 
have found that during stressful times of financial hardship and unemployment, women fare 
better than men partially due to access to social support (Russell 1999). This is in line with 
previous findings on gendered political participation patterns in the U.S. For example, there are 
strong historical roots of women being involved in broad social networks and more community-
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oriented activities (Baker 1984).  Finally, according to analyses of voter turnout between 2006-
2012, Bejarano (2014a) generally finds that Latina females vote at higher rates than their male 
counterparts. Increased levels of political participation and familiarity with navigating the 
political system, in part through exposure to their children’s schools, can also provide women 
with stronger ties to their community and political institutions (Bejarano 2014a). This literature 
is relevant as we consider the more social or expressive activities captured in my study.   
To test my theoretical framework of the mobilizing effects of both threat and opportunity, 
I rely on a survey-experiment and two nationally representative surveys.  In the experiment, I 
focus on the effect of threat and opportunity on various forms of political participation, including 
the intent to join a protest, volunteer time with an immigrant organization, talk about politics 
with friends and family, and the intent to vote.  It is important to consider outcome measures 
aside from the intent to vote, especially because a large portion of the Latino population is 
ineligible to vote, because of high rates of non-citizenship (Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Garcia 
2011; Schildkraut 2005).  In the original survey experiment, I also have the ability to test 
whether the hypothesized effects of coupled threat and opportunity message impact observable 
forms of political activism. The observed behavior involves sending an electronic postcard to 
their U.S. Senators.  This form of participation is arguably a much tougher test of my theory 
because it moves beyond the intended forms of political behavior, which are more speculative.   
The novel combination of being exposed to both policy threat and policy opportunities cues is 
distinct from the presence or absence of threatening policies seen in previous threat appraisal studies.  
Also, by including separate conditions for threat and opportunity cues as single cues, this provides 
more baseline comparisons previous studies have been unable to leverage.   Finally, the use of a survey 
experiment approach with a Latino population provides a unique test of previous threat appraisal 
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studies that have largely relied on experiments with predominantly white samples (see Albertson and 
Gadarian 2015).  My experiment’s findings expand the realm of possibilities of mobilizing 
messages, and point to the notion that threat is not the only external catalyst for Latinos.  
Finally, I compliment the experiment treatment conditions by analyzing the effects of hope and 
fear in the American National Election Study (ANES).  The representative sample surveys in the 
2008 and 2012 ANES contain oversamples of Latinos in both years. Fear and hope are often 
triggered by political threats and political opportunities (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Groenendyk 
and Banks 2014; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Miller 2005; Kim and Cameron 2011).  I 
rely on fearful feelings towards the Republican candidates (McCain and Romney) to represent a 
perceived political threat, and hopeful feelings towards the Democratic candidate (Obama) to 
represent a perceived political opportunity for the Latino electorate.  These partisan perceptions 
of threat and opportunity are measured as such because of the overwhelming partisan support 
Obama received among Latinos in 2008 (66 percent of Latino vote) and 2012 (71 percent of 
Latino vote) (Pew Hispanic Center, 2012).  I test whether perceived threat and opportunity 
toward the presidential candidates influence Latinos’ intent to talk about politics with their 
friends or family.  
Chapter Overview 
In Chapter 2, I review and critique the literature on threat and participation among 
Latinos.   Additionally, I summarize the threat appraisal and political psychology research most 
central to the focus of my research question.  I argue that threat cues alone are probably 
insufficient to mobilize the Latino population.  For example, although there have been repeated 
attempts to create more punitive policies targeting undocumented immigrants nationally and 
state-by-state (Steil and Vasi 2014; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Hopkins 2010), these policy 
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threats have not provoked the mobilization response seen in 2006. In this chapter, I also focus 
more squarely on the theoretical underpinnings of my argument for the coupled threat-and-
opportunity approach, drawing from persuasive communication and social psychology research 
to illustrate reasons to revisit the dominant consensus that threat motivates political action.  This 
literature points us to the logic behind my hypotheses for the motivating effects of the 
simultaneous exposure to threat and opportunity to overcome collective action problems. 
As indicated above, researchers have traditionally focused on the mobilizing effects of threat 
cues, and somewhat less frequently opportunity cues (Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Marcus, 
et al. 2000; Meyer and Staggenborg 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Groenendyk and Banks 
2014), but not the two at the same time—which is more likely to reflect one’s political reality 
(Albertson and Gadarian 2015).  Furthermore, within studies focused on Latino participation and 
activism, threat is often assessed by objective measures at the aggregate level (e.g. based on living in a 
state or city with punitive immigration politics) rather than testing the casual effect of threat and the 
additional signals that may be present in a contentious political environment (although see Zepeda-
Millán 2014a; Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Barreto et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Garcia 
Bedolla 2005). 
Chapter 3 tackles these setbacks directly.  This chapter tests my causal hypotheses with an 
original Internet survey experiment with a sample of 1,015 Latino adults (including U.S.-born 
and foreign-born participants). One goal of the experiment is to test whether there is a causal link 
between being simultaneously exposed to threatening- and opportunity-based messaging 
environments and one’s political participation, including intended and observed forms of 
participation. A second goal of the experiment is to test whether the simultaneous threat-and-
opportunity message spurs greater rates of political engagement relative to the single cue 
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conditions of threat alone and opportunity alone.  Previous scholars have argued that threat alone 
will activate greater levels of political activism (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Pantoja et al. 2001; 
Barreto et al. 2009), some research points to the need to account for the potential motivating 
effects of opportunity appeals (Brader 2005; Marcus et al. 2000; Groenendyk and Banks 2014) 
and the important consideration of accounting for messaging environments that are 
simultaneously threatening and signaling more opportunities (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Vasi 
and Macy 2003). Furthermore, the comparison in previous research has not been made to a 
messaging environment that involves signals of both peril and promise.  We know the role of 
threat is complex, but what this project shows is that it is not the only way to shake the masses 
out of their political apathy.  Instead, we see that coupling a sense of peril with promise evokes a 
greater likelihood to take political action.    
To what extent are the results uncovered in Chapter 3 driven by a subset of my sample? 
In Chapter 4, I examine potential moderating effects of the coupled strategy, with a particular 
focus on gender because the acculturation literature largely expects women to integrate and 
navigate American culture and political systems at a faster rate than men, especially among 
immigrant women (Berry 2001; Jones-Correa 1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003; Hardy-Fanta 1993; 
Bejarano 2014a). Interestingly, my findings affirm that gender structures how one views the 
political world (Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin 2010; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Garcia Bedolla 
2005).  Given additional differences in the socialization process by gender, women may be more 
mobilized than men when faced with exogenous policy signals centered on the plight of one’s 
community (Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin 2010; Hardy-Fanta 1993).   
In Chapter 5, I turn to observational analyses through the American National Elections 
Studies (2008, 2012) to compliment my experimental findings and to be able to draw more 
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generalizable claims behind the coupled effect of threat and opportunity. In this chapter, I begin to 
delve into the potential causal mechanisms behind the motivating effects of a coupled threat and 
opportunity environment. As proxy measures of threat and opportunity, I rely on the mediating effects 
of fear and hope towards the presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012.  I rely on fearful feelings 
about the candidates to represent a perceived political threat and hopeful feelings about the 
candidates to represent a perceived political opportunity.  As seen with the experiment, I test 
whether perceived threat and opportunity toward the presidential candidates have a catalyzing or 
demobilizing effect on Latinos’ intent to talk about politics with their friends or family, as well 
as other political participation measures and vote intionality.   
The concluding chapter summarizes my findings and considers the implications of a 
coupled messaging strategy.  Thus, the work here revises our existing understanding of the 
catalyzing effect of threat, and provides important evidence of effective messaging strategies that 
are more likely to spur various forms of political activism.   In this chapter, I also speculate on 
the potential insights that might be drawn from my work to our understanding of the constituents 
mobilized, and those who abstained, from voting in the 2016 election.  For some voters, this past 
election may have been perceived as one full of threat and opportunity cues, while for others 
they may have experienced an overwhelming sense of despair and “battle fatigue,” leading to 
their abstention.  Generally speaking, a democracy that consists of more effective mobilizing 
strategies will provide people with the means and motivation to participate more fully 
(Schattschneider 1975).  Those means involve creating a more informed and engaged citizenry, 
indicators of a healthy democracy and more representative government (Dahl 1998; Fishkin 
1991; Habermas 1989).  Without properly motivating the masses, we may fail to create a more 
engaged citizenry to keep our elected officials more accountable  (Hutchings 2003).  Instead of 
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potentially exacerbating feelings of helplessness while only emphasizing a sense of urgency (or 
policy threat), combining these messages with more opportunity-based policy alternatives may 









Theoretical Framework for Pairing Threat and Opportunity 
 
Background 
In the spring of 2006, the Latino “sleeping giant” was stirred by the so-called Sensenbrenner 
Bill, or H.R. 4437.6  This awakening was similar in many ways to what transpired in the 1990’s in 
California, when many Latinos were mobilized by what was perceived as anti-immigrant and anti-
Latino state ballot initiatives. The unprecedented activism seen in 2006 has been characterized as a 
direct response to the threat of this punitive immigration bill (H.R. 4437), which would have made it a 
felony to be an undocumented immigrant and would have added more fencing along the Mexican-U.S. 
border  (Barreto, Manzano and Ramirez 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2008; 
Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008).  This bill also carried criminal penalties against persons or 
groups assisting undocumented immigrants (Merolla et al. 2012). In the spring of 2006, millions of 
immigrants and immigrant rights advocates took to the streets across the nation to demonstrate against 
H.R. 4437, making this the single largest civil rights action in American history (Merolla et al. 2012). 
Based on the large-scale political responses of the Latino electorate in the 1990s and in 2006, in the 
                                                
6 The Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act, or H.R. 4437, passed in the 
House of Representatives in December of 2005 (Merolla et al. 2012). For more details on H.R. 4437 and 
California’s propositions 187, 209 and 220 in the 1990s, see Chapter 1 footnotes 2 and 3. Overall, H.R. 4437 and the 
3 statewide ballot initiatives in California were seen as examples of racial/ethnic animus toward Latinos (Barreto et 
al. 2009; Pantoja et al. 2001; Garcia Bedolla 2005). In terms of perceptions of feeling targeted by such restrictive 
immigrant legislation (Vargas, Sanchez and Valdez 2017), polls administered through Latino Decisions in June 
2011 and March 2015 reveal that Latino voters are conscious of a tense, and broader anti-Latino, political context 
surrounding anti-immigrant policy concerns. In fact, approximately 75 percent of respondents perceive the political 
rhetoric in recent years as being anti-immigrant and anti-Latino more broadly (Latino Decisions, March 2015).  
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form of naturalization rates, voter turnout and protests, it is implied that a casual relationship exists 
between a restrictive immigration environment and Latino political behavior (Pantoja et al. 2001; Scott 
2000; Bada et al. 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Barreto, Manzano and 
Ramirez 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2008).7  Focusing more specifically on the 
unprecedented activism of 2006, though immigrant advocacy networks brought attention to stopping 
anti-immigrant policy proposals, they also pushed for proposals that were viewed as more promising, 
including a path to legalization through comprehensive immigration reform similar to that of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of the 1980s (Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008).  
Thus, the 2006 protests were not just a series of demonstrations against restrictive immigration 
legislation proposed in Congress, but may have also been an effort to mobilize support for more 
desirable policy opportunities (Johnson and Hing 2006; Gorman, Miller and Landsberg 2006; Pantoja, 
Menjivar and Magaña 2008). In fact, while engaging the grievances raised by the threats to immigrant 
rights, immigrant advocates have pushed forth a countermovement with different policy goals, a trend 
that is characteristic of social movements and counter-movements more broadly (Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996).  In sum, Latino politics scholars have not precisely identified whether threat 
messages, more desirable appeals, or some combination of the two, spark Latino activism.  Instead, 
researchers have made numerous assumptions about the perceptions and subsequent behaviors 
generated by one’s political context without directly assessing whether Latinos were motivated by 
threat or opportunity messages, or both.  By ignoring opportunity appeals, previous Latino politics 
studies have suffered from omitted variable bias and thus offered a threat-centered narrative of the 
kinds of political cues that may be more likely to spur political action.  I rely on general principles of 
collective action, persuasive communication and the study of fear appeals in social psychology to 
                                                
7 Scholars have tried to explain the size and extent of the protests (Jones-Correa and De Graauw 2013). With the 
exception of Merolla et al. (2012), the most popular, though untested, explanation is that the media played a critical 
role in spurring immigrants and immigrant advocates to action (Barreto et al. 2009).  
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develop my hypotheses regarding the mobilizing effects of a coupled message approach involving 
threat and opportunity cues.  We do not know which types of messaging strategies, involving 
threat and/or opportunity, play a more dominant role or if the interaction of the two is more 
likely to mobilize individuals.8   
Speaking in general terms, threat appeals have been construed as future-oriented policy 
cues that, if implemented, would run counter to one’s—or one’s group—interests (Miller and 
Krosnick 2004).  Ignoring the more complex nature of one’s political messaging environment, 
particularly in a contentious policy debate, does not further our understanding of the external 
motivators driving one’s political participation.  Furthermore, this one-sided focus on threat has 
depicted the nature of a policy debate operating within a simple dichotomy of threat or no threat.  E.E. 
Schattschneider recognized the need to consider policy alternatives that are more competitive than this 
simple dichotomy.  He concluded his classic book, The Semisovereign People, by defining democracy 
as  “a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives 
of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process” (1960, 
138).  Therefore, rather than only analyzing the isolated effect of one policy cue (Chong and 
Druckman 2007, 2010; Druckman 2010; Druckman and Leeper 2012), it is important to capture 
the competitive nature of policy cues when participants are simultaneously exposed to both threat and 
opportunity appeals.  
                                                
8 Although, it is worth noting that Merolla et al. (2012) find that upon portraying immigrants in a 
disparaging light, such as either social burdens or as threats to our national security, the focus of their study is to 
distinguish between racial group participation differences after being exposed to various depictions of Latino 
immigrants. Their treatment conditions randomize participants to different tones and issues related to the rationale 
behind federal immigration policies, though their treatments do not provide calls to action or specific attempts to 
create more expansive or restrictive legislation. Latino respondents in their sample are more likely to want to 
become more politically engaged. This line of inquiry raises important questions about the effects of being exposed 
to denigrating or exalting media frames about immigration policy. Though this work is related to the nature of my 
project and broader focus on political participation, my research more specifically considers whether the motivating 
effects posed by policy threats or policy opportunities that attempt to derail or improve the state of affairs for Latino 
immigrants could spur differences in Latino political participation. Thus, I am not manipulating whether immigrants 
are seen as drains or assets to society.  
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To better understand varying levels of political engagement among Latinos, I focus on 
the underpinnings of the threat narrative in political science. This first section includes a critical 
assessment of the existing literature on experimental work centered on the presence or absence of 
threat and highlights mixed findings from political psychology research on emotions associated 
with threat appraisals.  Secondly, I take a closer lens to the existing measurement concerns and 
model misspecifications most relevant to my project, especially as it relates to immigration 
policy environments that have been linked to greater levels of political engagement among 
Latinos.  In the third section I move on to provide more details on the threat and opportunity 
signals present within the immigration policy landscape across the U.S. and in the mobilizing 
messages used by immigrant movement organizers.  Then, gleaning from the “mobilizer’s 
dilemma,” explained below, and fear appraisal literature in social psychology and persuasive 
communication, this section lays the theoretical foundation behind the pairing of threat and 
opportunity messages.   Finally, in last portion of the chapter, I turn our attention to how coping 
strategies surrounding threat appraisals vary, based on socialization patterns observed among 
men and women more broadly and particularly based on levels of political engagement among 
Latinas.   
General Experimental Research on Threat and Opportunity  
The rationale behind threat appeals in politics is based on the human desire to survive and 
protect one’s self-interests (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lazarus, 1991; Marcus, Neuman and 
MacKuen 2000; Miller and Krosnick 1994); in fact, threat appeals often signal danger or fear and 
induce a fight or flight response in the decision-maker (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Darwin 1864). In 
psychological terms, we expect threat to be especially motivating because in the presence of 
threatening stimuli, people’s brains are more alert and in an anxious state of mind (Lazarus 1991; 
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Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Miller and Krosnick 1994). While not as heavily studied 
as the concept of threat, reactions to potential opportunities have most typically been correlated 
with people devoting less energy toward collective action efforts (Miller and Krosnick 2004; 
Marcus et al. 2000).  The predominant perspective in this literature understands opportunity 
messages through the lens of free-riding or “social loafing” effect, as in prospect theory and 
social impact theory (Miller, Krosnick, Lowe and Holbrook 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Latané 1981).  According to prospect theory, and from a basic evolutionary standpoint, people 
are more motivated by losses than gains; people are driven to protect themselves (or their group), 
and their resources or status from anything threatening to derail them (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979).  On the other hand, people are deterred from taking action towards a common goal, which 
offers potential gains, if they believe others are already working towards it (Latané 1981), similar 
to Mancur Olson’s (1965) free-riding expectations.  
Along with what we might expect from prospect theory, Miller (2000) and Miller and 
Krosnick (2004) find that threat has a mobilizing effect on various forms of political activism—
including financial contributions and volunteering time for a political interest group.  They 
employ a field experiment in collaboration with the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights 
Action League of Ohio (NARAL Ohio).9  The letters were intended to fundraise and recruit new 
members for NARAL.  Although a cursory view of this literature might suggest the 
unambiguous influence of threat appeals, a closer examination of the messages reveals that they 
include mixed signals of threat as well as positive cues.  Thus, given the confounding nature of 
the opportunity signals across their treatments, the support they find for the motivating effects 
behind the threat condition are actually not solely driven by threat cues. The experimental 
                                                
9 Given the focus of abortion issues and the demographic group NARAL-Ohio targets for its membership, 
the letter recipients in Miller and Krosnick’s (2004) field experiment were exclusively women registered as 
Democrats in Franklin County, Ohio. This is the county where the greatest numbers of NARAL members resided.   
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treatments were largely informed by a content analysis that consisted of 100 fundraising letters 
distributed by interest groups over a seven-year period.10 Again, similar to the letters in their 
field experiment, no letter across the nineteen organizations in their content analysis contained 
one single cue alone.   
More specifically, the control version of the letter included elements seen in typical 
fundraising letters: a discussion of the organization’s goals, evidence of past victories, attempts 
to increase efficacy, statements of urgency to take action and selective incentives to join 
NARAL’s attempts to facilitate access to abortions in Ohio. The threat letter highlighted an 
undesirable policy change that was intended to induce threat among those who favored legalized 
abortion.  This threat letter contained all the information seen in the control letter, but it 
specifically focused on legislative attempts aimed at making abortions more difficult to obtain.  
The opportunity letter emphasized desirable policy changes among people who favored legalized 
abortion, and it addressed the ways in which members of Congress were working hard to make 
abortions easier to obtain.  In addition to the policy opportunity seen in this letter, this condition 
also included the same information seen in the control letter. The threat and opportunity letters 
each contained a discussion of the organization’s goals, evidence of past victories, attempts to 
increase efficacy and statements of urgency.  Based on the content analysis portion of Miller’s 
work (2000), all the letters discussed more than the organization’s goals. Instead, thirteen out of 
the nineteen (or 68 percent) contained both signals of alternative future changes 
(goals/opportunities) as well as a sense of urgency (threat)(e.g., “there’s not a moment to lose”).  
These patterns, which involve mixed signals of both threat and appeasing policy goals, confirm 
                                                
10 These patterns involving aspects of both a political dilemma and hints of future policy goals (and 
empowering messages of efficacy) across the letters are consistent with patterns revealed in Godwin’s (1988) 
content analysis of 150 direct political mailings from liberal and conservative organizations.  For more on Miller’s 
content analysis, refer to discussion sections in Miller (2000) and Miller and Krosnick (2004) publications. 
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the implications drawn from Albertson and Gadarian (2015), who focus on the use of fear in 
contemporary politics and the ways in which anxiety affects how citizens engage in politics.11  
They conclude that policy scenarios provoking anxiety alone are not realistic as people are 
exposed to more complex political messages than those seen in their randomized treatment 
conditions in their experiments. 
Overwhelmingly, threat appeals have often been operationalized as cues that are aversive 
to one’s interests. The existing public opinion literature typically correlates and operationalizes 
an indication of threat with the presence of negative valence emotions, such as anger, fear and 
anxiety (Brader 2002, 2005; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings 2011; 
Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Fischer, Shaver and 
Carnochan 1990). Marcus et al. (2000) also find that people who feel threatened by a political 
stimulus (i.e. an opposing candidate in an election) are more likely to become politically active 
than those who do not feel threatened. They present the theory of affective intelligence, which 
explains that anxiety provoked by the novel danger behind threatening stimuli triggers more 
vigilant attention and a disruption to one’s typical patterns of behavior (Marcus et al. 2000). 
Thus, when assessing the literature on threat and its effects on motivating political action, this 
conversation cannot be devoid of the study of fear appeals and the ways that both negative and 
positive emotions serve as feedback to inform people’s decision-making behaviors (Vasi and 
Macy 2003, p. 982; Leventhal 1970; Mewborn and Rogers 1979; Rogers and Mewborn 1976).  
Behind the “mobilizer’s dilemma,” Vasi and Macy (2003) also rely on a literature of “fear 
appeals” and the importance of pairing them with an alternative so as to avoid making subjects 
                                                
11 More specifically, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) use experiments on immigration, public health, climate 
change and terrorism to assess the impact of anxiety-provoking threat messages on outcomes such as political 
learning, attributing trust to political actors as well as people’s policy support for more protective policies.  
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feel unable to respond to the danger (Vasi and Macy 2003; Leventhal 1970; Mewborn and Roger 
1979; Rogers and Mewborn 1976).   
Though some might assume we have arrived at a consensus about the way these emotions 
help people contend with their political environments (Gray 1990; Marcus et al. 2000), a few 
studies have found threat to be immobilizing (Miller 2005).  In fact, Valentino et al. (2011) find 
that fear has quite a sporadic effect on political action, sometimes deterring participation from a large 
battery of campaign-related political activities and it is not mobilizing for the 5-point political 
participation scale.12 To the degree fear is associated with participation, Valentino and colleagues’ 
(2011) separate analyses of the ANES from 1980-2004 reveal that these effects tend to be confined to 
more conservative actions, such as information-gathering, displaying a button or bumper sticker and 
talking to friends and family about politics.  Thus, we cannot expect political threats alone to be the 
dominant drivers of other forms of political action, including attending a rally, donating money to a 
campaign and working for a party or candidate.  Even within Miller’s work (2000, 2004), we see 
that there are mixed results on the effect of threat. Threat mobilized people to donate more 
money, but it inhibited one from contacting an elected official about their opinion (Miller 2000; 
Miller and Krosnick 2004).  In fact, Hobbes suggests that political elites are entrusted to define what 
the public is supposed to fear (Robin 2006). In this capacity, politicians and whistle-blowers often offer 
policy alternatives to provide relief from the provoked threat.  This latter portion of the policy narrative, 
one that provides hope and relief, is missing in our current understanding of what spurs political 
behavior under contentious environments. It is worth mentioning that it is potentially concerning to 
allow political elites to craft a political environment that only heightens the “politics of fear,” leaving 
society and the government more willing to enlarge its surveillance state (Robin 2006).  This 
                                                
12 These results included activities such as wearing a button, volunteering for a campaign, attending a rally, 
talking to others and donating money. 
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heightened state of survey and anxiety creates a citizenry that stops paying attention to new threats 
posed before them.   
A related problem in the literature is that scholars have uncovered inconsistent results regarding 
the motivating effects of opportunity cues.  On the one hand, we know that opportunity appeals 
have been found to encourage “free riding” (Meyer and Staggenborg 1995; Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979), and that positive emotions reinforce existing behaviors and attitudes (Marcus et 
al. 2000); however, others argue that opportunity appeals tend to have a mobilizing effect (albeit 
smaller than the effect of threat) on political participation depending on the political outcome of 
interest (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Miller 2000; Hardin 1968; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990).  In 
fact, they find opportunity messages increase the rate of people sending postcards (Miller and 
Krosnick 2004).  Additional studies also raise more questions about the expected “free riding” 
effects of opportunity appeals. Through the use of a randomized lab experiment and analyses of a 
2008 national survey, Valentino et al. (2011) repeatedly find that the motivating effects of 
enthusiasm on various forms of electoral campaign participation are positive—though not 
statistically significant.  Though, upon controlling for skills and resources across pooled analyses 
of ANES surveys from 1980-2004, Valentino et al. (2011) later find that enthusiasm significantly 
boosts participation for various campaign and non-campaign related forms of political 
participation.  Thus, we should not overlook the potential mobilizing effect the positive emotions 
(particularly hope) that opportunity appeals might provide for individuals, especially when 
paired with the urgency of a threatening message.  Furthermore, those experiencing enthusiasm 
have a higher predicted probability of engaging in more involved forms of participation, 
including joining a rally, working for a campaign and donating money (Valentino et al. 2011).13  
                                                
13 Interestingly, Valentino et al. (2011) find that anger is not politically mobilizing in the absence of skills 
and resources. Those that are angry can “put to use” the skills to organize and take political action. However, 
 
 30 
When accounting for the moderating effect of skills and resources, enthusiasm still boosts 
participation, though not as much as anger (Valentino et al. 2011). My argument is not that 
enthusiasm or hope stirred by opportunity appeals is more catalyzing for individual political 
action, but rather that the combination of hope and fear (or opportunity and threat) is most 
effective.  After all, upon drawing heavily from the neuroscience and automatic processing of 
emotions, there is reason to expect that the combination of the hope and fear may be especially 
motivating, especially as both positive and negative emotions might lead to action (Gray 1990) 
and boost political participation (Marcus et al. 2000). 
Measuring Immigration Policy Threat in Political Science 
Instead of oversimplifying the environmental cues people are exposed to, I suggest that the 
opposite of threat does not merely imply the absence of threat as characterized in previous research 
(Lupia and Menning 2005; Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Pantoja et al. 2001; Felix, Gonzalez 
and Ramírez 2008).  Alternatively, one must also incorporate the presence of opportunities in the 
political environment. Thus, I want to examine variations in responses to one’s political context by 
considering a coupled threat and opportunity approach and not simply account for the presence of 
threatening stimuli.  For example, previous observational survey analyses have only factored in 
the presence or absence of threat in their models when predicting Latino political engagement 
patterns.  More specifically, when analyzing exogenous immigration policy shocks perceived as 
posing a threat to Latinos, previous studies aggregate rather than rely on individual level 
measures to assess threat in the local environment (Pantoja et al. 2001).  For example, 
                                                                                                                                                       
without such access, anger can have a deterring effect on participation. In this study, I focus on the effect of fear and 
hope, and not on anger because action followed by anger requires a sense of entitlement and indignation (Planas 
2016), which may be largely fueled by one’s place in society and access to resources. Being in an alerted state of 
anxiety does not require a sense of entitlement. Finally, I also focus on fear posed by threats because this emotion 
has had theoretical underpinnings in motivating political action for a long time. In fact, Thucydides finds that fear 
has played a large role in motivating political action (aside from honor and interest)(Robin 2006).  
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respondents living in California from 1994-1996 are coded as 1, indicating the presence of a 
threatening environment as this was a time period when restrictive immigration propositions 
were on the state ballot.  Conversely, not living in California is coded as 0 to represent a non-
threatening political context in states without such restrictive immigration proposals (Pantoja et 
al., 2001). The authors also include a measure of living in California during this threatening time 
period (1994-1996) compared to Latinos living in Florida and Texas. Florida and Texas are 
intended as comparison states that represent “no threat,” and they do not find Latino immigrants 
naturalizing or turning out at the same rate there as they do in California at the time.    
Similarly, Bowler et al. (2006) focus on a slightly later time period to account for the 
passage of Propositions 187, 209 and 227 in California, and their effects on participants’ partisan 
identification.  To account for the cumulative effect of passing these 3 alienating propositions, 
they create a categorical variable that accounts for the time before the passage of Proposition 187 
(“0”), the time period between the passage of 187 in 1994 to the passage of 209 in 1996 (“1”), 
the passage of 209 to until the passage of 227 in 1998 (“2”), and thereafter the measures takes 
the value of (“3”).  In a separate model, Bowler et al. (2006) also code dummy variables for each 
proposition so as to better “assess whether specific propositions had greater or lesser effects 
among specific populations” (351).  Again, the variables specified in this study do not account 
for the persuasive effects of perceiving the legislation passed during this time as either threats or 
opportunities for minority interests in California.14  Thus, we do not know if the cumulative 
effect they are capturing in their categorical time variable is also conflating efforts led by 
                                                
14 For more on the perceived partisan and racialized nature of these ballot initiatives in California in the 
1990s, see discussions in Bowler et al. (2006) and in Tolbert and Hero (2001). The authors expect that the highly 
partisan nature of these racialized initiatives help explain the substantial shift of partisan loyalties observed in 
California’s political landscape after the mid 1990s. After the passage of Propositions 187, 209 and 227, Latino and 
white respondents identified more closely with the Democratic Party. To explain why white respondents became 
more closely identified with the Democratic Party, they explain that white voters were uncomfortable with the 
explicitly racialized nature of this legislation, which was seen as a violation of the norm of racial equality 
(Mendelberg 2001).  
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immigrant advocates attempting to provide more desirable policy goals amidst the political 
threats being passed. 
In addition to elite interviews, Barreto et al. (2009) analyze two national surveys 
collected during the immigration protests of 2006.  The surveys, conducted by the Latino Policy 
Coalition, were fielded two weeks after the April 10th immigration rallies and also one month 
after the second wave of immigration rallies and May 1st boycott.  To account for motivators of a 
threatening political environment, the authors rely on more negative approval ratings of 
Congress and the president.  They find that those who are more disapproving of Congress are 
more likely to have participated in the rallies.  Barreto et al. (2009) also include a control 
measure for the participant’s level of support for a pathway to citizenship, though this measure 
does not reach statistical significance and seems to be negatively correlated with participating in 
the rallies.15   
Moving beyond cross-sectional studies (Pantoja and Segura 2003; Pantoja et al. 2001; 
Bowler et al. 2006), more qualitative studies have found a positive relationship between 
restrictive immigrant legislation and increases in Latino mobilization efforts (Barreto et al. 2009; 
Zepeda-Millán 2014; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013).  The qualitative data provides further 
insight into the mechanisms motivating organizers of local 2006 marches, especially those in 
non-traditional gateway cities.  While this scholarship explores the role grievances or threatening 
immigration policies play in mobilizing the Latino community, previous work does not broaden 
                                                
15 The LPC surveys asked Latino registered voters whether or not they agreed with the principles, 
objectives and themes of the 2006 immigration rallies. This is more so tapping one’s ideology policy support of how 
to deal with undocumented immigrants and not necessarily the motivating effects of being exposed to messages of 
future policy goals. In terms of predicting support of the objectives behind the rallies, the effect of disapproving of 
the President and Congress has a positive and significant effect. Given the conceptually distant nature of these 
variables (involving evaluations of two branches of government and the extent to which one supports more 
expansive immigration policy reform), it would not make sense to collapse the disapproval ratings and policy stance 
measures into a single measure to account for both potential threats and potential policy opportunities. Thus, the 




the narrative to make room for the motivating role of more promising or desirable policy goals in 
these contexts.16  
Threat and Opportunity Signals in Policy Landscape and Mobilization Messages 
While state governments have acted on immigration issues throughout US history (Skerry 
1995; Filindra 2009; Okamoto and Ebert 2010), data from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL) highlights the dramatic increase in state action on immigration in the past decade 
(Jones-Correa and DeGraauw 2013).  In 2005, legislatures in 25 states considered approximately 300 
immigration-related bills and resolutions; by the end of 2007, after the failure to pass immigration 
reform at the federal level, this legislative activity increased five-fold—amounting to a total of 1,562 
bills and resolutions being introduced, and 290 were enacted in 46 states (NCSL 2012; Jones-Correa 
and De Graauw 2013). There is also legislative activity at the municipal level, which includes 180 
cities, towns and counties across the country enacting approximately 120 ordinances by the end of 2007 
(Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010).  Thus, the existence of oppositional movements associated with 
the immigration debate creates a research opportunity to address the dynamic effects of 
threatening and appealing policy cues (Tilly 1979; Steil and Vasi 2014).  
                                                
16 Interestingly, interviews by Garcia Bedolla (2005) reveal that threat leads to more disengagement among 
some Latinos, largely based on whether they have a positive sense of Latino identity.  For instance, among Latinos 
with a positive Latino identity and sense of group worth, they are more mobilized to take action in the hostile 
immigrant environment of California in the 1990s.  However, for those who do not have a positive Latino identity, 
the threatening environment leads to further inaction.  
 
 34 
Figure 2.1: Local immigration policies in the United States between 2005-2009  
 
Source: Map illustrates the distribution of local immigration policies in the United States between 2005 to 
2009 as assembled by Walker and Leitner (2011). The authors created this map from an original database 
of publicly available data in 369 U.S. localities (including 281 municipalities and 88 counties), focusing on 
those locales that had proposed or created an immigration or immigration-related policy.  
 
To illustrate that immigration policies have not been exclusively restrictive, and instead 
that there have been several legislative examples of perceived policy threats and policy   
opportunities for Latino constituents, Figure 2.1 depicts a visual representation of restrictive and 
integrationist immigration policies between 2005 and 2009.17  Across the U.S., nearly 370 local 
                                                
17 The map in Figure 2.1 does not include the expansion of Secure Communities program implementation 
past February of 2009, at which point was still considered voluntary (Walker and Leitner 2011). Thus, their map 
underestimates the expansion of Secure Communities by the Obama Administration. The data ranges back to 2005 
because a plethora of these local and county-level policies were passed between 2005-2007 (Walker and Leitner 
2007; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010).  The passage of local ordinances, including those that are restrictive or pro-
immigrant, are primarily based on partisan politics, immigrant protest activity and salience of immigration stirred by 
the Sensenbrenner Bill of 2005, and not due to demographic pressures faced by immigrant-receiving localities 
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governments have proposed or implemented policies aimed at addressing issues of 
undocumented immigration in their communities (Walker and Leitner 2011).  The increased 
policymaking taking place in states and municipalities is part of a broader trend of the devolution 
of immigration responsibilities to local levels, including coordinating with federal immigration 
authorities on matters of immigration control and immigrant policing (Ellis 2006; Coleman 
2007a, 2007b; Varsanyi 2008). For example, through the 287(g) Program and Secure 
Communities, local police authorities are deputized to check the immigration status of detainees 
and initiate deportation proceedings (Walker and Leitner 2011). However, as seen in Figure 2.1, 
there is a mix of both inclusive and exclusionary immigration policies in the U.S. across cities 
and county-level governments, which are arguably perceived as attempts to challenge, maintain 
and/or improve the status quo of immigrants (Walker and Leitner 2011; Ybarra and Sanchez 
2015; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015).  Walker and Leitner (2011) constructed a dataset 
of proposed immigration policies within 269 localities (including 281 cities and 88 counties) 
between 2005 through February 2009.18   Inclusive or integrationist policies are sanctuary 
ordinances, policies granting local rights to undocumented residents (such as local voting rights 
to noncitizens, valid identification cards, and the acceptance of Mexican matricula consular ID 
cards as valid forms of identification), and resolutions in support of paths to legalization for 
undocumented immigrants (Walker and Leitner 2011; Wells 2004; Varsanyi 2006; Ridgley 
2008).  Exclusionary or punitive policies involve examples aside from 287(g) agreements and 
Secure Communities Program, these policies also consist of English-only ordinances, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2007, 2010; Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2013; 
Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015). 
18 It is worth noting that this list is not exhaustive. The authors gathered this information from databases on 
local immigration policies produced by Fair Immigration Reform Movement, The Mexican American and Puerto 
Rican Legal Defense Funds, and the National Immigration Law Center. The authors also cross-checked and 
supplemented information from a collection of national and local media documents. For a study that considers 
policies that actually passed between 2001 and 2011, see Steil and Vasi (2014).  
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penalties to employers and landlords who knowingly hire or rent to undocumented immigrants 
(Walker and Leitner 2011).  
Table 2.1: Regional Distribution of Immigrant Ordinances in U.S. Municipalities, by 
Ordinance Type 
U.S. Region Percent “Pro” Percent “Anti” Total 
West 52.2 (36) 47.8 (33) 69 
Midwest 43.2 (19) 56.8 (25) 44 
South 11.5 (9) 88.5 (69) 78 
Northeast 25.6 (23) 74.4 (67) 90 
All Ordinance 
Municipalities 
31.0 (87) 69.0 (194) 281 
 
Notes: This table was compiled by Walker and Leitner (2011). The quantity of ordinance municipalities in the 
region is indicated in parentheses. This table includes the full sample of ordinance municipalities, n = 281. Census 
region definitions are based on the U.S. Census Bureau. Chi-square test: p < .001.  
 
 
As Walker and Leitner (2011) point out, Figure 2.1 reveals a plethora of both inclusive 
and exclusionary local ordinances—although they are more heavily skewed towards restrictive 
policies overall, though Ramakrishnan and Wong (2007, 2010), and Gulasekaram and 
Ramakrishnan (2015), find there is a shift towards more integrationist policies in the 2000s as 
well, particularly with the presence of pro-immigrant protest activities.  This fragmentation and 
variation in policy proposals is in part due to the stagnation of federal immigration policy and the 
failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform (Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013), but it 
also involves grassroots responses to the presence (or potential presence) of undocumented 
immigrants.  Some grassroots responses have led to policies that exclude immigrants or penalize 
employers who hire undocumented immigrants, while others have pursued integrative strategies 
(Walker and Leitner 2011; Ybarra and Sanchez 2015; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; 
Okamoto and Ebert 2010). As portrayed in Figure 2.1, and with percentage details in Table 2.1, 
over half of the Midwestern municipalities (57 percent) introduced local immigration ordinances 
designed to deter the settlement of immigrants.  In the Northeast, 74 percent of the municipalities 
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also introduced more exclusionary policies rather than those designed to incorporate immigrants.  
The South stands out as a region with nearly 90 percent of municipalities in the sample 
introducing restrictive immigration policies.  Whereas the West is the only region where a slight 
majority of the municipalities adopted pro-immigration policies (52 percent).   
Despite the proliferation, and potential exposure, of both expansive and restrictive 
immigration policy changes, the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the latter as 
the primary catalyst driving political participation within the Latino electorate, particularly their 
voter turnout, naturalization rates and 2006 protest participation (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto et 
al. 2009; Ramírez 2013; Wallace et al. 2014; Ybarra and Sanchez 2015).  This is, at best, one 
portion of the story and may lead us to believe that threatening immigration contexts are the 
dominant external motivators spurring Latino activism.  I do not discount that threat can play a 
catalyzing role in one’s political motivation.19  I aim to pinpoint the causal impact of threat 
appraisals, which may not only consist of careful thought-processing of the risk or danger posed 
by a threat, but it may also involve an appraisal of the opportunity messages, and the potential 
promises, surrounding a particular debate.   
Aside from the proliferation of immigration policy changes at the local and municipal 
level, cues of peril and promise are also evident in various organizations’ political 
communication: fundraising letters, memoranda, press releases and email action alerts (Miller 
2000, p. 75; Daniels, 2010; NCLR, 2007; LULAC, 2007; NALEO, 2007; NPNA, 2015). For 
instance, the National Partnerships for New Americans (NPNA) emphasized the concerning 
threat of Texas Supreme Court Rulings interfering with then-President Obama’s second Deferred 
                                                
19 In fact, threat may also be a catalyst for opportunity appeals from the opposing side of an issue, as seen 
with a social movement and its countermovement (Tilly 1979).  With the social movement surrounding immigration, 
scholars have found very strong proponents and opponents of the most heavily protested punitive immigration 
policies in the past decade (Barreto et al. 2009; Steil and Vasi 2014).  
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Action program. Referring to the first paragraph below, the Deferred Action of Parents of 
American and Lawfully Permanent Residents (DAPA) was aimed at providing deportation relief 
for 5 million undocumented immigrants parents who have U.S.-born children was seen as a 
policy opportunity among immigrant advocates. Instead of only emphasizing the stalling effect 
these rulings could pose (threat), the NPNA’s second paragraph also reminds the public of 
policies pushing forth benefits (opportunities) for undocumented immigrants. From an action 
alert publicized on their website in September 2015, the NPNA highlights the following policy 
threats and policy opportunities: 
“Last week, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the Obama 
administration's executive actions on immigration which were announced one 
year ago this week and would grant 5 million people temporary work 
authorization and relief from deportation. 
 
We will not be deterred by the delays. National Partnership for New 
Americans (NPNA) organizations and partners are commemorating this 
anniversary by hosting 49 naturalization, DACA, and document preparation 
workshops to continue building power and preparing for eventual implementation 
across the country. […] These workshops are a part of the NPNA’s “Full 
Citizenship Campaign” which aims to assist the nearly 9 million green card 
holders who are eligible to become U.S. Citizens, to find pathways to citizenship 
for the 11 million undocumented immigrants across the nation, and to fight for a 
more vibrant, just, and welcoming democracy for all.”  
 
 The NPNA does not overwhelm its audience with the alarming problem of the court 
stalling President Obama’s administrative relief program.  They move beyond the first paragraph 
and also emphasize naturalization drives and the need to push for reform with a path to 
citizenship. This strategy embodies the coupled threat-and-opportunity approach proposed in this 
dissertation.  Similarly, the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) used a coupled threat-and-
opportunity approach to try to spur action in a 2007 memo release in response to the Senate 
failing to move a comprehensive immigration bill forward: 
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“‘It is utterly unacceptable for the Senate to fail to address the issue of 
comprehensive immigration reform,’ said Janet Murguía, NCLR President and 
CEO. ‘The country demands and deserves a solution to our broken immigration 
system, and it is unthinkable that the Senate would fail to move the debate 
forward.’ Murguía asserted that while much of the bill needs improvement, it also 
offers a great deal of hope. She highlighted the pathway to citizenship for 
undocumented immigrants, the ‘DREAM Act,’ the reduction of backlogs for 
immigrant families, and the ‘AgJOBS’ proposal. ‘Our opportunity to improve this 
bill and to enact the best possible reform rests with the United States Senate.’” 
  
Some of the hopeful policy opportunities the NCLR press release includes are the Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act and the Agricultural Job Opportunities, 
Benefits and Security Act (AgJOBS)—two policy proposals that would provide protection and a 
safety net for undocumented immigrant students and farmworkers. First introduced in the U.S. 
Senate in 2000, the DREAM Act is aimed at providing a pathway to citizenship for children of 
undocumented immigrants who were brought to this country under the age of 5 and have sought 
higher education (or served in the military) and have not committed any crimes.  AgJOBS was 
also first introduced in the U.S. Senate in 2000, is aimed at providing H-2A visas to the large 
number of farmworkers without existing access to legal protections from abuse and wage theft. 
The DREAM Act and AgJOBS policies are examples of policies that may provide the reward-
seeking behavior, or gains, triggered by enthusiasm or hope as people process this message, 
helping them overcome the potential distraction or despair caused by the threat of legal action to 
stall deportation relief efforts.   
Theoretical Framework 
I argue that the pairing of threat and opportunity work together so that threat arouses 
attention and opportunity directs specific actions towards policies that are more appeasing.  The 
promise of hope and viable alternatives are crucial in one’s responses to threatening situations. In 
fact, in the field of persuasive communication and psychology, “fear appeals” were found to be 
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unsuccessful if unaccompanied with an alternative (Vasi and Macy 2003, 982; Leventhal 1970; 
Mewborn and Roger 1979; Rogers and Mewborn 1976). As opposed to participants who did not 
have any sense of reassurance, Rogers and Mewborn’s (1979) findings reveal that respondents 
were more likely to alter their behavior in their best interest if they knew they could take a course 
of action to avert the threat. Similarly, Vasi and Macy (2003) find that participants were more 
likely to take action when encountering a threat if and only if they had an empowering message 
that reinforced the utility of their collective action. Thus, there is room to delve more deeply into 
these motivating (or reassuring) alternatives within the field of political science where social 
movements give rise to a more complex set of policy options beyond threat and putting a halt to 
aversive policies.  
I rely on general principles of collective action, persuasive communication and the study of fear 
appeals in social psychology to elaborate the logic behind the motivating effects of a coupled message 
approach.  For example, Vasi and Macy (2003) explain that collective action is difficult to initiate 
and sustain, posing a substantial social dilemma on participants and mobilizers (Olson 1965).  
Aside from competing with the busy lives among the inattentive masses (Olson 1965; Marcus et 
al. 2000), Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that potential participants are faced with two challenges 
in the mobilizer’s dilemma.  First, one might not receive a greater portion of the benefits if they 
put forth their own effort (the “efficacy problem”) (Marwell and Oliver 1993).  Second, 
participants also face the temptation to free ride or enjoy the benefits others worked toward to 
achieve the desired goal (the “free-riding problem”) (Hardin 1968; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990).  
For participants, the dilemma involves being successfully persuaded of the importance of their 
individual contribution; for mobilizers, the dilemma involves not overwhelming people with the 
dire nature of a call to action (Olson 1965; Vasi and Macy 2003).  Thus, the mobilizer’s task is to 
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create a call to action that alerts them to pay attention to politics, but one that does not backfire 
by undermining the belief in the ability for individuals to make a difference (Vasi and Macy 
2003).  It might seem intuitive to emphasize urgency or attention to a threatening policy change 
in the early stages of mobilization, perhaps to shake people of out of their habitual 
inattentiveness. Yet, “this risks creating a sense of despair at precisely the worst possible time—
when the obstacle to participation is more likely to be the problem of efficacy, not free riding” 
(Vasi and Macy 2003). While they assign participants to a control condition with no message, a 
crisis message condition, and a coupled condition combining a crisis and empowerment 
messages, they do not test the tendency to free-ride when the messages are empowerment-only. 
Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that mobilizers can better spur participation, and 
consequently alleviate the “efficacy problem,” by issuing empowering messages that highlight 
the possibilities, accomplishments, and victories of collective action and affirm the importance of 
individual efforts when coordinated with others (Klandermans 1992).  The strains between 
individual and collective interest in social dilemmas can be alleviated through persuasive 
communication techniques (Klandermans 1992; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Van Vught 1999).  
Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that mobilizers can better spur participation, and consequently 
alleviate these two dilemmas by issuing empowering messages in conjunction with crisis-
oriented messages.  By adding this empowering message, it highlights the possibilities, 
accomplishments, and victories of collective action and affirms the importance of individual 
efforts when coordinated with others (Klandermans 1992).  Relatedly, Leventhal (1970) finds 
that if people feel vulnerable to a threat, they tend to show more resistance to attitudinal and 
behavioral change.   If crisis communication and calls of collective action are only based on 
making fear appeals (or threat appeals) salient, the general public can experience “battle fatigue” 
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from the volume and oversaturation of such urgent appeals (Smith, Allen and Danley 2007).20  
Furthermore, they do not test a combination approach where people are exposed to threat and 
opportunity appeals in their mailers (Smith et al. 2007). Thus, for these aforementioned reasons, 
we would not want to rely on a mobilizing strategy that mainly emphasizes fear, especially if we 
want people to feel that they have the ability to ward off the danger and to avoid making them 
feel overwhelmed by their vulnerability.  Borrowing from basic principles of peril and promising 
messages, I apply this to mobilizing messages that are policy-specific.   
Vasi and Macy (2003) test this messaging strategy with two experiments based on 
resource-management games. More specifically, they tested the effects of crisis and 
empowerment messages on conservation efforts in laboratory experiments.  Members of a large 
group faced a resource-depletion problem with “declining” conditions, and the investigators 
manipulated the presence of persuasive empowerment messages to suggest conditions were 
“improving.”  Vasi and Macy (2003) measured the extent to which people practiced self-restraint 
in harvesting the commons, or protecting the group’s resources in these laboratory experiments.  
The rules of the game were such that it was in each individual’s best interest to collect as many 
resources as possible to earn more redeemable points; however, if the community chest depleted, 
the game would automatically end, and everyone would lose all their points (Vasi and Macy 
2003, 985). They found that those who received a paired empowerment message, reassuring 
them that their efforts were “improving” the group’s resources, were more willing to cooperate 
                                                
20 For example, in response to hostile social and academic campus environments, black male students 
reported psychological responses symptomatic of racial battle fatigue (e.g., frustration, shock, anger, 
disappointment, resentment, anxiety, helplessness, hopelessness and fear)(Smith, Allen and Danley, 2007). In their 
discussion section, Miller and Krosnick (2004) refer to the potential desensitization or underestimation of threat 
mailers in their experiment as a “threat fatigue.”  To explain the underestimated effects of threat in their 
experiments, the investigators suggest that respondents may have already received countless mailers and 
solicitations regarding the same issue and this may have already made the threat very salient in their minds. 
However, the authors are unable to test this alternative explanation as they do not consider the timing of their 
mailers in the experiment. 
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with other group members and conserve more resources for their community chest.  Those who 
received the crisis-only message, which emphasized the “slippery slope” and declining 
conditions they were in, conserved far fewer resources than the paired crisis-empowerment 
group. The paired crisis-empowerment group received identical crisis messages as those in the 
crisis-only group, but also received empowerment messages when conditions were improving 
(Vasi and Macy 2003, 988).  
When one faces an inability to ward off the danger confronting them in their 
environments, individuals do not have the means to change their behavior and respond 
accordingly (Rogers and Mewborn 1976).  Rogers and Mewborn (1976) focused on people’s 
health behavior responses to health threats.  Although Rogers and Mewborn (1976) focus on an 
alternative operationalized as a recommended health change (e.g. recommending subjects stop 
smoking to prevent bodily harm), I focus on alternatives in a goal-oriented policy context that go 
beyond a call to stop the threat or instructions on how to cope with the threat (Mewborn and 
Rogers 1979).  Relatedly, scholars find that if people feel vulnerable to a threat, or particularly 
targeted, they tend to show more resistance or defiance, making it more difficult to facilitate 
attitude change (Leventhal 1970). As mobilizers try to design their calls to action, it may be 
detrimental and counterproductive to follow suit and only emphasize the crisis at hand. Instead, it 
is important to couple their sense of urgency with affirmative messages pointing to progress and 
more hopeful policy alternatives (Vasi and Macy, 2003).  
We can apply additional lessons from public health studies in this case. People’s 
acceptance of a health recommendation depended not only on the likelihood of the harmful 
effects and extent of urgency in their prognosis, but also on the change in probability if the 
recommendation were followed (Rogers and Mewborn 1976). “When perceived efficacy is low, 
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people tend to do the opposite of what is advocated, and fear appeals may boomerang (Rogers 
and Mewborn, 1976; Witte, 1992)” (Vasi and Macy, 2003). Through psychophysiological 
experiments, this line of work finds people were more likely to comply with the recommended 
practices when those recommendations were paired with coping responses (Leventhal, 1970; 
Rogers and Mewborn, 1976; Mewborn and Rogers, 1979; Rogers, Cacioppo and Petty, 1983; 
Witte, 1992). “The data indicated that the efficacy component acted upon intentions, not by 
making the threat seem less severe or less likely to occur but by directly strengthening beliefs in 
the ability to cope with danger when it is confronted ” (Rogers and Mewborn, 1976). This two-
pronged strategy guards against feelings of hopelessness or feeling overwhelmed by the 
prognosis or recommendations.  
The logic behind the importance of providing people with a reassuring message is heavily 
supported in psychology work on fear appraisals. To hone in on the process by which people 
weigh the risks involved in taking action or doing nothing when confronting a stressor in their 
environment, I turn to work by Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten (1993).  These authors 
clarify that threatened individuals perceive the potential for loss, with little, if anything, to be 
gained in the situation whereas challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as 
loss in the situation. Thus, I suggest we apply this to our understanding of threat and opportunity 
appraisals in a political context, as the combined effect of threat-and-opportunity cues may lead 
to heightened political participation.  The coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is intended to 
challenge individuals to take action by conveying the possibility of gain and loss, a perspective 
Tomaka et al. (1993) find most helpful as people encounter a threat or stressor in their 
environment.  Threatened individuals, who only perceive the potential for loss, may think it is 
not worth exerting their efforts; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of 
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gain as well as loss, and are more eager to accomplish the goal at hand (Tomaka et al. 1993).  As 
such, there is room to delve more deeply into these motivating, or reassuring, paired messaging 
alternatives within the field of political science and the topic of immigration lends itself squarely to 
provide a sense of loss and gain for some.   
Theoretically, I assert that threat evokes a sense of loss for one or one’s group, whereas 
an opportunity evokes a sense of benefit and greater access to privileges for one’s group (Miller 
and Krosnick 2004; Soss and Schram 2007; Campbell 2003; Schneider and Ingram 1993; 
Okamoto and Ebert 2010).  Combining the effects of these two distinct signals may generate the 
necessary motivation to take political action against any attempts to derail a group’s progress and 
provide the reassurance that their efforts will improve the state of affairs for the collective group.  
Gender and Political Participation 
To my surprise, I found that women were the most responsive to the coupled threat-and-
opportunity strategy. To explain these findings, I turn to new findings on gender as it relates to 
political participation, threat appraisal and the immigrant acculturation literature. Focusing on 
immigrants and their intent to become more politically engaged in the U.S., women tend to be at 
more of a political advantage than men. For instance, women account for 55 percent of all 
persons seeking naturalization (Office of Immigration Statistics 2013; Bejarano 2014a). Among 
Latino communities, scholars have found that various forms of political incorporation, such as 
naturalization rates and voter turnout, are dominated by Latina women (Bejarano 2014a).  Within 
our understanding of Latino immigrants and their political incorporation, women tend to 
spearhead community organizing efforts as well as more formal electoral forms of participation 






(Jones-Correa 1998; Bejarano 2014a). In terms of where they are paying political attention, male 
immigrants are more willing to pay more attention to politics of their countries of origin than 
female counterparts.  While examining the political socialization of Latin American immigrants 
in New York City, Jones-Correa (1998) finds that men express greater desires to return to their 
native country, and they send remittances back home at higher rates than immigrant women. 
These gendered pathways are, in part, due to Latino male immigrants experiencing a more 
elevated political status in their home countries, where a patriarchal system is more predominant; 
in the U.S., immigrant men experience a demotion in status as they navigate their place in the 
host country’s economic market. Though immigrant men may have been considered middle class 
and well educated in their countries of origin, their newfound jobs in the U.S. are well below 
their previous socioeconomic class positions. Conversely, immigrant women experience less of a 
decline in their status as they enter the labor market with less previous work experience (Jones-
Correa 1998).  Additionally, women come in contact with more American civic institutions, 
especially through their children, than their male counterparts. Thus, “the structuring of social 
and economic experiences in the U.S. leads to very different kinds of organizational incentives 
for immigrant women and men,’’ and this illustrates why women would be more efficacious and 
responsive to the coupled threat-and-opportunity strategy (Jones-Correa 1998).  
According to analyses of voter turnout between 2006-2012, Bejarano (2014a) generally 
finds that Latina females vote at higher rates than their male counterparts. Increased levels of 
political participation and familiarity with navigating the political system can also provide 
women with stronger ties to their community and political institutions, making them the most 
likely to encourage other family members to become more involved in American politics 
(Bejarano 2014).   In terms of immigration policy enforcement and work in more economically 
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vulnerable spaces, it is no secret that Latino immigrant men have been more heavily targeted, 
and deported, at higher rates than female immigrants (Golash-Boza Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; 
Rugh and Hall 2016).  In fact, 85 percent of deportees are estimated to be male immigrants from 
Latin America (Golash-Boza Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016).  Thus, this leaves 
Latina women in the household to take on a heavier burden in navigating U.S. political 
institutions.  
Though scholars have explained differences in political activity based on the amounts of 
time and money devoted to these forms of engagement (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995), 
there is also an aspect of expressiveness and social venues that political activities provide 
participants, especially for women. “Recent sociological research argues that women are more 
strongly connected to neighborhood networks than men, whilst mothers of young children enjoy 
particularly robust patterns of social exchange” (Lowndes 2008). Similarly, Taylor et al. (2000) 
suggest that the female stress response of “tending” to offspring and affiliating with a social 
group (“befriending”) provides resources and protection for the female and her offspring under 
conditions of stress. Thus, threat appraisal responses are likely to differ among men and women 
in my study, particularly as women might be more willing to engage in activities as a group and 
in political acts that leverage their social networks.  
Summary 
To reiterate, the “mobilizer’s dilemma” is a theory of collective action which holds that 
efforts to galvanize a response with crisis messages only make matters worse by undermining the 
belief in one’s ability to “make a difference”(Vasi and Macy 2003).  Vasi and Macy (2003) 
suggest that efforts intended to overcome free-riding and override feelings of low efficacy are 
best tackled through a two-pronged message approach: a coupling of crisis and empowerment 
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message frames. In other words, “a one-sided emphasis on the need for action can be 
counterproductive unless coupled with messages that call attention to occasional progress” (Vasi 
and Macy 2003).  These findings suggest that threats alone may not be an effective strategy for 
mobilizing some populations.  Because at least some researchers have found that there are 
motivating effects behind a two-pronged approach in a few domains of participation and 
collective action (Vasi and Macy 2003; Rogers and Mewborn 1976), I propose that we test the 
dynamic effects of simultaneously threatening and opportunity appeals on one’s political 
behavior.  
 In the pages that follow, I test empirically the theoretical framework presented here, and 
demonstrate some of the ways in which a combined threat and opportunity message approach 
may lead to greater likelihoods in spurring political activism among Latinos. Aside from not 
accounting for alternative explanations that would be part of a threatening political environment, 
including exposure to opportunity messages, previous studies concluding that Latinos have felt 
“under attack” have not included measures at the individual level. Thus, without measuring threat 
at the individual level, it is difficult to conclude that threat alone motivates peaks in political activism. 
My project expands the range of potentially mobilizing messages, and challenges the idea that 
threat is the most successful way to encourage participation among Latinos. My findings also 
point to the ways in which women cope with threat and stressors in their environments through 
the more expressive and social forms of political engagement captured in this study.  The 






A Matter of Causality? Testing the Causal Impact of Threat-and-Opportunity on Intended 
and Observed Forms of Political Participation 
 
 
In this chapter, I present details regarding the design and administration of a survey 
experiment conducted with an Internet sample of Latino adults living in the U.S.  I focus on the 
general findings that emerge from the entire sample from this experiment. In Chapter 1, we saw 
that there are at least three limitations in the extant literature on threat appraisals as they relate to 
mobilization.  Briefly, I argued that there is the failure to consider alternative explanations for 
heightened political participation among Latinos, including exposure to a combination of policy 
messages designed to both alert Latinos to impending threats and to encourage them to seek. 
Second, the existing scholarship on Latino political behavior in response to threat has relied on 
objective measures at the aggregate level (e.g. one’s state or city of residence) rather than relying on 
measures assessed at the individual level. Lastly, by relying on observational data alone the Latino 
politics literature on participation has been vulnerable to the charge of omitted variable bias.  An 
experimental design provides a straightforward way of addressing these concerns.  In sum, without 
testing the causal impact of threat, and randomly assigning subjects to alternative appeals, we do not 
know if threat alone motivates political activism (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006; Barreto and 
Ramirez 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).   
In Chapter 2, I presented a theoretical framework to account for the simultaneous effects of 
threat and opportunity cues, and why they may be more mobilizing than alternative approaches 
focusing on threat alone or opportunity alone.  Instead of analyzing the isolated effect of one type of 
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policy appeal, I explore the effects of an opportunity-based appeal as well as a more competitive policy 
environment in which participants are jointly exposed to threat and opportunity messages.  Second, as 
opposed to relying on aggregate measures of threat and opportunity, I randomly assign subjects 
to either threat, opportunity, or both threat and opportunity appeals in my experiment so as to 
more precisely measure their causal effects.  In this chapter and the following chapter, I provide 
results from my survey experiment. As indicated in chapter 2, I expect the combined effect of 
threat-and-opportunity cues to lead to heightened political participation.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical groundwork I have laid out for the mobilizing effects of a 
coupled threat-and-opportunity approach in Chapter 2, I have developed four testable 
hypotheses.  My primary hypothesis involves the combined effects of the threat and opportunity 
cues.  This coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is especially important because individuals 
who feel challenged (as opposed to only threatened) may be more task-focused and less 
distracted by the negativity stirred by the crisis-only message (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; 
Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Tomaka et al. 1993).   
H1: The coupled threat-and-opportunity cues will encourage respondents to participate in 
politics at a greater rate, relative to the non-political appeals condition.  
 
 
To test whether to the motivating effects of the coupled approach are consistent when 
comparing the results to a policy environment that only focuses on threat or opportunity signals, 
I generate a second hypothesis with different baseline comparisons from that seen in hypothesis 
1. 
H2: The coupled threat-and-opportunity cues will catalyze respondents to participate in 




Vasi and Macy (2003) find that participants did not partake in greater collective action 
efforts when they were only alerted to the crisis without an empowering message.  Furthermore, 
Valentino et al. (2011) and Brader (2005) find that the motivating effect of fear on political 
action is sporadic, and often limited to more conservative and less time-consuming forms of 
political participation (such as talking about politics and wearing a political button). Thus, I 
reconsider the mobilizing effects of threat alone in the following hypotheses. 
H3: The threat condition alone will either be ineffective or discourage respondents from 
participating in political acts such as participating in protests, volunteering time with an 
organizing, the intent to vote and sending an electronic postcard, relative to the non-
political appeals condition. 
 
H4: The threat condition alone will spur participants into taking political action, such as 
talking about politics, relative to the non-political appeals condition. 
 
 
Moreover, the dominant narrative of opportunity messages expects people to engage in 
“social loafing” tendencies (Latané 1981), similar to Mancur Olson’s (1965) free-riding 
expectations.  According to social impact theory, learning about a potential policy opportunity 
should inhibit respondents from participating in collective action efforts because it demonstrates 
that others are already working towards a common goal, making their individual contribution 
appear to be less critical (Latané 1981).   
H5: The opportunity condition alone will either be ineffective or discourage respondents 
from participating in political acts such as participating in protests, the intent to vote and 
sending an electronic postcard, relative to the non-political appeals condition. 
 
Methods and Procedure 
In order to address the hypotheses described above, an experimental design will allow me 
to isolate the effects of coupled threat-and-opportunity appeals on one’s political behavior 
relative to singular appeals and those who received a non-political message.  By using data from 
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a randomized experiment, I can pinpoint the causality of the observed outcome differences 
(Druckman, Green, Kuklinski and Lupia 2006; Huddy, Sears and Levy 2013).  Experiments 
facilitate causal inference through the randomization of experimental treatment conditions.  
Campbell (1957) explained internal validity as the ability of the investigator to be able to find a 
significant difference between the treatment and control condition.  As indicated previously, I do 
not expect a single policy cue, whether it be threat or opportunity alone, to be a realistic 
representation of one’s policy environment (Albertson and Gadarian 2015).  I view threat as 
most effective when it is tempered with opportunity appeals, and vice versa.  Thus, I focus on the 
important effect of coupling threat and opportunity appeals on one’s political behavior.  
 In this experiment, I focus on policy appeals, although one could easily imagine threat and 
opportunity cues outside the realm of proposed policies.  More specifically, subjects are presented with 
an appeal designed to threaten, an optimistic appeal, as well as simultaneously exposed to both threat 
and opportunity appeals.  As such, opportunity appeals consist of future policy goals consistent 
with one’s interests.  Instead of potentially exacerbating feelings of helplessness while only 
emphasizing a sense of urgency (or policy threat), combining these messages with more 
opportunity-based policy alternatives may represent an improved strategy to mobilize, rather 
than demoralize, politically salient groups.  
This study relies on a convenience sample collected on the Internet by the polling firm, 
Latino Decisions.  The field date of the survey was May 21, 2016 through June 1, 2016. The 
sample consists of 1,015 Latino adults in the U.S., including 511 women and 504 men.21 Sixty-
three percent of the sample was born in the U.S.  Sample quotas were collected based on loose 
                                                
21 The overall survey length averaged nineteen minutes. Fourteen outliers were dropped based on spending 
less than four minutes on the overall survey, as well as based on spending over ten times the average length on either 
the overall survey or experimental treatment screens. These outliers may have consisted of those who were 
distracted and spent lots of time away from the survey screen. Thus, the analyses are restricted to 1,001 cases, 
including 496 women and 505 men.  
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benchmarks of nativity, generation status, Latino subgroup ethnic origin, age, gender, income and 
census region from the U.S. Census 2010 and American Community Survey (2014). 
Before delving into additional details, I compare my sample’s demographics to that of known 




Table 3.1: Experiment Sample Distribution and National Demographic Benchmarks 




Survey 2014 (%) 
Gender   
Female  50 49 
Male 50 51 
Median Age 32 28 
Immigrant Generation   
First Generation 36 37 
Second Generation 36 30 
Third Generation+ 28 33 
Educational Attainment   
Less than a high school diploma 8 20 
High school diploma or equivalent 24 15 
Some College 40 12 
Bachelor's degree or more 29 7 
Household Income (ACS categories in 
parentheses) 
  
under $16,999 (ACS: under $14,999) 15 17 
$17,000-$34,999 (ACS: $15,000-$34,999) 26 30 
$35,000-$69,000 (ACS: $35,000-$74,999) 34 33 
$70,000-$119,000 (ACS: $75,000-$99,000) 18 9 
$120,000 or more (ACS: $100,000 or more) 7 12 
Census Region   
Northeast 17 3 
Midwest 8 9 
South 36 36 
West 39 52 
National Group Origins   
Mexican 44 63 
Puerto Rican 11 9 
Cuban 6 4 
Other 39 24 
Partisanship (with leaners being probed)   
Democrats 57 52 
Independents 12 20 
Republicans 27 23 
 
Notes: With the exception of age being reported as a median, the figures above are based on 
percentages. The sample demographics from my original experiment are based on 1,015 Latino 
adult respondents gathered through Latino Decisions. The final column includes figures from the 
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American Community Survey 2014, though the national partisanship figures are based on a 
recent USA Today/Gallup (from April 16-May 31, 2016), and they are not excluded to those 
who are registered to vote. 
 
 
To highlight a few of the differences, the American Community Survey in 2014 provides 
the following demographic benchmarks for Latinos: 49 percent female and median age of 28.  
My sample of 1,015 Latino adults consisted of similar gender and age breakdowns.  My sample 
contained 50 percent female and an overall median age of 32.  It is also worth noting I had a 
more highly educated sample.  In terms of national group origins, my sample underrepresents 
Latinos of Mexican origin.  My sample had slightly fewer independents and non-partisans than 
known estimates provided in Table 3.1. 
If an experimental subject did not meet the age and Latino ethnic origin screener 
requirements on the first two questions of the survey, they were sent to a closing message and 
were not allowed to complete the entire survey.  The survey firm compensated respondents with 
redeemable points, or the equivalent of one movie ticket or a $10 iTunes gift card. Participants 
took the survey in the privacy of their own home at their leisure.  The survey length in English is 
approximately sixteen minutes long, while in Spanish it is approximately seventeen minutes long 
(Spanish language surveys traditionally take longer to read than English translations).  
 
 Treatments: 
My experimental treatments consist of three versions of an online action alert from the same 
immigrant advocacy organization.  The reputed source of the action alert is from Reform Immigration 
for America. According to their website, this organization is “the online component of a united national 
coalition that brings together individuals and grassroots organizations with the mission to build 
widespread support for workable, humane and comprehensive immigration reform” (Reform 
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Immigration for America 2016). Participants were randomized to a Control Condition, a Threat 
Condition, an Opportunity Condition, and a fourth condition that includes both threat and 
opportunity-based cues, referred to as the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition.  Subjects 
assigned to the non-political Control Condition read an article about smartphone messaging 
applications that was the same length as the single cue messages.  All three experimental treatments 
consist of a realistic action alert regarding a U.S. Senate immigration proposal that participants 
are told will be voted on within the week.  By manipulating the content of the proposed Senate 
bill(s) and its corresponding photograph, the treatments will consist of a call to action that has 
either 1) threat-only, 2) opportunity-only, or 3) a combination of the threat-and-opportunity cues. 
Screenshots of the treatment messages, including the Control Condition, are available in 
Appendix A.22  The Threat condition refers to a policy proposal that suggests eliminating the 
birthright citizenship of children born to undocumented immigrant parents.  The Opportunity 
Condition references a policy proposal that would provide a pathway to citizenship for 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S.  A detailed description of each of the conditions can be 
found in Table 3.2, with differences across the 3 action alert treatments highlighted in bold text.  
                                                
22 The juxtaposed use of photographs and verbal text can enhance the memory and comprehension of the 
verbal information to achieve the message’s effect (Abraham and Appiah 2006; Abraham 2003; Paivio 1986; 
Burgoon 1985; Hutchings, Walton, Mickey and Jardina, 2011).  I conducted intercoder reliability tests with seven 
adult respondents from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk from October 15 through October 18 of 2015.  They coded eight 
different photographs I found through Google images search.  Coders described the photographs in an open-ended 
question, as well as six measures regarding their affective responses, the subjects’, race, ages, gender and social 
groupings. Coders also provided their affective responses and described the threat/opportunity policy content 
without accompanying images. Finally, the policy content reading ease for each of the experimental vignettes is 
accessible at a 6th grade reading level, according to readability software online (https://readability-score.com/).  
More extensive pre-testing of the treatments were gathered with a snowball sample of 221 respondents in February 




Table 3.2: Description of Survey Experiment Randomized Action Alerts  
Description Threat Opportunity Coupled Message 
Headline "Warning! Ending 
birthright citizenship 
is the wrong move!" 
"Our time is now! A 
pathway to 
citizenship is the 
best move!" 
"Warning! Ending birthright 




"This week the Senate 
is going to vote on a 
bill to end the U.S.-
citizenship for 
children born of 
immigrant parents 
who do not have legal 
U.S. status. Before it is 
too late, let your 
Senators know that 
ending birthright 
citizenship would be an 
attack for American 
and immigrant 
families everywhere!" 
"This week the 
Senate is going to 
vote on a bill to 
provide a pathway 
to citizenship for 
immigrants living in 
the U.S. without 
legal status. Before it 
is too late, let your 
Senators know that 
providing a 
pathway to 
citizenship would be 




"This week the Senate is going 
to vote on a bill to end the 
U.S.-citizenship for children 
born of immigrant parents 
who do not have legal U.S. 
status. Let your Senators know 
that ending birthright 
citizenship would be an attack 




  "…Meanwhile, another bill 
in the Senate provides a 
pathway to citizenship for 
immigrants who are living in 
the U.S. without legal status. 
Before it is too late, let your 
Senators know that providing 
a pathway to citizenship for 
these immigrants would be a 





"Let’s take action 
today!" 
"Let’s take action 
today!" 
"Our time is now! Providing a 
pathway to citizenship is the 
best move!   
 
Let’s take action on both of 
these bills today!" 
Photograph 
Descriptions 
Two identical images of 
a scared and crying 
little girl. She is 
standing in the middle 
of a line in a detention 
center with her mother. 
There is a small 
American flag hanging 
out of mother's 
backpack. 
Two identical images 
of a happy and 
smiling little girl. She 
is standing in a 
naturalization 
ceremony celebration 
with mother. Mother 
and daughter are 
holding a small 
American flag. 
Two images: One copy of the 
frightened girl and one copy of 
the happy little girl from the 





The differences across the three treatments begin with the headlines, as shown in the first 
row of Table 3.2. In the Threat Condition, people are alerted to the urgency of the proposal 
attempting to revoke the birthright citizenship status of children born to undocumented 
immigrant parents.  This policy proposal is not far from reality as there have been such bills 
introduced to every U.S. Congress since 1993 and there have already been attempts to revoke 
birthright citizenship in Arizona and Texas through legislation or administrative rulings (Van 
Susteren 2011; Jacobson 2010; Feere 2010); furthermore, then-candidate Donald Trump had 
been very vocal about revoking birthright citizenship on the campaign trail (Connelly 2015).  By 
and large, the organization behind the action alert is acting as a whistleblower in this scenario, 
pointing to a policy most Latino communities would perceive as unfavorable to immigrants.   
The Opportunity Condition also refers to matters of citizenship. The Opportunity 
Condition is centered on passing reform that includes a pathway to citizenship, an issue 
immigrant advocates and the Latino community have favored for the last decade, ranging from 
86 percent approval in 2006 to 77 percent among Latino voters in 2015 (Jones 2015).  The 
Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity approach provides language from the single-cue Threat and 
Opportunity conditions so that respondents learn about the attempt to revoke birthright 
citizenship and the bill aimed at providing a pathway to citizenship.  Each of the treatments 
ended with a general call to action. 
 
 Dependent Variables: 
Political participation was measured with three items: the likelihood of participating in a march, 
talking about politics with friends or family, and volunteering time with a political interest group.  
These outcomes are 5-level categorical variables ranging from 0 (“not at all likely”) to 1 (“extremely 
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likely”).  Respondents were asked “If given the opportunity to do so, we would like to know whether 
you are extremely likely, very likely, moderately likely, slightly likely or not at all likely to take part in 
any of the following three activities to express your opinion about immigration policies.”  Because the 
march, talk and volunteer items were on the same question prompt, I combined these into an overall 
participation scale ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning they were “extremely likely” to take part in all 
three non-electoral forms of political behavior. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Cronbach’s 
alpha was .85 for all three items. Thus, I combined all three behaviors into a 3-item participation scale, 
resulting in a mean of .387.  The distribution of these individual measures include 21 percent saying 
they are “extremely likely” or “very likely” to join a protest, 36 percent expressing they are “extremely 
likely” or “very likely” to talk about politics with their friends or family, and 22 percent suggesting 
they are “extremely likely” or “very likely” to volunteer for an interest group.  The intent to march 
variable had a mean of .324, the talking about politics measure had a mean of .481, and the 
volunteering with an interest group measure had a mean of .355.   
Furthermore, I also provide analyses for intended electoral political behavior.  Among 
respondents who said they were registered to vote or planned on registering to vote (n=789), they were 
then asked about how likely they were to vote in the general election in November.  This 5-level 
categorical variable was recoded from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning “extremely likely” and 0 meaning “not at 
all likely.”  The distribution of my vote variable consists of 62 percent of the sample saying they are 
“extremely likely” to vote in the November election, while nearly 17 percent reported being 
“somewhat” or “not at all likely” to vote.  This outcome measure had a mean of .84, admittedly quite 
high. 
Finally, instead of only relying on intended forms of political participation, I incorporate an 
observed measure of behavior, including sending an anonymous electronic postcard to the U.S. 
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Senators of their state (1 meaning they “sent any postcard message,” 0 meaning they “did not send any 
postcard message”).   This measure was asked after the intent to participate items.  All respondents had 
the option to urge their U.S. Senators to cast an affirmative or opposing vote on either or both of the 
following immigration proposals: 1.) ending birthright citizenship for children born of immigrant 
parents who do not have legal U.S. status, and/or 2.) providing a pathway to citizenship for immigrants 
living in the U.S. without legal status.  Subjects also had the option to write their own message about 
immigration reform.  Lastly, subjects were also given the option to select “I do not want to send any 
message.” Unless respondents chose to send no message, they could select up to two preset message 
options (and/or write their own).  Sixty-four percent of the sample opted to send a postcard, while 
nearly 36 percent chose not to send any message. 
As opposed to my analyses of the intended forms of political participation, the observed 
postcard measure is potentially less vulnerable to one overestimating how willing they are to 
engage in politics. Furthermore, given that this was an Internet survey experiment, there is much 
less social pressure on this platform than there would be with a classroom laboratory experiment 
where the investigators are present (Merolla et al. 2012; see discussion of this difference in social 
pressures in Morton and Williams 2010).  When it comes to analyzing actual forms of political 
engagement, this postcard measure is part of a broader and newer range of online political 
behaviors (Valentino et al. 2011; Merolla, Pantoja, Cargile and Mora 2012), particularly one 
moving beyond more conservative forms of behavior (e.g. information gathering seen in 
previous studies)(Gibson, Lusoli and Ward, 2005; Brader 2005, 2011; Valentino, Hutchings, 
Banks and Davis 2008; Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot and White 2006). This actual form of 
participation allowed participants to send either an anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant message (or 
both) to their U.S. senators, which is an improvement from previous studies that have only 
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captured one-sided forms of political activism (Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004).  Finally, 
participants were able to write their own message if they wanted to go into more detail about 
their views. Again, the survey was available in English and Spanish, so my sample was able to 
write their messages in their preferred language.23 
 
 Manipulation Checks: 
Finally, though I did not rely on treatment messages that were self-generated among my 
participants, I protect the internal validity of my treatment randomization through the use of a 
manipulation check measure. I include a cognitive manipulation check of the treatment 
messages. Figure 3.1 below provides the predicted probabilities of perceiving threat and 
opportunity estimated by the treatment messages (for the model’s full results, refer to Appendix 
B Table B-1). The manipulation check measure asks the following question immediately after 
the randomized treatments: “Do you think current immigration proposals will make the lives for 
unauthorized immigrants currently living in the U.S. easier or harder?” The 6-category options 
range from 0 meaning the current immigration proposals would make life a “great deal easier” 
for unauthorized immigrants, and “1” meaning current immigration proposals would make life “a 
great deal harder” for unauthorized immigrants. To avoid acquiescence bias in the responses, the 
response options randomly appeared in forward- and reverse-ordering.  In fact, this was the case 
for all the variables in the survey. The results are consistent whether this measure is recoded as 
the original 7-category measure, including those in the middle of the scale who reported “neither 
                                                
23 So as to manage the scope of the project, the 96 open-ended postcard messages are currently not included 
in the empirical chapters of this dissertation. As part of an extension of this dissertation manuscript, I plan on hiring 
bilingual research assistants to generate intercoder reliability of the postcard messages and delve into deeper 
analyses for my book project.    
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harder nor easier.” This middle category was dropped as ambivalent cases.24 The aim of the 
manipulation check is to determine whether participants in fact perceived a policy threat to 
undocumented immigrants in the “Threatening Condition” and if they perceived a policy goal 
aimed at improving the state of affairs for undocumented immigrants in the “Opportunity 
Message.” Finally, the Coupled Condition contains signals of both threat and opportunity 
elements, and as such, we see that the participants perceived this message to be somewhere in 
between the scale range.  It is also important to note that based on additional robustness checks, 
the participation and postcard model results reported in this chapter and in the next chapter still 
hold when accounting for this cognitive manipulation check (Appendix Table B-2).  
Figure 3.1: Predicted Probabilities of the Perception that Policy Proposal Will Make Lives 
of Unauthorized Immigrants Easier or Harder by Treatments 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are derived from OLS regression estimates from Model 2 of 
Appendix Table B-1 (n=1,001). Predicted Probabilities based on the 6-category measure of the 
cognitive perception of threat and opportunity, ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning current 
                                                
24 Those in the middle of the scale (“neither”) of the 7-category measure could be considered cognitively 
ambivalent (Model 1). Thus, the outcome measure in Model 2 (and 3) of Appendix Table B-1 excludes these cases 
from the ambivalent category and results in a sample size of 756. The predicted probabilities are not substantively 
different whether based on the 7-category (Model 1, n=1,001) or the 6-category cognitive perception measure 






















































proposals will make life a great harder for undocumented immigrants and 0 meaning currents 
proposals will make life a great deal easier for undocumented immigrants. Relative to the non-
political control condition, all probabilities are based on the following p-values using a two-
tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. +Signifies the predicted probabilities that are 
statistically distinguishable from the threat condition at the p<.01 level (Model 3).  
 
 
Based on the predicted probabilities in Figure 3.1, the intended policy signals associated 
with each treatment message were consistent with what participants reported. Relative to those in 
the non-political Control Condition, those in the Threat Condition reported that the lives of 
undocumented immigrants would be made harder (by 12 percentage points) with the current 
immigration proposals. As suspected, those in the Opportunity Condition reported lower 
probabilities of seeing things get worse for undocumented immigrants (by 22 percentage points). 
Finally, those in the Coupled Condition said that life would fare somewhere in the middle, 
neither entirely making life harder, nor making life entirely easier.   
As expected, and relative to those in the Control Condition, subjects in the Threat 
Condition reported greater rates of perceived threat levels (Appendix Table B-1, Model 1, b = 
.092, p-value = 0.000) and those in the Opportunity Condition were substantially less likely to 
report perceived threat levels (Appendix Table B-1, Model 1, b = -.172, p-value = 0.000) and 
more likely to report greater opportunities for undocumented immigrants. Those in the Coupled 
Threat-and-Opportunity Condition landed in the middle on this spectrum (Appendix Table B-1, 
Model 1, b = -.003, p-value = .912), though indicating perceptions of threat and opportunity for 
those in this combined approach were not statistically distinguishable from those in the Control 
Condition. Because I know that the treatment messages triggered the policy signal they were 
intended for, I am confident that the coupled threat-and-opportunity, in effect signals of peril and 
promise, catalyzed greater rates of political engagement among my participants.  
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The appraisal process of threat and opportunity has often involved various reactions, 
including cognitive and affective stages of processing (Folkman and Lazarus 1980; Lazarus and 
Folkman 1984; Folkman et al. 1986; Lazarus 1991). People respond with fear when they 
confront threats that are either difficult to control or it is not clear how to address them.  In this 
study, hope is the desire and expectation for a promising or appeasing policy goal to materialize 
in the future (Phoenix 2015; Just, Crigler and Belt 2007). Thus, it is also worth pointing to an 
additional manipulation check I added to the survey instrument. Immediately after being 
randomized the experimental treatment screen (just before the cognitive perception item), 
subjects were asked about their affective responses to the treatments.25 Perhaps due to not having 
a larger sample, and the fact that the treatment screens were not designed to tap the emotional 
causal mechanism of one’s responses to the treatments, there is only one statistically 
distinguishable result that emerged from the analyses of the emotion manipulation check: the 
threat condition was negatively correlated with feeling hopeful (Appendix Table B-3, b = -.068, 
p = .035).26 The emotions were coded from 0 to 1 (1 = a great deal, .5 = a moderate amount, 0 = 
not at all).  There are ways to design a randomized treatment so as to trigger the intended 
emotions. This separate treatment design is being implemented in a current extension of the 
project in a new survey experiment with YouGov (funded by the National Science Foundation). 
Again, the aim in this survey experiment was to first establish the causal effect between policy 
messages (involving threat and opportunities) and one’s motivation to take political action. 
                                                
25 The exact question read: “What kind of emotional response did you have, if any, based on what you read 
or saw in the previous screen? For each of the 10 emotions shown below, do you feel that emotion a great deal, a lot, 
a moderate amount, a little or not at all?” The 10 emotions included were: anxious, proud, angry, hopeful, afraid, 
excited, happy, sad, uneasy and hopeless. The order of the emotions was randomized and the participants saw one 
emotion at a time. 
26 When it comes to the potential mediating effects of fear and hope in the appraisal process of threat and 
opportunity, I included these measures in Appendix Table B-4 to test whether my participation outcomes still 
remained significant. In fact, I find the results remain consistent upon controlling for both cognitive and affective 




 My primary hypothesis involves the variation in participatory behavior across 
experimental conditions, relative to non-political appeals.  Thus, my primary independent 
variables are the three experimental treatment conditions.  Given the continuous nature of my 
dependent variables of political behavior, I rely on ordinary least squares regression models.  The 
observable sent postcard outcome a dichotomous measure, so I rely on logistic regression 
analyses for this behavior.  Specifically, I explore the following question in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 
3.5: does the combination of policy threat and policy opportunity lead to greater mobilization 
rates than being exposed to non-political appeals?  Secondly, I determine whether the 
combination of threat and opportunity cues would yield greater observed participation rates 
relative to the single-cue conditions for the postcard outcome (seen in additional models of Table 
3.5).  This approach allows me to discern with greater precision whether any observed effects are 
as a result of the combination of threat and opportunity or simply any appeal other than the 
Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity approach.  To dispel beliefs that the differences in the 
distribution of sociopolitical variables across the cells might account for the results, I also 
estimate my models with controls for education, income, age, immigrant generation status and 
partisanship, which yield slightly stronger results for the main effects models.  All these control 
variables were coded from 0 to 1.27   
                                                
27 Results with the control variables are available in Appendix Tables B-5 through B-7. 
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Table 3.3: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms 
of Political Participation 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 

















0.046 0.037 0.030 0.038 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) 
Opportunity 
Condition 
0.011 0.018 0.001 0.010 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Coupled 
Condition 
0.051* 0.068** 0.027 0.049* 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) 
Constant 0.297*** 0.449*** 0.340*** 0.362*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as 
follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold 
after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables gender, education, income, age, 
immigrant generation status and partisanship measures as controls. These additional models are 
available upon request. 
 
 
As anticipated in Hypothesis 1, Table 3.3’s results suggest the Coupled Threat-and-
Opportunity Condition mobilizes participants at greater rates than the non-political Control 
Condition.  This is the only treatment with an effect that is statistically distinguishable from the 
baseline.  The mobilizing effect of the Coupled Condition is particularly apparent for the intent 
to join a march and talk about politics with friends or family.  The Coupled Threat-and-
Opportunity Condition’s coefficient translates to a 5 percent increase for joining a march relative 
to those exposed to the Control message (p = .100).  Moreover, in terms of talking about politics 
with friends or family, the Coupled Condition’s coefficient translates to a 7 percent increase (p = 
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.050) compared to those in the Control Condition.  These results are modest, but significant.  
There are no reliable mobilizing effects that emerge when predicting one’s intent to volunteer for 
an organization, as the treatment estimates fail to reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  In the final column (Model 4), I present results for the participation scale (which 
combines the marching, talking and volunteering outcomes), and here we see the positive effect 
of the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition still holds.  Thus, relative to the Control 
Condition, the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition yields greater participation rates 
among subjects.  While we also see that the effects of the single cue treatments of Threat and 
Opportunity alone are substantively positive in Table 3.3, these results do not reach statistical 
significance.  I thought the effect of the Threat Condition would have been positively correlated 
with at least talking about politics (Hypothesis 4), but Model 2 indicates this effect is not 
statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Results in Table 3.3 provide the first direct evidence that highlighting both the threat and 
opportunity cues can foster greater levels of political participation relative to those in the non-
political Control Condition, supporting Hypothesis 1.  Expanding on findings from sociology and 
psychology work, this conclusion is consistent with the implications of Vasi and Macy (2003) 
and Rogers and Mewborn (1976) and suggests that providing a promising goal with the urgent 
threat of a potential loss motivates respondents to take action.  Although not shown in Table 3.3, 
the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition also appears to have a positive effect on talking 
about politics when the referent category is the single-cue Opportunity Condition (b = .049, p = 
.100).28  This finding partially supports Hypothesis 2, where I expected the Coupled Condition to 
be more mobilizing than the single cue conditions.  
                                                
28 Results available in Appendix Table B-8. 
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Table 3.4: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Electoral Form of 
Political Participation – Intent to Vote in Upcoming General Election 
 Model 1 
 
Intent to Vote 


















Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as 
follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. The Intent to Vote 
outcome was limited to those who reported being registered vote or intending to register, and it 
did not include those who said they were ineligible to register to vote or who said they did not 
plan to register.  Results do not vary when controlling for gender, education, income, age, 
immigrant generation status and partisanship measures as controls.  
 
 
In Table 3.4, I focus on electoral political behavior, specifically the likelihood of turning 
out to vote.  Much like conventional wisdom might expect (Miller et al. 2002), the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for the Opportunity Condition suggests that cues of this sort 
actually inhibit political action (Kahneman and Tversky 1976; Latané 1981).  People in the 
Opportunity Condition indicate an intention to vote in the upcoming general election at about 5 
percent lower rates than comparable study participants in the Control Condition.  This finding 
supports Hypothesis 5, where I expected lone opportunity cues to discourage participation.  This 
is the only treatment with an effect that is statistically distinguishable from zero.  I expected the 
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Coupled Condition to have a positive effect on the likelihood to vote, but results reported in 
Table 3.4 do not support this hypothesis. 
Table 3.5: Logit Models, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Sent Postcard 
















0.041 - 0.072 
 (0.185) - (0.184) 
Opportunity 
Condition 
-0.031 -0.072 - 
 (0.184) (0.184) - 
Coupled 
Condition 
0.442** 0.401** 0.473** 
 (0.192) (0.192) (0.191) 
Control 
Condition 
- -0.041 0.031 
 - (0.185) (0.184) 
Constant 0.483*** 0.52*** 0.452*** 
 (0.130) (0.13) (0.129) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 1,001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as 
follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold 
after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables gender, education, income, age, 
immigrant generation status and partisanship measures as controls. 
 
 
Finally, instead of only relying on intended measures of political participation as seen in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I turn to an observed measure of political behavior in Table 3.5.  In some 
respects, this is the toughest test for my argument as an intention to participate might represent 
“cheap talk,” but an actual measure of participation might represent a more genuine indicator of 
the concept I have chosen to study.  Whether I compare the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity 
Condition to the non-political Control Condition or to the Threat Condition, we see that the 
combined approach has a positive effect on one’s willingness to send a postcard to their U.S. 
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Senators.  Model 1 is consistent with my expectations in Hypothesis 1, and so far provides the 
strongest support that the coupled approach is yielding greater rates of observed political action.  
Most interestingly, that the effect of this condition is also decidedly different from either the 
Threat (Model 2) or Opportunity Conditions (Model 3), as expected in Hypothesis 2.  Upon 
computing the odds-ratio of the reported logistic coefficients in Table 3.5, I find that the odds of 
sending a postcard are 1.555 times greater for those in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity 
Condition relative to those in the Control Condition.  The substantive impact of this condition is 
of comparable size when the Threat Condition is the baseline.  In Model 3, I find consistent 
results when the Opportunity Condition is the baseline.  The Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity 
Condition generates 1.604 times greater odds of sending a postcard relative to those in the 
Opportunity Condition.  This is consistent with my expectations in Hypotheses 1 and 2, the 
Coupled Condition was more mobilizing relative to the control or single-cue messaging 
strategies.  
To more easily interpret the results from Table 3.5, Figure 3.2 provides the predicted 
probabilities based on the logit coefficient estimates. As we can see, relative to the control (or 
other single cue conditions), the coupled threat-and-opportunity messages boost the probability 
of having sent a postcard by approximately 10 percentage points. This effect is significant at the 
.05 level, a pattern that was consistent whether the referent category was the non-political control 
condition or if it was either of the single cue conditions.  In fact, we see that the threat and 
opportunity conditions on their own are not statistically distinguishable from the non-political 
control conditions. Thus, the effect of the single message approach is flat and neither mobilizing 
or demobilizing for participants when it comes to sending a postcard. The single cue messages of 
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threat and opportunity alone are ineffective in spurring this form of political participation 
(Hypothesis 3). 
Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Sending a Postcard by Treatment 
 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities are derived from logit estimates from Table 3.5 (n=1,001). The 
referent category is the non-political control condition. Relative to the non-political control 
condition, all probabilities are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. +Signifies that the predicted probabilities are statistically 
distinguishable from the threat condition (Model 3).   
 
When it comes to understanding those who sent a postcard, we recall that participants 
also had the option to write their own message. In fact, 96 participants wrote their own message 
(nearly 15 percent of those who sent a message). Some of the messages people wrote on their 
own emphasized the importance of embracing America’s diversity and highlight the 
deservingness of immigrants and their children.  For instance, one participant’s comments 
summarize this best. 
“This country is the great melting pot, where for centuries folks have come to work hard, 
raise their families, and live a better life with endless opportunities. Let us always 
remember the words of MLK.....if one of us is oppressed, then we are [all oppressed].” 
 

































This participant was exposed to the threat message, which focused on revoking the 
birthright citizenship of children of undocumented immigrant parents. Thus, reading about this 
policy proposal invoked feelings of righteousness and social justice in them. Instead of feeling 
solely disillusioned or fearful, the participant focused on the diversity behind the American 
“melting pot” and how through hard work, folks have the chance to raise their families in a better 
life. To emphasize that there is injustice or a wrong that needs to be rectified, the participant goes 
so far as to share a quote from Martin Luther King, Jr.  Other participants provide shorter 
messages that speak to the deservingness and warmth with which immigrants should experience 
in the U.S.: “Children have the right to have the American citizenship” and “immigrants need 
some help to stay in [the] USA.” So, by emphasizing a paired policy message, one with hope and 
threat, we are harnessing the potential for all participations to feel empowered or as though there 
will be some relief for the situation of undocumented immigrants. This is critical, especially as 
threatened individuals who only perceive the potential for loss, may think they have very little to 
gain from their efforts; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as 
well as loss, and are more eager to accomplish the task in front of them. 
Discussion 
Overall, my findings provide strong support for my argument regarding the mobilizing 
effects of the combined threat and opportunity appeals among Latinos. Unlike the threat or 
opportunity strategies alone, when both approaches are adopted I found that Latinos in my 
sample were more likely to engage in non-electoral forms of participation and were more likely 
to contact their elected representatives through the use of a postcard.  With respect to sending a 
postcard to one’s senators, I found that the coupled strategy was effective relative to a non-
political control group and relative to the threat and opportunity appeals alone.  I suspect that my 
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mobilizing messages had the strongest effects in the intent to participate and postcard models 
because the treatment messages ended with an immediate call to action.  These participation 
measures allow respondents to express more immediate action, whereas the intent to vote in the 
general election measure consisted of a type of activity that was still about five months away at 
that point (data was collected in June of 2016).  Furthermore, people may not have been inclined 
to express a desire to vote because they realize that a president cannot create immigration reform, 
it has to be handled legislatively through Congress and state politics (Planas 2016).   
The Coupled Condition is intended to challenge individuals to take action by conveying 
the possibility of gain and loss, a perspective Tomaka et al. (1993) find most helpful as people 
encounter a threat or stressor in their environment.  Threatened individuals who only perceive 
the potential for loss, may think they have very little to gain for their efforts; contrastingly, 
challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as loss, and are more eager to 
accomplish the goal at hand.  When sufficient resources are present (perceived or real), the 
stressor in one’s environment becomes a challenge with the possibility of gains and benefits, 
instead of solely a danger or risk confronting them as seen in the threat-only condition (Tomaka 
et al. 1993; Pang et al. 2007).   
A potential alternative explanation of my findings is that the Coupled Threat-and-
Opportunity Condition might be more mobilizing because it is providing more information for 
participants to learn from.  However, we know through Lupia’s (1994) work that more 
information is more cognitively taxing for individuals.  As busy as people are, more information 
should turn them away from politics, and not towards it (Lupia 1994).  The Coupled Threat-and-
Opportunity Condition has approximately 60 more words than those seen in the single-cue 
treatments.  As such, the time spent reading the Coupled Condition was only approximately nine 
 
 74 
seconds longer than the time it took to read the other two single cue treatments.  It is also worth 
mentioning the Control Condition consisted of 66 words, while the Threat condition had sixty-
three and the Opportunity Condition had 67 (as seen in the transcript provided Table 3.1).  Upon 
analyzing whether differences in time carry weight, I found the time spent on each treatment 
screen does not have a statistically significant effect on one’s overall survey length.  Finally, 
another potential alternative explanation is that the Coupled Condition provided people with two issues 
to become impassioned about, and it may not necessarily be a sense of threat and opportunity working 
hand-in-hand.  As an extension of the current project, I am currently designing a separate survey 
experiment to test this alternative hypothesis. In this extension project, the threat-only and opportunity-
only messages would have two immigration policy issues in each, which would then match the length 
and number of issues presented in the coupled treatment message.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I questioned the causal link between threat and individual mobilization, 
and whether threat is the only catalyst Latinos respond to.  Again, the policy threat mentions a 
proposal that wants to revoke the birthright citizenship of undocumented immigrants, while the 
policy opportunity refers to providing a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. 
The coupled approach refers to both proposal initiatives, which both involve the topic of 
citizenship. The motivating effects behind a coupled threat and opportunity approach center on 
the expectation the urgency provoked by the political threat to boost greater attentiveness, and 
yet this anxiety does not veer into despair because the promising signals of a political 
opportunity provide encouragement and hope. This is captured through the cognitive 
manipulation check, which accounts for the risks posed by the policy threat as well as the 
glimmer of improving conditions posed by the policy opportunity.   
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My results shed further light into the nuance of policy threat and policy opportunity 
messages and the ways in which they work hand in hand in people’s environments.  Specifically, 
previous work has not directly examined whether threatening anti-immigrant appeals lead to 
greater levels of political participation among Latino participants.  Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, I find messages focusing solely on such threats do not always mobilize Latinos into 
action.  This narrow focus on threat has also prevented scholars from delving into the more 
complex messaging environment people are exposed to when facing threats in their environment, 
especially for a highly contested topic area like immigration policy.  As is, researchers have not 
explored whether additional messages, such as competing policy opportunities, might provide 
alternative explanations for observed levels of activism.  In part, previous scholars have largely 
expected competing messages (such as gains and policy opportunities) tend to foster free-riding 
behavior among the masses (Latané 1981; Olson 1965; Miller and Krosnick 2004).  The focus on 
the catalyzing effect of threat, particularly dominant in the Latino “sleeping giant” narrative in 
the 1990s and 2006, has been one-sided—often ignoring the demobilizing or ineffective 
mobilizing effect of this appeal.  We know the role of threat is complex, but what this project 
shows is that it is not the only way to bolster political participation.  Instead, we see that coupling 
a sense of peril with promise evokes a more participatory public, at least among Latinos 
regarding the immigration policy debate.   
Consistent with the work of Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976), 
simply exposing Latinos to a looming crisis without a reassuring policy alternative can be 
counterproductive.  The coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is more mobilizing because I 
argue that individuals who feel challenged, and not only threatened, are less distracted by the 
negativity stirred by the threat message (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; 
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Tomaka et al. 1993).  I have some indirect evidence for this, as the cognitive manipulation check 
demonstrates that subjects are less pessimistic about the future well-being of unauthorized 
immigrants in the Coupled Condition – even though they receive the identical message as in the 
Threatened Condition.  That is, without an incentive such as the benefits posed by a policy 
opportunity, threatened individuals who only perceive danger have little, if anything, to gain 
from their efforts (Tomaka et al. 1993).  The experiment results point to a positive association 
between the Coupled Condition and the intent to participate in various non-electoral forms of 
participation (march, talk and volunteer). I find the coupled strategy of threat and opportunity 
encourages people to send a postcard at higher rates than simply using lone messages 
emphasizing threat or opportunity appeals.  This observed political behavior provides the most 
striking results, as it moves away from speculating about potential or intended behavior.  
Finding ways to promote political participation is very important in the health of a 
democracy.  Political participation is central to healthy democracies because it is indicative of an 
engaged citizenry (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The less that people are involved, the 
less likely they are to hold favorable evaluations of the responsiveness of the political process 









Who is More Mobilized? Explaining Conditional Effects by Gender 
 
In Chapter 3, my survey experiment allowed me to test hypotheses on the main effects for 
each of my treatment groups.  One of my major findings is that, relative to a non-political appeal, 
a message combining elements of threat and opportunity is most effective at encouraging various 
forms of reported political participation, such as the intent to participate in protest marches and 
talk about politics with their friends or family. This finding expands the realm of possibilities of 
mobilizing messages, and points to the notion that threat appeals are not the only factors 
motivating one’s political behavior.  Another major finding in my experiment is that the coupled 
message spurred greater levels of observed political behavior—sending a postcard with their 
immigration opinion to their U.S. Senators—, arguably a much tougher test of my hypotheses as 
it moves beyond the intended, or speculative, forms of political behavior.  For this observed 
measure of participation, I found the coupled threat-and-opportunity message to be more 
mobilizing than the single-cue threat or single-cue opportunity conditions.  This set of findings 
for the coupled approach challenges previous scholars who have relied on the threat as the most 
effective external motivator to explain heightened levels of political participation in a 
contentious political environment.  What has yet to be explored is for whom the coupled message 
is most effective? Upon subsequent analyses of the experimental data, I found these mobilizing 
effects are moderated by gender, with women driving the results behind the coupled message.  In 
this chapter, I explore this surprising finding and explain the moderated effects for gender. Some 
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of the questions guiding this chapter are: why would we expect women to respond differently to 
the coupled threat-and-opportunity message? Do women assess risks and opportunities 
differently and, therefore, turn to alternative coping strategies than their male counterparts? What 
would lead us to believe that women respond differently to various messaging strategies? Given 
differences in the rate at which Latino men and women acculturate in the U.S., are Latino 
women generally advantaged or disadvantaged when it comes to navigating the U.S. political 
system? 
The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section provides my experiment’s 
results and discussion of the analyses. I then proceed to a theoretical background to grasp a better 
understanding of the ways in which gender shapes one’s stress appraisal and coping strategies.  
Lastly, I provide an overview of the socialization and acculturation differences that explain 
varying levels in political engagement patterns among Latinos more broadly. 
Methods and Procedure: 
 
As described in the previous chapter, this study relies on a convenience sample collected 
on the Internet by the polling firm, Latino Decisions.  The sample consists of 1,015 Latino adults 
in the U.S., including 511 women and 504 men. To test the moderating effect of gender across 
my treatment conditions, I create an interaction term between gender and the experimental 
treatments. Again, gender is coded as a dummy variable with “1” representing females and “0” 
representing males. Each treatment condition is coded as a dummy variable, with “1” being those 
who saw that specified treatment and “0” being “all else.” Due to this interaction term, the 
analyses are conducted with the pooled sample and not in a split-sample design where men and 





To reiterate, my experimental treatments consist of three versions of an online action alert from 
the same immigrant advocacy organization.  Participants were randomized to 1 of 4 screens: a 
Control Condition, a Threat Condition, an Opportunity Condition, or a fourth condition referred 
to as the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition.  Subjects assigned to the non-political Control 
Condition read a non-political summary about Smartphone messaging apps.  All three experimental 
treatments consist of a realistic action alert regarding a U.S. Senate immigration proposal that 
participants are told will be voted on within the week.  By manipulating the content of the 
proposed Senate bill(s) and its corresponding photograph, the treatments will consist of a call to 
action that has either 1) threat-only, 2) opportunity-only, or 3) a combination of the threat-and-
opportunity based cues.  The Threat condition refers to a policy proposal that suggests 
eliminating the birthright citizenship of children born to undocumented immigrant parents.  The 
Opportunity Condition references a policy proposal that would provide a pathway to citizenship 
for undocumented immigrants in the U.S.  A detailed description of each of the conditions can be 
found in Table 3.2, with differences across the action alerts highlighted in bold text.  
Results: 
 
 Political Appeals and Gender 
To better identify the mobilizing effect of the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity message, 
I explore whether single cue and coupled approaches of threat and opportunity messages 
motivate some and not others.  In Table 4.1, the treatments are interacted by gender, allowing me 




Table 4.1: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Participate Scale 
(Baseline = Control) 
Intent to Vote 
(Baseline = Control) 
Sent Postcard 
(Baseline = Control) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.076** -0.097*** -0.871*** 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.267) 
Threat Condition 0.015 -0.064* -0.398 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.266) 
Threat X Gender 0.047 0.079 0.872** 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.374) 
Opportunity 
Condition 
-0.018 -0.099*** -0.388 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.272) 
Opportunity X 
Gender 
0.060 0.100** 0.718* 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.372) 
Coupled Condition -0.010 -0.061* 0.200 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.289) 
Coupled X Gender 0.117** 0.091* 0.512 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.389) 
Constant 0.399*** 0.913*** 0.922*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.194) 
Observations 1,001 789 1,001 
R-squared 0.011 0.016  
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for two-tailed test. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and 
Opportunity = 252. There were 119 women in the Control, 121 in the Coupled Condition, 133 in 
the Threat Condition and 132 in the Coupled Condition. Results still hold after sensitivity tests 
with added demographic variables including gender, education, income, age, immigrant 
generation status and partisanship measures as controls. It is worth noting that postcard outcome 
findings for the coupled condition lose their statistical significance in the fully specified model. 
These additional models are available in Appendix C. 
 
 
We see that the gender coefficient is negative and statistically significant, meaning that in 
the Control Condition, women are less likely to participate across all 3 models relative to their 
male counterparts.  Focusing on Model 1, while estimating one’s intent to participate in various 
forms of non-electoral political behavior, the Coupled Condition’s combined interactive effect is 
statistically significant and remains positive.  Women in the Coupled Condition express greater 
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rates of political participation than men exposed to the same condition.  This message helps 
women minimize the wide gender gap between their rates of participation and that of their male 
counterparts (refer to first two columns of Figure 4.1).  When predicting people’s likelihood to 
vote (see Model 2, Figure 4.2), I find that men are less likely to indicate they will vote.  Gender 
does make a difference, but mostly by allowing women to resist the negative effects that men 
experience in the Coupled Condition.  Interestingly, the gender-by-treatment interaction term for 
the Threat Condition remains positive, but does not reach statistical significance.  The interactive 
effect of the single cue Opportunity Condition cancels out. Some of the findings in Table 4.1 
suggest that the mobilizing effects of this message are driven by women being more motivated to 
participate in social forms of political behavior (Model 1). As seen with the case of intending to 
vote, women are not being demobilized in the Coupled Condition, as with the case of men 
(Model 2). 
When estimating the sent postcard outcome (Model 3), these analyses reveal the single 
cue treatment messages do not have the same mobilizing effect for men and women.  Contrary to 
free-riding and “social loafing” expectations of opportunity messages in the extant literature 
(Miller et al. 2002; Olson 1965; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Latané 1981), the gender-by-
opportunity treatment interaction indicates that the opportunity message is motivating women to 
send a postcard.  Women in the Opportunity Condition have expressed greater predicted 
likelihoods in sending a postcard, at least relative to men in the same condition.  The interactive 
effect of the Opportunity treatment by gender is statistically significant. The interactive effect 
also appears to be positive for the Threat Condition, meaning that for women threat is mobilizing 
them to send a postcard relative to men in the Threat Condition.  Though the single-cue 
conditions appear to be having a substantively demobilizing effect for men, these coefficients are 
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not distinguishable from zero. Furthermore, the interactive effect of gender by the Coupled 
Threat-and-Opportunity Condition does not appear to have a statistically distinguishable effect 
among men and women.  Thus, the effects are in the anticipated direction but they fall short of 
statistical significance.   
To ease interpretation of the moderating effects of gender in my experiment, the results in 
Table 4.1 were converted into predicted probabilities in Figures 4.1-4.3. The first figure depicts 
the predicted probabilities of the participation scale estimates. 




Notes: Predicted probabilities derived from the participation scale regression found in Model 1 of 
Table 4.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 
250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic 
variables including gender, education, income and age as controls. 
 
 
As we examine Figure 4.1, the first pair of bars columns represents the probability of 















































the second set of columns are from subjects in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition.  
In the Control Condition, I find that women are significantly disadvantaged relative to men when 
it comes to non-electoral forms of participation.  This disadvantage amounts to about 8 
percentage points, so it is not trivial (p = .05).  However, as seen in the highlighted Coupled 
Condition in this figure, we find this gender imbalance is not only eliminated, but women are 
slightly more likely (4 percentage points) than men to participate politically.  Interestingly, men 
remain essentially unmoved by the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition.  Thus, the 
positive interactive effect of gender and the Coupled Condition is being driven almost entirely by 
the 9-point increase in participation among women.   




Notes: Predicted probabilities derived from the intent to vote estimates presented in Model 2 of 
Table 4.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 
250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic 
































In Figure 4.2, we see there is an obvious gender gap in likelihood to vote in the non-
political Control Condition (p = .01), but this is quickly eliminated in the Coupled Threat-and-
Opportunity Condition.  The combined approach is static for women and deters men from the 
intent to vote.  In fact, women experience a mild, albeit statistically insignificant, 2-point 
increase in voting, men encounter a 6-point decrease in voting between the Control and Coupled 
Conditions.  This may be due to the difference in coping styles men and women rely on under 
threat and opportunity appraisals (Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1980).  Because 
voting is more of an expressive form of political participation and women tend to be more 
expressive when coping with a stressor in their environment (Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and 
Lazarus 1980), Latino men might not see voting as a solution to their concerns or as a means to 
deal with the stress they encounter in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition.  
Expression and seeking social support are more so the types of coping styles women engage in 
(Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1980).  Men might turn to other forms of political 
behavior, such as lobbying or running for office to resolve the issue at hand, but those outcomes 
were not part of the scope of this study.  The socialization literature on Latinos would suggest 
that men might be deterred from participating because the positive message embedded in the 
Coupled Condition is not enough to dissuade the triggered “oppositional” response associated 
with the threat message in this same condition (Foner 2000; Waters 1999; Lopez 2003).  
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Notes: Predicted probabilities derived from the postcard estimates provided in Model 3 of Table 
4.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and 
Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables 
education, income and age as controls. For the predicted probabilities of all the treatments, see 
Appendix Figure C.1.  
 
Finally, we see in Figure 4.3 that the interactive effect fell short of statistical significance 
in the Coupled Condition for women relative to men, meaning there is no substantial gender 
difference in this treatment—neither men and women experience a mobilizing effect when 
plotting one’s probability of sending a postcard.   
To test whether the gendered findings hold relative to the single cue conditions, I assign 
threat or opportunity alone as the referent category conditions in Table 4.2 (participation scale) 
and Table 4.3 (postcard) below. Table 4.2 focuses on the participation scale measure. The 




































attainment, income, age, generation status, and partisanship (for full results, refer to Appendix 
C). The tables in this chapter are estimated without the control variables. 
Table 4.2: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue 
Message Baselines 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Participation Scale  
(Baseline = Threat) 
Participation Scale  
(Baseline = Opportunity) 
Gender, 1= Female -0.029 -0.016 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
Control Condition  -0.015 0.018 
 (0.036) (0.037) 
Control X Gender -0.047 -0.060 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Opportunity Condition  -0.033 - 
 (0.037) - 
Opportunity X Gender 0.013 - 
 (0.052) - 
Coupled Condition  -0.025 0.008 
 (0.037) (0.038) 
Coupled X Gender 0.071 0.057 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Threat Condition  - 0.033 
 - (0.037) 
Threat X Gender - -0.013 
 - (0.052) 
Constant 0.414*** 0.381*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
As seen in Table 4.2, we do not find evidence of a moderating gender effect in the 
Coupled Condition relative to the single cue treatment conditions.  Thus, the gendered effect 





Table 4.3: Estimating Postcard Sent Logit Models by Treatment and Gender with Single 
Cue Message Baselines 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Sent Postcard Sent Postcard 
 Gender Interactions Gender Interactions 
Gender, 1= Female 0.00 -0.15 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
Control Condition  0.40 0.39 
 (0.27) (0.27) 
Control X Gender -0.87** -0.72* 
 (0.37) (0.37) 
Opportunity Condition  0.01 - 
 (0.26) - 
Opportunity X Gender -0.15 - 
 (0.37) - 
Coupled Condition  0.60** 0.59** 
 (0.28) (0.29) 
Coupled X Gender -0.36 -0.21 
 (0.39) (0.38) 
Threat Condition   -0.01 
  (0.26) 
Threat X Gender  0.15 
  (0.37) 
Constant 0.52*** 0.53*** 
 (0.18) (0.19) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 In Table 4.3 above, we see the logit coefficient estimates for sending a postcard relative 
to the single cue baseline conditions of Threat (Model 1) and Opportunity (Model 2). We see that 
with either of the single cue conditions set as the baselines, the control message has a dampening 
effect on the observed participation rates of sending a postcard among women compared to men 
in the control message. As we can see, the coupled condition still results in a positive effect on 
the reported likelihood at which both men and send an electronic postcard. 
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Interestingly, I find that the effect of the coupled treatment makes women feel 
significantly less afraid, at least relative to men (Appendix Table C.4, Model 2). In that same 
Appendix table, I also find that women are less likely to report they are hopeful (Model 1), but 
this effect is not as significant or as large as that seen when estimating fear. Perhaps women 
report being less fearful because they rely more on their social networks to confront the scenario 
before them (Carver, Scheier and Weintraub 1989; Stone and Neal 1984; Rosario et al. 1988; 
Ptacek et al. 1992), and they have the positive opportunity cue in the coupled message that points 
to promise and is more aligned with wishful thinking (Ptacek et al. 1992). Furthermore, because 
men are disproportionately targeted by immigration police enforcement (Golash-Boza and 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016), men are perhaps more anxious and vigilant to 
have additional emotions triggered by the policy messages. This nuance in the extent to which 
men and women are reporting varying levels of fear (and hope) is worth exploring further. I plan 
to explore this more closely in the emotion-induction experiment design immediately following 




 The Role of Gender in Stress Appraisal and Coping Strategies 
A gendered approach to the threat appraisal process and its impact on one’s political 
participation would help us better understand participatory differences among Latinos, 
particularly as Latinas are naturalizing and voting at higher rates than their male counterparts 
(Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a).29  Because men and women are socialized differently (Choderow 
                                                
29 Though the experiments analyzed by Miller and Krosnick (2004) most closely relate to the design and 
political participation outcomes in my study, their sample is limited to female Democrats and thus they could not 
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1978; Gilligan 1982; Lang-Takac and Osterweil 1992; Ptacek et al. 1992), they may also be 
mobilized differently.  In fact, “women are raised to internalize a great sense of responsibility for 
the most vulnerable in society, whereas men are encouraged to focus on self-fulfillment 
(Choderow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Lang-Takac and Osterweil 1992)” (as in Hutchings, Walton and 
Benjamin 2010).  Women tend to display public opinions inclined to show concern for the 
disadvantaged and endorse social group equality (Pratto, Stallworth and Sidandius 1997; 
Schuman et al. 1997; Sidanius and Ekkehammar 1980).  Thus, calls to action that emphasize the 
needs of a marginalized community, like those seen across the treatment messages in my 
experiment, would likely stir more political engagement among women. Furthermore, in the 
U.S., there are strong historical roots of women being involved in broad social networks and 
more community-oriented activities.  Historically, from the time of the American Revolution, 
women have used methods for influencing policies from outside electoral channels (which they 
were excluded from) in their efforts to address concerns of the well-being of women, children, 
the home, and the community (Baker 1984). Some of those activities included crowd actions, 
circulating and presenting petitions. Throughout the nineteenth century, the charitable work of 
women addressed societal problems revolving around poverty and disease (Baker 1984). In the 
early twentieth century, after a period of discouragement in the late nineteenth century, a surge 
of renewed energy centered on the women’s suffrage campaign.   
Ptacek et al. (1992) explain that because of widely held sex role stereotypes and gender 
role expectations, men are socialized to a greater extent to deal instrumentally with stress, 
whereas women tend to be socialized to express emotion, to employ emotion-focused coping 
                                                                                                                                                       
test a gendered divide in the threat and opportunity appraisal process. Other scholars have focused on group 
differences among racial groups (Phoenix 2015) and along partisan lines or partisan strength (Valentino et al. 2011; 
Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Heurberger et al. 2016; Marcus et al. 2000), but there has not been a concerted focus 
on gender differences when it comes to assessing threats.  
 
 90 
methods, and to seek the support of others (Mainiero 1986; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Rosario, 
Shinn, Morch and Huckabee 1988).  Given differences in the socialization process by gender, 
women may be more mobilized than men when faced with exogenous policy signals centered on 
the plight of one’s community.  Thus, women may be more likely to seek expressive forms of 
participation under stress, including more expressive and social forms of political behavior—for 
example, intending to march, talking about politics and sending a postcard fulfill this form of 
social or more expressive coping behavior.   
Several studies have revealed that men use more problem-focused coping than women 
(Brems and Johnson 1989; Folkman and Lazarus 1980; Stone and Neal 1984; Ptack et al. 1992). 
Folkman and Lazarus (1980, 1986) focus on three broad classes of coping responses: problem-
focused coping, emotion-focused coping and the seeking and utilization of social support. 
Several scholars have found the preferred response options at times vary by gender (Ptackek et 
al. 1992).30  And although both men and women employ emotion-focused methods, women do 
so with greater frequency (Fondacoro and Moos 1987; Stone and Neal 1984).  Many studies have 
found that women are more likely to seek social support than men when responding to stress in 
their environments (Carver, Scheier and Weintraub 1989; Stone and Neal 1984; Rosario et al. 
1988; Ptacek et al. 1992).   
The tendency for women to seek social support in response to a threat in their 
environment is supported in newer studies of the human stress response as well (Taylor, Klein, 
Lewis, Gruenewald, Gurung and Updegraff 2000; Ptacek et al. 1992). Taylor et al. (2000) 
challenge the well-known human stress response known as “fight-or-flight” (Cannon 1932) with 
findings that women tend to respond in a pattern they characterize as “tend and befriend.” Given 
                                                
30 According to Folkman and colleagues (1980, 1986), problem-focused coping includes cognitive and 
behavioral attempts to change the stressful situation. Emotion-focused coping involves attempts to control emotional 
responses elicited by the situation. Finally, the third class of strategies involves attempts to secure social support. 
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the constraints females face in taking on the role as primary caregivers for offspring, the authors 
describe the need for women to have evolved with these alternative behavioral responses to 
threats (Taylor et al. 2000). “Tending” refers to the quieting and caring for offspring and 
reducing the neuroendocrine responses that may compromise offspring health. On the other 
hand, fighting would jeopardize the safety and wellbeing of the mother and offspring, and flight 
behavior is not a viable option with the need to take care of young offspring. The “befriending” 
pattern involves affiliating with social groups to reduce risk and increase the likelihood that 
multiple group members will protect both them and their immature offspring.  Thus, threat 
appraisal responses are likely to differ among men and women in my study, particularly as 
women might be more willing to engage in activities as a group and in political acts that leverage 
their social networks.  
The two dominant explanations behind the gender differences that emerge in the 
appraisal process and coping strategy patterns have fallen into either the socialization hypothesis 
or structural hypothesis (Ptacek et al. 1992).  The socialization hypothesis holds that men and 
women are socialized to deal with stressful events in different ways, with men being expected to 
deal with stress more instrumentally, whereas women are socialized to be more expressive and 
seek the support of others (Mainiero 1986; Shinn, Morch and Huckabee 1988).  The structural 
hypothesis contends that specific classes of situations demand particular methods of coping, and 
so because men and women experience dissimilar types of events, they appear to have different 
coping preferences.  For instance, women experience more stresses associated with health and 
family concerns, and men report more stresses related to work and finances (Billings and Moos 
1981; Folkman and Lazarus 1980). Mainiero (1986) finds empirical support for both 
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socialization influences and structural factors that reinforce coping strategy differences among 
men and women.  
Ptacek et al. (1992) find that men and women did not differ significantly in the frequency 
with which they appraised events as threats, but they differ in the proportion of challenge 
appraisals they reported.  Women appraised more events as threatening, whereas men appraised 
more events as challenging.  In terms of additional coping strategies that are used frequently, 
women were also found to engage in more wishful thinking and avoidance. The appraisal 
differences and tendencies to engage in more wishful thinking and avoidance among women is 
critical as we assess the relative ease at which people feel they can cope with the threat and 
opportunities presented in the treatment messages (Ptacek et al. 1992). Again, threats consist of 
events that could have negative or undesirable consequences, whereas challenges are events that 
could have the potential of negative and more desirable consequences (Lazarus and Folkman 
1984; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Tomaka et al. 1983). Tomaka and colleagues (1993) clarify 
that threatened individuals perceive the potential for loss, with little, if anything, to be gained in 
the situation; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as loss 
(Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Folkman and Lazarus 1985).  By painting the potential for losses 
and positive consequences more clearly in the coupled threat-and-opportunity message, women 
are more readily able to channel their empathetic concerns and wishful thinking into more 
political engagement. Given the social and expressive nature of the political outcomes following 
the treatment messages, women are turning to these forms of political action, especially since 
they are already more apt to seek social support under stress. They do not seek this same political 
action in the threat alone condition, and instead operate under the expected avoidant behavior 
previous scholars have found when subjects are overwhelmed with the potential of negative 
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consequences provoked by the event (Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Tomaka et 
al. 1992). 
 
 Socialization Differences among Latinos 
Gender has also been a critical construct of the political paths and acculturation patterns 
for men and women from largely Latino immigrant backgrounds.  Acculturation is the process 
by which people adjust to contact with a culture other than their own and the extent to which 
they maintain their cultural identity (Berry 1994, 2001).  The acculturation literature largely 
expects immigrant women to integrate and navigate American culture and political systems at a 
faster rate in the U.S. than men (Berry 2001; Jones-Correa 1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003; 
Hardy-Fanta 1993).  For instance, as seen with the gender gap in U.S. education overall, and 
across various racial and ethnic groups, immigrant girls are obtaining higher levels of education 
than their male counterparts, producing outcomes that indicate “gendered pathways” (Waldinger 
and Perlmann 1998; Portes and Zhou 1993).  This gender gap coincides with the patriarchal 
norms of femininity that girls need more protection and stricter curfews in order to maintain 
important values of virtue.  These social restrictions fit well with education systems that reward 
those who comply, obey and do not challenge authority figures (Waldinger and Perlmann 1998; 
Lopez 2003).  On the other hand, immigrant parents treat their sons with more freedom, allowing 
more opportunities for immigrant boys and second-generation male youth to channel negative 
experiences with authority and experiences of racism into a masculinist “oppositional culture.” 
This “oppositional culture” involves more questioning of authority figures as they navigate 
various institutions in their daily lives. As a result, these aversive interactions contribute to the 
gender gap observed between men and women, especially as it relates to their educational 
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attainment and political participation (Foner 2000; Waters 1999). Thus, to avoid another stressful 
encounter, men might be more willing to disengage (“flight” response) from politics when 
exposed to a call to action that also includes a threatening message. 
Bejarano (2014a) also finds that Latino youth are socialized differently growing up in the 
U.S.  As a function of traditional gender roles, young Latinas are expected to take on more 
community involvement and increased responsibilities with their families compared to young 
Latino males (Lopez, 2003).  These experiences can lead Latinas to gain more civic skills than 
Latino males. In fact, over the last decade Latinas have had higher voter turnout rates in 
presidential elections than Latino males (NALEO; U.S. Census Bureau; Bejarano 2014a; Lien 
1998).  Increased levels of political participation and familiarity with navigating the political 
system can also provide women with stronger ties to their community and political institutions, 
making them the most likely to encourage other family members to become more involved in 
American politics (Bejarano 2014a, 2014b).   
Additionally, scholars find that men and women in the Latino immigrant community 
engage in different kinds of political behavior (Hardy-Fanta 1990; Uni 1991; Jones-Correa 
1998).  For instance, while Latino women are more absent in political office, they are more 
involved in community-organizing efforts than their male counterparts.  Jones-Correa (1998) 
provides more insight into the gendered pathways of the Latino community with interviews of 
recent immigrants in New York.  Because women experience a greater boost in their social 
mobility status in the U.S. than in their home country, they tend to be more active in American 
politics than their male counterparts, who are still more valued in their native countries’ social 
hierarchies than those in their host country (Jones-Correa 1998).  As a result, Latinas tend to 
maintain fewer close ties with their country of origin than Latino immigrant males, including 
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sending remittances and expressing a desire to return to their home country (Bejarano 2014a).  In 
fact, Latinas have spearheaded community organizing efforts and voter turnout in the Latino 
community (Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a).   
In sum, and in the case of the Latino population in my study, I imagine the gender 
differences that emerge are due to both socialization and structural pattern explanations.  In part, 
women are more encouraged to care for the marginalized and seek social support when 
confronted with stress, but women are also building their ability to navigate politics with the 
advent of interacting more with their children’s educational institutions (Jones-Correa 1998). 
Mothers also face less of a language barrier with their children than male immigrant fathers, 
whose work demands often keep them away from the home more often (Mahalingam 2013; 
Berry 1997). Finally, in terms of an additional structural factor that could be affecting the 
gendered differences that emerge in my study, immigrant men are disproportionately deported at 
higher rates than their immigrant female counterparts (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 
2013; Rugh and Hall 2016).  In fact, 85 percent of deportees are estimated to be male immigrants 
from Latin America (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016).  Thus, 
women are left behind to address the emotional, political, social and economic consequences of 
more punitive immigration policies.  
As we recall, without an incentive such as a policy opportunity, threatened individuals 
who only perceive danger or the potential of a loss have little, if anything, to gain from their 
efforts (Tomaka et al. 1993).  We also know that women seek more expressive and social-
oriented forms of coping when dealing with stressors in their environments (Ptacek et al. 1992; 
Taylor et al. 2000).  Finally, due to additional socialization and acculturation differences among 
Latina women and Latino men (Jones-Correa 1998; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lien 1998; Bejarano 
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 This chapter sought to shed light on who was driving the results of the coupled threat-
and-opportunity message. After initial analyses, I found that the results were heightened among a 
subset of my sample, specifically along gender lines.  I find the messaging cues work differently 
for men and women, with women being especially receptive to the coupled message when asked 
about intending to participate in politics.  Perhaps because men and women cope with 
environmental stressors differently (Ptacek et al. 1992), signals of hope along with those of threat 
in the Coupled Treatment-and-Opportunity Condition may have helped women feel more able to 
confront the stressor through expressive and group-oriented political activities.  Ptacek et al. 
(1992) explain that because of widely held sex role stereotypes and gender role expectations, 
men are socialized to a greater extent to deal instrumentally with stress, whereas women tend to 
be socialized to express emotion, to employ emotion-focused coping methods, and to seek the 
support of others (Mainiero 1986; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Rosario, Shinn, Morch and 
Huckabee 1988).  Furthermore, given differences in the socialization process by gender, women 
may be more mobilized than men when faced with exogenous policy signals centered on the 
plight of one’s community.  I suspect my results are driven among women for the participation 
scale model because they potentially have more advantageous civic skills available at their 
disposable, especially based on greater exposure to the civic skills and social capital they 
encounter in their children’s schools (Bejarano 2014a; Berry 1997; Jones-Correa 1998; 
Bloemraad, Voss and Lee 2011).  Perhaps these additional civic skills are why we see women 
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driving the mobilizing effect behind the Coupled Treatment-and-Opportunity Condition for these 
intended forms of participation.  
Second, threatening messages are ineffective and even discouraging for some in my 
sample.  As it turns out, the importance of understanding the intersection of gender and stress 
appraisals should not be overlooked when considering the effect of threat (Ptacek et al. 1992), 
even when it is paired with an opportunity message.  Men in my sample are discouraged from the 
intent to vote in the Coupled Condition.  When estimating the intent to vote, men experienced a 
demobilizing effect in the Coupled Treatment-and-Opportunity Condition, whereas women are not 
deterred from voting. Part of what may be going on is that this types of political outcomes measured in 
this survey experiment do not capture the types of political behaviors men might be more inclined to 
participate in. Additionally, the men in my sample might have felt more willing to disengage when 
exposed to the Coupled Condition because their assessment of the threat may have clouded their 
willingness to strive for the policy opportunity offered in the same message. Their socialization 
experiences and potential for an “oppositional” response may have made them default to abstention 
more readily than for women (Lopez 2003; Foner 2000; Waters 1999), who are more highly educated 
and involved in navigating U.S. political institutions.   
A possible alternative explanation for the moderating gender effects, particularly among 
women in the intend participation scale findings, is that the treatment designs included female images 
that felt more relevant for women in my sample. If this were driving the results, we would expect to see 
the girls in the images also have a positive effect for women in the vote intentionality and postcard 
models, but we do not find this to be the case. This is not to say that if the treatment designs included 
images of boys, then maybe we would not see the demobilizing effect that we observe for men in the 
 
 98 
vote intentionality model. A future iteration of this experiment will randomize the gender of the 
photographed subjects in the action alerts.   
This chapter is not an exhaustive exploration of the role of gender in processing threat 
and opportunity mobilizing messages.  In fact, Garcia Bedolla, Lavariega-Monforti and Pantoja 
(2007) point to differences in the gender gap across national group origins indicating that gender 
has a differential impact on the political attitudes of men and women in Mexican, Cuban and 
Puerto Rican communities.  In future studies, scholars should explore various policy priorities 
and political leanings by gender across Latino national group origins. 
Previous studies have found that participation in collective action more likely occurs 
when members of a group identify with one another (Brewer and Kramer 1986; Kollock 1998; 
Kramer and Brewer 1984). Given the emphasis on solidarity messages and mobilization efforts 
spearheaded by Latino organizations, media, political elites, and activists that all aimed to make 
one’s panethnic Latino identity salient in more politicized environments (Ramirez 2013; Barreto 
et al. 2009; Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2011; Perez 2015), future studies should include the 
role of group identity in perceiving threat and opportunity appeals.  Several organizations also 
managed to expand the plight of immigration reform across multiple constituencies, regardless of 
nativity, citizenship status, and Latino origin group (Olesen 2006; Barreto et al. 2009). By 
activating a broader pan-ethnic identity, along with a sense of group solidarity (Bloemraad and 
Trost 2008), this widened the participation and support of the immigration marches. This helps to 
explain why a diverse coalition of Latinos in the U.S. are willing to endorse expansive 
immigration policies and participate in immigration marches even when they themselves are not 
undocumented immigrants or foreign-born (Barreto et al. 2009; Pantoja et al. 2001; Zepeda-
Millán and Wallace 2013).   
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Interestingly, the idea of striving toward the same common goal is thought to 
disincentivize or inhibit people’s activism (Kahneman and Tversky 1979); in fact, this free rider 
problem is particularly the case because participants can enjoy the benefits without having 
shouldered the burden of collective action.  However, for an individual with a strong sense of 
group consciousness, working together toward collective action is inherent to its definition 
(Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Garcia 2003). Thus, perhaps policy opportunities will not have 
the free-rider effect as so many have previously expected (Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 
2004), particularly among Latinos with higher levels of group identification. I would expect this 
free-riding effect to be diminished among Latinos with a high sense of panethnic identification.31 
As opposed to a one-sided emphasis on either urgency or opportunity, coupling attention to an 
impending threat as well as empowering messages regarding policy opportunity alternatives, 
mobilizers can better communicate crisis messages and improve efforts for collective action. I 
expect these effects to be particularly amplified when the group’s pan-ethnic Latino identity is 
made salient.  Due to potential ceiling effects of heightened Latino identification in a 2016 
election that largely alienated Latino voters, the role of Latino group identity and linked fate 
were not significant moderators of my treatment effects.  This not to say there may not be a 
stronger mobilization response to coupled threat-and-opportunity messages among those who 
more strongly identify with Latinos, but this particular study did not capture this effect.  
                                                
31  Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976) rely on the moderating effect of efficacy to 
explain people’s responses to communication strategies involving threatening stimuli posing a danger.  Efficacy 
does not lessen the severity of the threat but it strengthens people’s belief in the ability to cope with danger when 
they confront it (Rogers and Mewborn 1976; Vasi and Macy 2003).  Subsequent analyses revealed that the gendered 
findings are partially explained by women who follow immigration more closely, as well as women who are more 
efficacious.  However, salience and efficacy are not conditioning the treatment’s effects for the sample as a whole. 
This may be because the timing of this study was in the middle of a presidential election season, at a time people 
when may have been particularly attentive to topics and group appeals being discussed by the candidates.  Also, 
remarks made by then-candidate Donald Trump may have made it so that immigration issues and racial group 
attacks were chronically salient among Latino communities. 
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Together, the findings in this chapter underscore an important point: The gendered aspect 
of threat- and opportunity-appraisal processes yields unexpected results in a terrain that has gone 
largely unexplored in the study of mobilizing messages and their effects on one’s political 
behavior.   The coupled threat and opportunity approach may be especially critical to effectively 






Fear and Hope: Motivating Effects of Emotions in ANES 2008 and 2012 
 
 
The motivation to participate in politics that I posit is derived from exposure to a coupled 
threat and opportunity message centers on the expectation that the urgency and anxiety stirred by 
the political threat is tempered by the promise associated with the opportunity appeal thereby 
elevating a sense of excitement and thus encouraging political engagement. The previous chapter 
provided direct evidence of the influence of the coupled approach but little attention was devoted 
to the mechanism for these results. Thus, in this chapter, I more explicitly address the role of 
emotions in processing a risk and opportunity appraisal process, and their impact on one’s 
political behavior. Though there is still debate about how emotional appeals in campaign ads 
work and lead to both persuasive effects among the public (Brader 2005; Eagly and Chaiken 
1993; Witte and Allen 2000; Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Banks 2016) and motivate 
individuals to take political action (Valentino et al. 2011; Gray 1990; Groenendyk and Banks 
2014), there is more consensus about the causes and consequences of the two emotions political 
ads commonly appeal—enthusiasm and fear (Damasio 1994; Lazarus 1991; LeDoux 1996; Gray 
1987).32 Building upon the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, the analyses in this chapter 
involve examining the combination of fear and hope emotion measures and their impact on non-
                                                
32 Given their high correlation rate, scholars have often combined hope and pride to measure enthusiasm 
(Brader 2005; Valentino et al. 2011; Marcus et al. 2000; Groenendyk and Banks 2014). For theoretical reasons and 
to avoid having the paired version of pride and hope skew too positively, I limit my analyses to hope. It is worth 




electoral political participation among Latinos. I find that feeling both fear and hope towards the 
presidential candidates encourages one to talk about politics, relative to those who did not feel 
the combination of both fear and hope.  
This chapter is organized into four sections. First, I provide a literature review of the role 
of emotions and their impact on one’s motivation to take political action. This first section draws 
our attention to existing emotion measures of fear and hope, which the existing literature has 
previously used as proxies for threat and opportunity. This first section ends on an overview of 
how the short-term motivational effects derived from one’s emotions fits into the standard 
resource model of political participation. Secondly, I introduce the hypotheses section, where I 
focus on the simultaneous effect of fear and hope on one’s political engagement. In the third 
section, I describe the methods and procedures that will allow me to test my hypotheses. The 
analyses are drawn from the Latino samples in the 2008 and 2012 American National Election 
Study (ANES). Finally, I conclude with the results and discussion section based on my three 
outcome measures: including talking about politics, participating in politics and vote 
intentionality. 
Emotions in Politics 
Gray (1990) and Valentino et al. (2011) contend that either hope or fear might lead to 
action, either in the form of reward-seeking behavior or danger-averting behavior. In fact, the 
following synopsis of the types of signals that stir feelings of hope and fear encapsulates this 
best: 
“Enthusiasm is a reaction to signals that have positive implications for a person’s goals 
(i.e. things are going well). It reinforces commitment to those goals and strengthens the 
motivation to act or stay involved. If goals are not met, the result is disappointment and a 
diminished drive for pursuits. Anxiety or fear is a reaction to threat. Fear breaks a person 
out of routines, directs attention to relevant portions of the environment, and activates 
thinking about alternative courses of action. The motivational impact of fear is less 
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certain, as it can stimulate constructive action to deal with a threat, withdrawal, or 
immobility, depending on the person and situation (Gray 1987; LeDoux 1996)” (as seen 
in Brader (2005)).  
 
While a few strands of this line of research have focused on the role of emotions in 
resolving collective action problems (Groenendyk 2011; Lupia and Menning 2009), voting 
behavior (Wang 2013; Hueberger, Jorgeson and Leighley 2016), and non-electoral political 
participation (Valentino et al. 2011), the dominant focus of the role of emotions in political life 
have been limited to more information-seeking, political efficacy, candidate preferences or 
policy preferences (Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 2009; Valentino et al. 2011; 
Petersen, 2010; Civettini and Redlawsk 2009; Albertson and Gadarian 2015).  
Additionally, scholars have found that negative emotions like fear can have dampening 
effects on concentration, learning and problem solving (Valentino et al. 2008; Ashcraft and Kirk 
2001), particularly because fear can be highly distracting (Calvo and Carreiras 1992; Tohill and 
Holyoak 2000). Based on the fact that the motivational impact of fear is less certain (Gray 1987; 
LeDoux 1996; Miller 2005; Valentino et al. 2011), I focus on fear with regard to threats. Fear is 
triggered when an individual is less certain about the cause and does not feel in control (Lerner 
and Keltner 2000, 2001; Smith and Kirby, 2004; Tiedens and Linton 2001).33  Brader (2005, 
2006) finds that participants exposed to an enthusiasm-evoking political ad specifically reported 
higher levels of campaign interest, intention to register, intention to vote, and a greater 
willingness to work for a campaign relative to those exposed to a control ad without music or 
imagery. However, Brader (2005, 2006) finds fear ads to have a more limited impact, with 
participants only expressing a greater willingness to work for the campaign and a stronger belief 
in the importance of voting.  
                                                
33 New research has uncovered that one’s sense of control can help explain why anger and fear operate 
differently (and for different people)(Valentino et al. 2011; Banks 2009, 2016; Phoenix 2015). 
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Drawing on insights from circumplex models of emotional responses (Plutchik 1980; 
Russell 1980; Zevon and Tellegen 1982), Marcus and his colleagues offer the most prominent 
theory of the effect of emotions on individual political engagement. In fact, according to the 
theory of affective intelligence (Marcus et al. 2000), emotions may help citizens use political 
heuristics more efficiently, particularly as emotions complement reason by signaling to the brain 
when to rely on heuristic processes and when to expend greater cognitive effort (Gray 1987a, 
1987b, 1990). A threatening political signal triggers a high-level of arousal (Lupia and Menning 
2009; Witt 1992; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000), particularly as one instinctually wants 
to protect oneself or those in their group from the potential losses it poses. Thus, I use fear 
towards a candidate as a proxy for threat, while hope towards a candidate as a proxy for 
opportunity. Some might feel more enthusiasm, or hope, when exposed to a candidate with 
policies they favor. Damasio (1994) finds that both positive and negative emotions can improve 
decision-making behaviors. Positive and negative emotions serve as feedback from brain systems 
that encourage reward-seeking and danger-averting behavior, respectively (Gray 1990). 
A candidate might pose a threat or opportunity through “proposing particular policies that 
visibly favor some groups at the expense of others; by emphasizing or neglecting problems that 
are of special concern to a particular group; by keeping certain company, spending time in the 
public eye with iconic representatives of one group or another; and more” (Kam and Kinder 
2012, p. 338)(Hutchings, Cruz Nichols, Gause and Piston, 2015). In my analysis of the 2008 
American National Election Study (ANES), 62 percent of respondents identify somewhat 
strongly or strongly with the Democratic Party.  Thus, most Latinos have more overlapping 
interests with the Democratic candidate, in this case Barack Obama, and might perceive more 
political threats from the Republican candidates, John McCain (2008) and Mitt Romney 
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(2012)—two candidates often characterized in the press as embracing more restrictive policies 
on immigration.  Then-candidate John McCain emphasized building a larger wall and a more 
secured border between the U.S. and Mexico in 2008, while then-candidate Mitt Romney upheld 
Arizona’s SB 1070 bill as a prime example that the rest of the country should follow in 2012.34  
As such, Romney supported the idea of undocumented immigrants engaging in “self-
deportation” in the face of worsening living conditions. 
Standard Models of Participation 
 The prevailing explanation of political participation is often hinged upon access to stable 
and long-term resources, skills, interests and mobilization strategies. This explanation stems 
from the Basic Resource Model (BRM) and Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM). Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980) proposed a basic resource model of participation that includes education, 
income, age and other demographics. To explain the substantial variation in the public’s 
participation patterns, they find that those lacking resources are less likely to participate. Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady (1995) confirm the earlier findings on the role of socioeconomic status, 
but they also move beyond the individual resources one possesses and turn our attention to the 
role of engagement and recruitment. They add that that based on basic life circumstances and 
exposure to different institutions (like families, school, work, non-political associations and 
religious organizations), some people are not predisposed to participate in various forms of 
political activity. Following their theory, more money, more spare time and more skills will 
increase political participation. By engagement, Verba et al. (1995) are referring to the 
                                                
34 For more on the overwhelming support Obama received over McCain and Romney, refer to Latino 
Decisions (June 2008) http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2008/06/16/national-poll-shows-that-latino-voters-
favor-obama-over-mccain/ and the Pew Hispanic Center (2012) http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-





motivation stemming from political interest, political efficacy, political information, and 
partisanship. These measures provide the “desire, knowledge, and self-assurance that impel 
people to be engaged by politics” (Verba et al. 1995, p. 354).  Finally, and most central to this 
study, recruitment consists of being asked to participate. Thus, individuals who are both 
motivated and capable of participating in politics are more likely to become more active if they 
are part of recruitment networks where requests for their participation take place. In fact, 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. (1995) find that people do not participate 
because they are not tapped or mobilized by political elites (e.g. campaigns, candidates, political 
parties, interest groups, etc.). 
 There are a several possible explanations why people who possess the resources (time, 
money and skills), engagement and recruitment, still do not participate. “Political scientists have 
begun to investigate the short-term forces that affect one’s decision to take political action. The 
majority of this work has focused on ‘threat,’ generally defined as any risk of future harm either 
material or symbolic” (Valentino et al. 2011, p. 157). The kind of message they are being 
exposed to when being recruited to participate in politics may not effectively communicate the 
stakes involved in their political action. By drawing from Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) 
(Marcus et al.) and cognitive appraisal theory (Folkman et al. 1986; Lazarus 1991; Lerner and 
Keltner 2000, 2001), we gain a better understanding of the emotional processing of the risks and 
gains involved in prompting one’s political mobilization. This chapter builds on the previous 
observations by exploring the specific role of combined emotions, triggered by political threats 
and political opportunities, and their role in motivating one’s political mobilization. As such, 
depending on the substance of the recruitment message, people may have a different 
understanding of the policy goals they are trying to achieve.  Are they trying to stop a threat 
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posed by their political opponent? Are they trying to advance a policy opportunity posed by their 
favored candidate? Are they potentially motivated by both?  
Hypotheses 
 
H1: Feeling a combination of both hope and fear will have a stronger positive 
association with political participation relative to those who feel other emotions.  
 
H2: Feeling only fear will not be associated with political participation relative to those 
who feel other emotions. 
 
H3: Feeling only hope will not be associated with political participation relative to those 
who feel other emotions.  
 
H4: Women who feel a combination of both hope and fear will have a stronger positive 
association with political participation relative to men who feel both hope and fear. 
 
H5: Feelings of fear towards the Republican candidate and hope towards the Democratic 
candidate will be especially catalyzing among Democrats.  
 
Methods and Procedure 
In order to test whether threat and opportunity are more catalyzing when paired together 
than alone, I draw on existing survey data from two years of the American National Election 
Study (ANES). The two years consist of nationally representative samples of Latino adults, 
included the 2008 and 2012 ANES. The 2008 and 2012 ANES allow me to replicate the results 
provided by the experiment fielded with Latino Decisions in the previous two chapters. Although 
the ANES provides data among a nationally representative probability sample of American 
citizens, I focus my analyses on Latinos.  The inclusion of ANES survey measures aimed at 
capturing the public’s emotions toward the major political parties and candidates date back to 
1980, which have asked participants to recall whether “a candidate has ever made you feel 
(angry, afraid, proud, hopeful)?”  The coupled threat and opportunity message approach provides 
a sense of loss and gain for participants. I argue that the pairing of the opportunity signals 
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prevents the participant from veering too far into despair.  Based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study of fear appeals, which is often provoked by threat, and the hope an 
underlying promise of positive change, which is often evoked by an opportunity appeal, fear and 
hope serve as imperfect proxy measures for signals of threat and opportunity. I begin my 
analyses with the 2008 ANES in this dissertation because this was the first year the survey 
included a nationally representative Latino oversample. The pre- and post-election interviews 
were offered in Spanish as well, thus not limiting the sample to the most acculturated and 
English-speaking Latinos. In the 2012 ANES, the Latino sample was supplemented with an 
additional web-based survey sample. In an effort to make comparable analyses between the 2008 
and 2012 datasets, I rely only rely on the face-to-face samples.  
The results in this chapter provide some support for the coupled threat and opportunity 
strategy, demonstrating that this strategy at times catalyzes political participation among Latino 
respondents. I present these results with the caveat that individual demographics, socioeconomic 
effects (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), a heightened sense of racial group identity (Sanchez 
2006b; Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Schildkraut 2005; Stoke 2003) and broader measures of 
political engagement (including party mobilization)(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Almond and 
Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995; Liu 2001) play important roles in understanding who is motivated 
to take political action. I provide additional robustness checks including these measures in my 
models in Appendix D. Before delving into the details of the distribution of these key control 
variables and addressing any differences that may artificially skew relationships, I proceed by 
considering the distribution of my main outcome measure: talking with anyone about political 




Table 5.1: The Distribution of Outcome Measures among Latinos 
 ANES FTF Sample ANES 2012 FTF Sample 
Talking About Politics   
Yes 66% 65% 
No 34% 35% 
   
Participation Scale (Talk, Rally, Sign)   
Yes 43%  44% 
No 57%  56% 
   
Vote Intent   
Extremely/Somewhat Likely 48% 63% 
Not at all/Somewhat Likely 12% 24% 
 
Notes: The data are weighted. Percentages based on 2008 and 2012 ANES Latino samples.   
 
  
Talking about Politics 
 
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of responses when asked whether they talked about 
election politics with anyone across the 2008 and 2012 ANES. As part of the post-election 
interview, the ANES interviewer asks respondents to recall whether they spoke with anyone to 
try to convince them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates. More 
specifically, the question wording goes as follows: “We would like to find out about some of the 
things people do to help a party or a candidate win an election. During the campaign, did you 
talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or 
candidates?” The response options were “Yes” or “No.”  Along the two Latino samples in 2008 
and 2012, nearly 35 percent of the sample is expressing that they talked to someone they knew 
about the most recent election, especially to persuade them on which particular candidate or 
party to vote for. Though this measure may suffer from social desirability bias because people 
may want to appear to be more politically engaged and more politically influential than the 
average person, the proportion of Latino respondents reporting that they engaged in this form of 
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political participation is lower than that among non-Latino participants (43 percent).35 Given the 
dichotomous nature of the talking measure, I used logit model estimates with the 2008 and 2012 
ANES models in this chapter.  
 
Political Participation Scale 
The preponderance of other social activities, including joining a political rally during the 
past election season, only consisted of 4 percent of the sample, and less than 1.5 percent upon 
limiting the sample to those in the face-to-face mode.36  Furthermore, while wearing a political 
campaign button or displaying a campaign bumper sticker are expressive forms of political 
behavior, only 13 percent of the Latino sample participated in this form of political engagement 
(and only 7 percent in the face-to-face sample). The talking about politics, joining a rally, and 
wearing a political button were each dichotomous variables. As such, I combined the following 3 
political participation measures into 4-category participation scale (coded from 0 to 1), including 
talking about politics, joining a political rally, and those wearing a political campaign button or 
campaign bumper sticker. Those coded as “0” did not participate in any activities, those who said 
they participated in at least one of the activities were coded as “.33,” and those who participated 
in two activities were coded at “.66,” and those who participated in 3 activities are coded as “1.” 
Based on the dichotomous coding scheme I created, the logit statistical model analyses in the 
results section below uses the 4-category measure including those who participated in no 
activities (0) to any of the 3 activities (1). All 3 measures had a cronbach’s alpha of .48.  
                                                
35 The difference-in-means for the talking outcome measures is statistically significant different across 
Latino and non-Latino samples (p<.01, based on two-tailed test).  
36 Though the ANES includes additional measures on the extent to which participants have been civically 
engaged, they ask about the last 4 years. Perhaps as a result of an inability to recall information in the last year, let 
alone the past 4 years, the proportion of respondents saying that they engage in these civic forms of participation is 
low, ranging from 6 to 22 percent preponderance levels, among Latino respondents and the general sample (without 
limiting to the face-to-face sample). These behaviors include contacting an elected official, posting a message on 




Vote Intentionality Certainty 
Aside from talking about politics with friends or family and other measures of non-
electoral political participation, I tested my theory with vote intentionality. The 2008 ANES 
measure was based on the certainty for one’s intent to vote or not to vote. Recoded from 0 to 1, 
this was a 10-category measure, with “1” meaning “definitely will vote” and “0” meaning 
“definitely will not vote.” Estimates in the 2008 ANES are based on OLS regression models. In 
the 2012 dataset, the vote intentionality measure I rely on was based on an open-ended measure 
where respondents could report how likely they were to vote (ranging from 0 to 100). I recoded 
this measure into a 5 quantiles, with those closer to “1” meaning they were “absolutely certain 
they would vote” and those closer to “0” meaning “there is no chance they would vote.” The 
distribution table above is based on the two lowest and two highest categories combined 
together. The OLS statistical models are based on the full range of these categorical variables.37 
As seen with the 2008 ANES, the vote intentionality models in the 2012 dataset were estimated 
with OLS models as well. 
 
 Threat and Opportunity Emotion Proxies 
To capture threat and opportunity in the ANES surveys, I turn to emotions of fear and 
hope. Table 5.2 provides the means and observations for the emotion measures serving as 
proxies of threat and opportunity. The single cue and paired conditions are each coded as 
dichotomous measures. The ANES uses the following question to capture multiple emotions a 
general election candidate might stir. The question reads: “Has (Democratic or Republican 
                                                
37 The 2012 ANES also had an additional measure for the certainty of one’s vote intent, but this was based 
on 5-categories and only half the sample was randomized to this version of the survey question. Future iterations of 
the ANES analyses will combine both versions of these vote intentionality measures. 
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candidate)—because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done—ever 
made you feel (angry, afraid, proud, hopeful)?” These questions are asked in the pre-election 
questionnaires of the ANES waves. I have coded the emotions such that the “Only Fear” measure 
involves respondents who reported being fearful of the Republican candidate that election 
season, while the “Only Hope” condition represents those who reported feeling hopeful towards 
the Democratic candidate.  
Though the ANES follows up with a question about the amount of said emotion the 
candidate made them feel, these follow-up measures contain too much missing data for the 
Latino sample (particularly among those in the face-to-face mode). Thus, my analyses are 
restricted to the initial question about whether they felt said emotion—“yes” or “no.” I focus 
specifically on fear and hope. For the combined fear-and-hope variable, I only include those who 
felt the two emotions. This provides a conservative test of my theory because only participants 
who feel a combination of these two emotions, and only these two emotions (fear and hope), are 
expected to be catalyzed to more action than those in the single emotion conditions.38  
Given the relevance of one’s party identification when assessing their emotions towards a 
candidate, I also control for party identification and partisan strength. Party identification 
involves group-level emotions that stimulate participation (Groenendyk and Banks 2010; E. R. 
Smith et al. 2007; Groenendyk 2011).  Based on this existing literature on the persuasive and 
motivating effects of emotions, scholars have found that emotions trigger political interest 
(Brader 2005, 2006; Marcus et al. 2000).  According to intergroup emotions theory, when social 
identity is salient, those who identify with the group will consider the stimuli in the group 
                                                
38 The ANES randomizes the order in which people receive the four emotion questions. The ANES also 
randomizes whether they ask the emotions battery about the Republican or Democratic candidate first. In a future 
project, this could allow me to test whether the ordering of threat and opportunity appraisals matter for the coupled 
threat and opportunity approach to catalyze people to take action.  
 
 113 
context as opposed to the individual context (Mackie, Devos and Smith 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993; 
E. R. Smith, Seger and Mackie, 2007).  As such, individuals experience emotions on behalf of 
their group, including that of their partisan identity. Furthermore, to test whether the outcome 
measure of participation is explained away by one’s substantive political views or partisan 
leanings, I also account for partisan strength (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; 
Rudolph et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011). For a distribution of these party identification and 
partisan strength variables, refer to Appendix D (Table D.1 and Table D.2).  
More specifically, respondents who said they felt afraid about something to do with the 
Republican candidate as a person or what the Republican candidate did, were coded as 1 for 
experiencing “only fear” and 0 for all else. I used this coding scheme for the single emotion 
dummy variables. Those who reported the Democratic candidate made them feel hopeful were 
coded as 1 for experiencing “only hope” and 0 for all else.  By coding these emotion variables as 
dichotomous independent variables, I mimic the mutually exclusive nature of being exposed to 
one condition as seen in the survey experiment.  Finally, to capture the coupled effect of threat 
and opportunity, I combined those in the “only fear” and “only hope” conditions as 1, and “all 
else” as 0.  I combined these variables by interacting the two single emotion variables. Thus, 
those in the coupled threat and opportunity condition (“fear and hope”) are based on those who 
only felt fear towards the Republican candidate as well as those who only felt hope towards the 
Democratic candidate. It is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of Latino voters 
supported Obama in 2008 (66 percent) and 2012 (71 percent) (Pew Hispanic Center 2012).  
Table 5.2 provides the bivariates of the combined fear and hope measures with that of the 
outcomes of interest. The proportions provided are weighted. Admittedly, as each of the lower 
right-hand quadrants demonstrates, there is not an apparent association between the outcome 
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measures and the combined fear and hope emotion strategies. However, when focusing on the 
bivariates among Democrats alone (see italics in Table 5.2), the associations give way for a 
possible correlation between the coupled Republican fear and Democratic hope strategy.  
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Table 5.2: Bivariates Between Outcomes and Emotions Variables of Fear and Hope 
 ANES 2008 Sample ANES 2012 FTF Sample 
 Combined Republican Fear and Democratic Hope 
 0 1 0 1 
Talk     
No (0) 52% 14% 49% 16% 
Yes (1) 22% 12% 22% 13% 
     
  Talk (Among Democrats)     
No (0) 43% 20% 48% 20% 
Yes (1) 18% 18% 16% 16% 
     
Participate     
No (0) 45% 12% 42% 13% 
Yes (1) 29% 14% 30% 16% 
     
Participate (Among Democrats)     
No (0) 38% 16% 41% 17% 
Yes (1) 24% 22% 22% 21% 
     
Vote Intent     
No (0) 10% 10% 18% 15% 
Yes (1) 32% 15% 44% 19% 
     
Vote Intent (Among Democrats)     
No (0) 4% 10% 12% 5% 
Yes (1) 31% 24% 33% 26% 
     
 Combined Fear and Hope towards Either Candidate 
 0 1 0 1 
Talk     
No (0) 46% 20% 45% 20% 
Yes (1) 18% 16% 15% 20% 
     
Participate     
No (0) 41% 16% 38% 16% 
Yes (1) 24% 19% 22% 24% 
     
Vote Intent     
No (0) 9% 2% 17% 6% 
Yes (1) 27% 20% 32% 28% 
 
Notes: The percentages are weighted. Table entries are based on Latino respondents in the 2008 





Before moving on, it is important to highlight that there tend to be fewer cases for those 
reporting fear than any of the other emotions available in the ANES. This is consistent with what 
previous scholars have found (Valentino et al. 2011; Huerberger et al. 2016), and is more than 
likely due to social desirability bias in people wanting to appear that they are in control. In the 
2008 and 2012 data, fear is reported nearly 30 to 40 percent lower than those reporting hope, 
which is closer to 70 and 80 percent. The percentage point difference is the nearly the same when 
combining fear towards either candidate.39 The combined approach in the ANES is only an 
imperfect proxy of the randomized survey experiment conditions, particularly because I am 
combining discrete emotions that were asked separately. For instance, there is not a question in 
the ANES that asks if the subject felt two simultaneous emotions about the candidates. 
Additionally, the emotion variables in the ANES are based on evaluations of the candidate, or 
something the candidate did or said. This is tough to separate from partisan politics, especially 
when asked so close to the general election. This partisan component was not part of the survey 
experiment; in other words, there is no mention of partisan cues in the treatment designs. To 
account for the partisan bias to favor one’s in-party candidate in the ANES, I focus some of my 
analyses on Democrats alone.40 As seen in Table 5.2, the bivariates demonstrate the importance 
of partisan considerations when asking participants about their feelings towards the leading 
general election candidates. Furthermore, as a result of the relatively lower levels of those 
reporting one emotion over the other, future steps involve using an emotion-induction 
                                                
39 I have also estimated the models with a combination of fear towards the Republican candidate or fear 
towards the Democratic candidate. I have also created a general hope dummy variable that includes hope towards 
either the Republican candidate or hope towards the Democratic candidate.  This technique of combining emotional 
reactions to both candidates, and not simply evaluations of the in-party or out-party candidate, is common the 
existing scholarship of the role of emotions in political life (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; 
Rudolph et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011).  
40 When I focus on Democrats alone, this includes those that are strong/moderate/leaning. This is only 
relevant for the models with the Republican fear and Democratic hope measures. Focusing on Democrats alone does 
not apply for the models in which I have combined measures of fear and hope towards either candidate. 
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experiment where people are asked to reflect and write about feeling a particular emotion, 
including fear. By using this approach, the intensity of the given emotions will be equally strong, 
especially since it will be based on what that particular respondent felt and not based on an 
external stimulus (e.g. policy vignette). The emotion-induction experiment is an extension of this 
dissertation project, and is being fielded by YouGov in August of 2017. By using an emotion 
induction experiment, in which respondents are asked to write about aspects of a policy domain 
that make them feel a particular emotion, we run into less of this social desirability problem to 
underreport. As we will later see in the results section, even with the low number of cases of 
people reporting fear, some of my findings still reach statistical significance and allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis of the mobilizing effect behind the coupled strategy.   
To account for the role of key demographic and socioeconomic factors playing a role in 
predicting whether someone is motivated to take political action, Table 5.3 provides the means 









Resources   
Income .326 .372 
Unemployed .063 .071 
Education Indicator (1=College) .154 .199 
Female .568 .524 
Age 41.034 39.473 
U.S. Born Nativity .744 .643 
English Speaker .828 .848 
Internal Efficacy Scale .527 .487 
External Efficacy Scale .405 .409 
Political Interest   
Attention to Politics .566 .463 
Party Identification (Democrats =1) .696 .740 
Strong Partisans .576 .615 
Social Involvement   
Church Attendance .694 .629 
Household Member Labor Union .123 .134 
Number of Memberships .590 .716 
Home Ownership .604 .544 
Length of Residence (Years) 9.846 11.935 
Mobilization   
Mobilized by Political Party .321 .286 
Cares Who Wins Election .733 .778 
Linked Fate .580 .594 
 
Notes: Table entries are based on Latino respondents in the 2008 and 2012 ANES. With the 
exception of age, all variables are coded from 0 to 1. Missing data are not included by default 
when using Stata13 survey estimations with subpopulation weights. 
 
The demographic control variables and standard participation model predictors are 
provided in Table 5.3. To account for resources, I use a couple of different variables. The family 
income measure includes 28 income categories ranging from “0” to “1,” with “1” being the 
highest ($250,000 or more). The unemployment status indicator is based on whether respondents 
reported they were unemployed (“1”), with all other categories (including looking for a job, 
student, homemaker, etc.) being coded as “0.” The education indicator is a dichotomous measure 
based on those who have a college degree (“1”) and those who have less than a college degree 
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(“0”).41 Gender is coded “1” for females and “0” for males. The continuous age variable ranges 
from 18 to 90. The nativity indicator is a dichotomous variable that involves those who are U.S.-
born (“1”) and those who are foreign-born (“0”). The English variable is based on whether the 
respondent took the survey in English in the 2008 ANES. Due to the fact that this language of 
interview question was not available in the 2012 ANES, I relied on whether they watched the 
news in Spanish or English. For both measures, there were 3 categories, and I collapsed them 
into 2. For the English measure, “1” means “English” or “both English and Spanish” and “0” 
means “Spanish.” The internal efficacy and external efficacy scales each contain two 5-category 
variables. For internal efficacy measures, I rely on measures that tap asked about how strongly 
they agree with having a good understanding of politics as well as how strongly they disagree 
with politics being too complicated to understand.42 For the external efficacy measures, I coded 
those who said they strongly disagreed with having little say in the government and those who 
strongly disagree with elites having little care about people like them into one scaled efficacy 
measure. The scaled internal and external efficacy measures range from 0 to 1 (9 categories), 
with 1 meaning they have higher levels of efficacy. 
The party identification variable involves 3 categories, with “1” meaning they are “strong 
Democrats, not very strong Democrats, and independent leaning Democrats,” “.5” meaning they 
are “independents,” and “0” meaning they are “strong Republicans, not very strong Republicans, 
and independent leaning Republicans.” If a respondent has a stronger sense of partisan identity, 
they are more interested in politics and more invested in participating (and this is especially 
                                                
41 The analyses are also consistent when the education variable when coded as a categorical variable 
including 8 different levels of education, with the highest level (graduate school) being “1.”  
42 These measures were asked in a split-sample ballot format. The other portion of the sample had response 
category options regarding how frequently they felt the statement was true. The category options included: “All the 
time, most of the time, about half the time, some of the time and never.” I did not rely on respondents with this 
newer format of the question. As a result, there are a lot of missing observations when I include this measure in the 
models. In future iterations of the project, I will include these newer measures as well. As is, I cannot combine these 
measures (doing so results in 0 observations). 
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heightened among those participating in electoral behaviors) (Heurberger, Jorgeson and Leighley 
2016; Hamill, Lodge and Blake 1985; Lupia 1994; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). The emotion 
variables ask about emotions towards political candidates, which may be heavily influenced by 
one’s party identification leanings.  The partisan strength measure also involves 2 categories, 
with “1” being strong and not very strong party identifiers and “0” being those who are 
independent and those independents who are leaners. For those who mentioned they liked and 
disliked aspects of the Democratic and Republican parties, I combined these “Yes” responses to 
these 4 questions equal to “1.” Those who said they had no dislikes towards the parties equal 
“0.” In addition to one’s party identification, a sense of racial and ethnic group identification has 
been linked to greater levels of political engagement among racial minority groups (Schildkraut 
2005; Garcia 2003; Sanchez 2006b; Stokes 2003; Miller et al. 1981). I rely on the dichotomous 
variable available in the ANES that asks whether the respondents feels their life is affected by 
what happens to Hispanics/Latinos in the U.S.  
To measure social involvement, I have included union membership, organization 
memberships and church attendance. Those who said they had someone in their household that 
belonged to a labor union were coded as “1.” I also included a continuous measure for the 
number of organizations for which the respondent belonged to as a formal member. The religious 
identity indicator involves those who attend church outside of weddings, baptisms and funerals 
(“1”).  
Results   
Talking about Politics, Participation Scale and Vote Intentionality 
 
 In Table 5.4, I provide the most basic models estimating the key outcome variables in this 
chapter. The first 3 models do not include any control measures, but demonstrate the effect of the 
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main emotion variables of fear and hope on talking about politics, participating in politics and 
vote intentionality. The last 3 models include more demographic control variables. These models 
are useful before moving on to the more fully specified models that follow in this chapter, which 
include more standard participation controls and emotional engagement variables.  
The first covariates are emotions based on feelings of fear towards the Republican 
candidate—McCain in 2008, Romney in 2012—and feelings of hope towards the Democratic 
candidate (Obama).43  These two single emotion variables are dichotomous dummy variables. To 
test whether the combination of fear and hope is more mobilizing than either of these feelings 
alone, I have created an interaction term between these two emotion variables.  Thus, the 
interactive term across the models specified in this chapter are based on those who 
simultaneously feel fear towards the Republican candidate (Republican fear = 1) and hope 
towards the Democratic candidate (Democratic hope = 1). As such, the constituent terms of the 
interaction variable cannot be interpreted as if they stood alone. 
In the first model of Table 5.4, we see the results for talking about politics. The outcome 
measure for talking about politics is a dichotomous measure, so I rely on logistic regression 
models to estimate the predicted likelihoods of engaging in this form of political action. We see 
that the interactive effect of experiencing hope towards the Democratic candidate and fear 
towards the Republican candidate is positive, though not statistically significant. These patterns 
are in the same substantive direction throughout the table, with the exception of the vote 
intentionality model (Model 3). The interaction term does not reach statistical significance at any 
point throughout the first 3 non-fully specified models or in the latter 3 models with additional 
                                                
43 As main independent variables, I also test the collapse fear towards the Republican candidate and fear 
towards the Democratic candidate into one overall fear dummy variable. This involves testing hope towards the 
Democratic candidate and hope towards the Republican candidate into a separate dummy variable as well. These 
results are available in Appendix D and among the final tables of Chapter 5.  
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demographic and socioeconomic control factors. Interestingly, only feeling hope towards the 
democratic candidate has a positive effect on the predicted likelihood one’s vote certainty 
(Model 3, p<.10 level), but it has a negative effect on the overall participation scale, which 
includes talking about politics, joining a rally and wearing a political button (Model 5, p<.10 
level). Models 4 through 6 include controls for family income, unemployment status, education, 
gender, party identification, age, nativity, political interest, owning a home, union membership 
and a sense of Latino linked fate. I rely on these more simplified models in Table 5.4 to paint a 
general sense of the associative effects of our key emotion variables (or proxies for threat and 
opportunity). The table below is an abbreviated version for readability purposes. These models 
also provide larger samples than those in the more fully specified models to follow. It is also 
worth noting that the interaction term of fear and hope is actually in a negative direction (though 
it predominantly fails to reach statistical significance) when using the same models seen in Table 
5.4 with the 2012 ANES (available in Appendix D). I anticipated the simultaneous effect of 
feeling hope towards the Democratic candidate and fear towards the Republican candidate to 
boost one’s political participation. As seen in Table 5.4, there is no definitive evidence 





Table 5.4: Models Estimating Talking, Participating and Voting with ANES 2008 Latino 
Subpopulation with No Controls and with Limited Control Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Talking 
Politics 













 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Main Independent 
Variables 
      
Fear- Rep 0.228 0.035 0.132 -0.074 0.005 0.048 
 (0.670) (0.091) (0.092) (0.780) (0.101) (0.072) 
Hope- Dem 0.058 0.010 0.088* -0.391 -0.046* 0.016 
 (0.272) (0.024) (0.045) (0.319) (0.024) (0.042) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear 
(R):   
0.431 0.046 -0.035 0.877 0.074 0.001 
 (0.739) (0.095) (0.104) (0.823) (0.108) (0.089) 
Demographic Controls       
Family Income    0.409 0.028 -0.037 
    (0.453) (0.042) (0.083) 
Education Indicator 
(1=College Degree) 
   0.295 0.027 0.148*** 
    (0.404) (0.044) (0.034) 
Gender (Female=1)    -0.236 -0.027 0.090*** 
    (0.282) (0.027) (0.033) 




   -0.145 0.010 0.097** 
    (0.352) (0.031) (0.047) 
Nativity Indicator 
(1=U.S.-born) 
   -0.060 0.012 -0.058 
    (0.355) (0.031) (0.041) 
Interest in Campaign 
Politics 
   0.730 0.139*** 0.384*** 
    (0.475) (0.051) (0.047) 
Own a Home    0.143 -0.009 0.020 






 (0.206) (0.019) (0.035) (0.546) (0.059) (0.089) 
Observations 440 440 438 355 355 353 




Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-
tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents 
in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey 




Talking About Politics – Among Democrats and Women 
 
Moving on to Table 5.5, I demonstrate the results for a more conservative model, 
including more important controls for traditional models of political participation, but also 
includes additional emotional engagement variables. For this table, I focus on predicting talking 
about politics. The talking measure in the ANES is a social behavior that consists of trying to 
influence one’s friends or family into supporting a candidate of their choice (or on behalf of 
one’s community). Though the results are fully specified, they are abbreviated in this table for 
readability purposes. For results with the full demographic, standard participation and emotional 
engagement control variables provided in the list of variables in Table 5.3, refer to Appendix D.  
The first model is based on the entire Latino subsample in the 2008 ANES. However, one cannot 
overlook the entangling effects of partisanship when asked to evaluate their feelings towards the 
leading general election candidates (Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014). To 
account for the partisan nature of feeling fear towards the Republican candidate and hope 
towards the Democratic candidate, the second model is focused solely on Democrats in my 
sample (strong/moderate/leaning). This group would see any message of opportunity and threat 
provided by the candidate through the lens of their party or partisan group. I focus on the subset 
of respondents who identified as either strong, moderate or leaning Democrats because those 
who consider themselves Democrats would be expected to feel more strongly about their hope 
towards the Democratic candidate and feel more strongly about their fear towards the Republican 
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candidate. Due to the gendered findings that emerged in the survey experiment (Chapter 4), the 
third model focuses on female respondents. In the previous chapter, I found that women were 
driving the results behind the coupled threat-and-opportunity strategy’s mobilizing effects. By 
the same logic, to test whether women in the ANES data are particularly susceptible to the 
mobilizing effects of the coupled fear-and-hope strategy, I focus on the subset of women in my 
sample in Model 3.   
Again, in an effort to test whether the combination of fear and hope is more mobilizing 
than either of these feelings alone, I have created an interaction term between the first two single 
emotion dummy variables. The first covariate represents those who only feel fear towards the 
Republican candidate (Republican fear=1) and those who do not feel hope towards the 
Democratic candidate (Democratic hope = 0). The second logit coefficient in Table 5.5, or the 
additional constituent term, represents having hope towards the Democratic candidate 






Table 5.5: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino 
Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
Main Independent Variables    
Fear- Rep 1.618 1.768 0.755 
 (1.904) (1.963) (5.347) 
Hope- Dem -0.606 -1.552 -2.440 
 (1.338) (1.070) (1.668) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):   1.590 2.632* 4.440* 
 (1.235) (1.371) (2.343) 
Additional Emotional 
Engagement Variables 
   
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-1.644 -1.729 0.994 
 (1.431) (1.112) (2.391) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-1.118 -0.991 -1.030 
 (1.713) (0.925) (2.167) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.187 -0.343 1.671 
 (0.539) (0.540) (1.029) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
2.736** 4.405**  
 (1.175) (1.010)  
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
-1.030  -0.949 
 (0.761)  (2.422) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.189 -0.451 - 
 (0.517) (0.565)  
Constant -2.687* -3.713 -6.976 
 (1.459) (2.313) (6.150) 
Observations 165 117 88 
 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-
tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents 
in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey 
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estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and standard 
participation controls, see Appendix D. 
 
As seen in Model 1 of Table 5.5, the interactive effect of fear and hope is positive among 
the Latino sample, but the results do not reach statistical significance. The results are in the 
expected substantive direction, though. Moving on to subsample results among Democrats 
(Model 2), results from the logit estimates indicate that feeling a coupled sense of fear and hope 
is in fact significantly associated with talking about politics at the .10 level of significance for 
both outcomes in the 2008 ANES. These results hold upon controlling for various socioeconomic 
and standard participation predictors. Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 4, where the coupled 
effects of threat and opportunity in my experiment’s findings were heightened among women, I 
also find that the simultaneous effect of feeling fear and hope is driven among women (Model 3). 
Previous research has found that women seek more expressive and social-oriented forms of 
coping when dealing with stressors and threat appraisals in their environments, and often relying 
on wishful thinking strategies (Ptacek et al. 1992; Taylor et al. 2000).  Finally, due to additional 
socialization and acculturation differences among Latina women and Latino men, where women 
have been found to be more engaged in various forms of political behavior (Jones-Correa 1998; 
Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a; Waters 1999), I expected to find that women 
would be more willing to deal with both fear and hope by talking about politics with people they 
know.  
My findings provide additional support for the catalyzing effect of coupled threat and 
opportunity messages seen in Chapters 3 and 4.  The effect of “only fear” towards the 
Republican candidate (or threat alone), is positive; as such, this provides some support for threat 
being a catalyst of political action, but it does not reach statistical significance. It is also worth 
mentioning that although the effect of “only hope” towards the Democratic candidate (or 
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opportunity alone) is not statistically significant, it is overwhelmingly negative (except for 
Model 3). Overall, based on Table 5.5’s 2008 results, we can reject the null that the coupled 
effect of fear and hope is not associated with talking about politics, even after controlling for 
important predictors of political participation. 
As demonstrated in Table 5.5, I have also included additional emotional engagement 
controls, and even still my results remain significant among Democrats and women. Overall, 
Democrats and women are more susceptible to the mobilizing effect of the combined feelings of 
fear (Republican) and hope (Democratic). The additional emotional engagement variables are 
accounting for a couple of different forms of being more emotionally engaged so as to explain 
away the simple combination of two emotions—fear and hope—seen in the interaction term I 
have created.  Presumably, those who feel any of these feelings towards either candidate are 
more emotionally engaged in this election and perhaps this will explain away my results. As we 
see in Table 5.5, my main independent variable of the combination of fear towards the 
Republican and hope towards the Democrat is still positive and statistically significant among 
Democrats and among women. It is also worth noting that the angry feelings towards either 
candidate are also positive and statistically significant (p<.01 among Democrats). In the past, 





Table 5.6: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino 
Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
Main Independent Variables    
Fear- Rep 2.534 32.055 -3.740 
 (2.836) (0.000) (3.094) 
Hope- Dem -0.479 15.060 1.857 
 (1.035) (0.000) (2.961) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):   -3.931 -27.714 -7.829 
 (3.028) (0.000) (5.017) 
Additional Emotional 
Engagement Variables 
   
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
2.969* -2.151 7.981* 
 (1.577) (0.000) (4.103) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
2.792 -11.537 6.784* 
 (1.686) (0.000) (3.959) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-1.414 -1.498 -6.621** 
 (1.482) (0.000) (2.968) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.449 0.294 4.123** 
 (0.656) (0.000) (1.882) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
-1.284  -0.762 
 (1.066)  (1.657) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.128 -0.133  
 (0.491) (0.000)  
Constant -9.361*** -10.673 -20.353* 
 (2.842) (0.000) (11.729) 
Observations 160 112 88 
 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-
tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents 
in the 2012 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey 
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estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and standard 
participation controls, see Appendix D. 
 
In Table 5.6, we have the same model specification, but we move on to the Latino sample 
found in the 2012 ANES. As we see in this table, the coupled feelings of fear and hope do not 
reach statistical significance and cannot reject the null hypothesis. Furthermore, the results are 
not in the expected direction (substantively positive). The coupled feelings of fear and hope are 
negatively correlated with talking about politics in 2012. The single emotion variables of feeling 
fear towards the Republican and hope towards the Democrat candidate are not statistically 
significant and the effect is not in one consistent direction.  These results are consistently 
insignificant when focused only on Democrats  (Model 2) and on women (Model 3). Thus, in 
2012, feeling both fear towards Romney and hope towards Obama did not have a positive effect 
on people’s willingness to talk about politics with friends and family to try to influence their 
decision in the election. As seen in the last table in 2008, feeling angry towards either candidate 
is positive and statistically significant (among women only). In fact, among women, most of the 
additional emotional engagement variable controls boost one’s willingness to talk about politics. 
Admittedly, we see the total observations deplete considerably in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, especially 
as these models include a more complete list of control variables. Some of these control 
measures have a large number of missings (i.e. including the additional emotional engagement 
variables), some in large part because respondents were asked about the items in a split-sample 
format (i.e. internal and external efficacy measures). Furthermore, due to the split-sample nature 
of focusing either solely on Democrats or solely on women, the total observations shrink even 
more. 
 




As we move on to Table 5.7, we move on to estimating people’s willingness to engage in 
more forms of political participation. The participation scale outcome measure includes talking 
about politics, joining a political protest, and wearing a campaign button or displaying a 
campaign bumper sticker. This 4-category outcome measure ranged from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning 
the participant engaged in all 3 activities and 0 meaning they had not participated in any of these 
activities. Thus, given the categorical nature of the variable, I rely on OLS models in Table 5.7. 
In Table 5.7, we see the overall sample results available in Model 1. Due to the partisan nature of 
feeling fear towards the Republican candidate, and hope towards the Democratic candidate, I 
move on to assessing the results among Democrats in Model 2. Finally, Model 3 demonstrates 




Table 5.7: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2008 Latino 
Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
 2008 2008 2008 
Main Independent Variables    
Fear- Rep 0.106 0.071 -0.019 
 (0.097) (0.109) (0.153) 
Hope- Dem -0.081 -0.041 -0.095* 
 (0.056) (0.070) (0.048) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):   0.131* 0.132 0.235* 
 (0.076) (0.108) (0.124) 
Additional Emotional 
Engagement Variables 
   
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.153** -0.085 -0.064 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.050) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.041 0.036 0.081 
 (0.058) (0.079) (0.055) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.068 -0.100** -0.009 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.075) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.152* 0.139* 0.189* 
 (0.084) (0.076) (0.098) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
0.004  -0.068 
 (0.034)  (0.052) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.053* -0.073*  
 (0.029) (0.037)  
Constant -0.072 -0.186 -0.150 
 (0.100) (0.157) (0.152) 
Observations 165 117 93 
R-squared 0.381 0.426 0.452 
 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-
tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents 
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in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey 
estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and standard 
participation controls, see Appendix D. 
 
In Table 5.7, I find that the coupled strategy of feeling fear towards the Republican 
candidate and hope towards the Democratic candidate is positive in predicting more political 
participation. I find this effect to be positive and statistically significant at the .10 level.  
Although the effect remains positive when focusing solely among Democrats, the combined 
effect loses significance (Model 2). To test whether the results were driven by women in my 
sample, Model 3 presents these results. Among women, the coupled effect of feeling both fear 
and hope is positive and statistically significant (p<.10 level). Each of these models includes 
additional controls for robustness, though they are not presented here. We can see that the results 
hold after controlling for important demographic and standard participation controls (outlined in 
Table 5.3). The full table of results is available in Appendix D. It is also worth noting that the 
angry feelings towards either candidate are also positive and statistically significant across all 
three models in Table 5.7. Again, this confirms the motivating effects found behind anger among 




Table 5.8: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2012 Latino 
Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
 2012 2012 2012 
Main Independent Variables    
Fear- Rep 0.265** 0.351** 0.293 
 (0.107) (0.145) (0.240) 
Hope- Dem -0.105 -0.129 -0.060 
 (0.071) (0.150) (0.073) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):   -0.318*** -0.151 -0.506** 
 (0.115) (0.174) (0.245) 
Additional Emotional 
Engagement Variables 
   
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.107** -0.124** 0.166** 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.081) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.130 0.223 0.213** 
 (0.082) (0.150) (0.090) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.061 -0.074 -0.038 
 (0.068) (0.087) (0.099) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.031 -0.003 0.118 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.071) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
-0.032  -0.002 
 (0.059)  (0.075) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.028 -0.069*  
 (0.034) (0.040)  
Constant -0.161* -0.089 -0.295** 
 (0.086) (0.075) (0.148) 
    
Observations 160 112 88 
R-squared 0.373 0.424 0.463 
 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-
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tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with face-to-face Latino 
respondents in the 2012 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted 
survey estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and 
standard participation controls, see Appendix D. 
 
The 2012 results for the participation scale outcome are available in Table 5.8. 
Interestingly, the 2012 results for this outcome raised mixed results. As it turns out, the coupled 
effect of fear and hope is not positively correlated with various measures on the participation 
scale in 2012. In fact, the coupled effect is negative and statistically significant in the entire 
sample (p<.01), among Democrats (not significant), and among women (p<.05). Feeling fear 
towards the Republican candidate and feeling hope towards the Democratic candidate does not 
have a boosting effect on the extent of one’s participation. Among those in the pooled sample 
(Model 1), the composite deterring effect of feeling both fear and hope is small (-.053 times). 
Among women, those who felt both fear and hope, are .213 times less likely to participate in all 
3 political activities. This is the first table for which we have seen the threat alone, or fear alone, 
effect is positive and reaches statistical significance. Given that Obama was an incumbent 
president, the amount of hope associated with him may have been lower than that seen in 2008. 
As such, it may be threat alone, or fear towards Romney, that is driving the deterring results 
observed in the coupled effect of fear and hope.44 Moving on to the additional emotional 
                                                
44 In an effort to test if the combination of fear and hope reactions to both candidates would still support the 
coupled approach of threat-and-opportunity, the final results in Appendix D account for one’s emotional responses 
to either candidate.  By combining responses towards either candidate for the corresponding emotion, I boost the 
number of cases for each measure. More specifically, “Only Fear” is based on fear posed by either candidate—the 
Republican or Democrat. The “Only Hope” variable includes respondents who said they felt hopeful towards either 
the Democrat candidate or the Republican candidate.  Finally, the combined effect of “Both Fear and Hope” 
involves those who feel both hope and fear posed by either candidate. Combining the emotion variables for either 
the Republican or Democratic candidate has been a standard technique in previous research on the effect of 
emotions in politics (Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Groenendyk 2011; Marcus et al. 2000). 
Though the combined hope and fear interaction term is positive and statistically significant focusing solely among 
female participants for either talking about politics or predicting the participation scale, the results are not positive or 




engagement variables, we see that hope towards either candidate has a positive effect, but only 
among women this time (Model 3). 
 
Vote Intentionality – Among Democrats and Women 
 
 In terms of predicting vote intentionality, I rely on OLS models for the categorical 
measure of one’s intent vote in the general election. The 2008 ANES measure is based on a 
follow-up question regarding the respondents’ certainty to vote or not to vote. Recoded from 0 to 
1, this was a 10-category measure, with “1” meaning “definitely will vote” and “0” meaning 





Table 5.9: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intentionality with ANES 2008 Latino 
Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
Main Independent Variables    
Fear- Rep -0.019 -0.093 -0.332* 
 (0.206) (0.180) (0.179) 
Hope- Dem -0.172* -0.223** -0.072 
 (0.090) (0.103) (0.120) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):   0.169 0.295* 0.246 
 (0.215) (0.155) (0.189) 
Additional Emotional 
Engagement Variables 
   
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.137 -0.134 0.169 
 (0.090) (0.116) (0.114) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.185** 0.132 0.000 
 (0.088) (0.119) (0.102) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.073 0.082** 0.148** 
 (0.052) (0.041) (0.060) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.138 -0.016 0.073 
 (0.099) (0.067) (0.076) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
0.080  0.058 
 (0.064)  (0.124) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.153*** 0.107* - 
 (0.057) (0.062) - 
Constant 0.066 0.240 0.517** 
 (0.148) (0.162) (0.250) 
Observations 163 115 92 
R-squared 0.453 0.440 0.437 
 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-




Among those in the pooled sample (Model 1), experiencing both fear towards the 
Republican candidate and hope towards the Democratic candidate in 2008 appears to suggest a 
positive effect on one’s likelihood to vote in the general election. This is not a very strong 
finding, as the standard errors indicate it is not statistically distinguishable from zero. However, 
it is in the expected positive direction. As we move on to Model 2, focusing solely on the 
Democratic subset of Latinos, we see that the results become discernable from zero. The 
boosting effect holds and is statistically significant at the .10 level. The composite effect of those 
who experience fear towards the Republican candidate and hope towards Democratic candidate 




Table 5.10: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intentionality with ANES 2012 Latino 
Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













 2012 Dems Women 
  2012 2012 
Main Independent Variables    
Fear- Rep 0.167 0.189 0.383** 
 (0.260) (0.485) (0.166) 
Hope- Dem 0.232 0.164 -0.060 
 (0.222) (0.336) (0.215) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):   -0.525** -0.345 - 
 (0.221) (0.442) - 
Additional Emotional 
Engagement Variables 
   
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.346** 0.129 -0.095 
 (0.143) (0.334) (0.122) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.076  0.126 
 (0.306)  (0.210) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.002 -0.035 -0.529*** 
 (0.145) (0.190) (0.162) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.215* -0.251** -0.445*** 
 (0.114) (0.098) (0.093) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
0.060 - -0.312 
 (0.148) - (0.200) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.175* 0.045 - 
 (0.095) (0.097) - 
Constant -0.005 0.368 0.190 
 (0.207) (0.383) (0.198) 
Observations 71 51 37 
R-squared 0.696 0.668 0.871 
 
Notes: The dependent variable contains 5 categories, ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 being 
“Extremely Likely.” Entries are OLS coefficients. This vote intentionality outcome measure is 
based on one of the split-ballot measures available in the 2012 ANES. This measure asks about 
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the likelihood one will vote in the November election and provides a 5-point Likert scale. All 




In the 2012 dataset, the vote intentionality measure I rely on was based on an open-ended 
measure where respondents could report how likely they were to vote (ranging from 0 to 100). I 
recoded this measure into quantiles, with those closer to 1 representing those reporting higher 
percentages about their certainty to vote in the general election.  As seen previously with the 
2012 results, the coupled results of fear and hope have a deterring effect on one’s likelihood to 
vote. The results reach statistical significance at the .10 level. In fact, accounting for the 
composite effect of the interaction term and one of its constituent terms (-0.525+0.167 = 0.358), 
they are .358 times less likely to report they are likely to vote. In Model 3, among women, the 
estimates for the interaction term are missing because there were not enough cases for the 
coupled feelings of fear and hope.  
 
Discussion  
 I use data from the ANES 2008 and 2012 to test my hypothesis that, among Latino 
respondents, the coupled message of threat and opportunity is more mobilizing than threat alone. 
The benefit of using the ANES to analyze secondary data to test my theory is that it allows me to 
draw more generalizeable claims, which I could not do with the convenience sample in the 
survey experiment in Chapters 3 and 4. Thus, the nationally representative sample of Latinos 
available in the ANES provides me with claims of external validity as I replicate my survey 
experiment. The use of face-to-face interviews and probability-based geographic sampling is the 
same gold-standard approach used by the U.S. Census Bureau (Maholtra and Krosnick 2007). 
The ANES Time Series studies started collecting survey data during the years of Presidential 
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elections since 1948 including interviewing respondents during the two months prior to the 
November election, and then re-interviewing during the two months after the election.45 Despite 
its longstanding history collecting public opinion of American voters, the ANES only recently 
began collecting comparable representative data of ethnic and racial minorities, including 
Hispanics (and Blacks) in 2008. More specifically, the ANES gathered a Latino oversample in 
the 2008 Time Series oversample design. In the 2012 ANES, the ANES included a nationally 
representative main sample (including people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds) as well as an 
oversample of black and Hispanic respondents. The 2012 ANES also contains a self-
administered portion of the interview, which is intended to minimize the social desirability 
pressures or privacy concerns one might face in front of an interviewer. The participant can 
answer some of the questions privately on a tablet computer. 
Skeptics might wonder how the role of partisanship might be driving the results. In fact, 
one’s partisanship identity has often been found as an important political identity, and one that is 
based on group considerations. Thus, threats to policies one holds as important are not just a 
threat to the individual, but they threaten the individual’s group (Groenendyk 2011). Processing 
these threats in terms of a group lens allows the individual to have a greater sense of control over 
the situation (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). In terms of predicting voter turnout, having a strong 
partisan group identification has been found to be a strong predictor of political participation 
(Groenendyk and Banks 2014) and trust in government sources (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), 
particularly as people navigate their complex political environment by following political cues 
from parties and interest groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Kam 2005; Lupia 1994; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991). Emotion scholars have controlled for partisan strength by 
                                                
45 The ANES also collects Pilot Studies testing content and methodology in ‘between’ most of the Time 
Series studies since 1979. 
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combining emotional reactions to either Republican or Democratic candidates (Valentino et al. 
2011; Groenendyk 2011). Nicholson (2011) finds that party leaders are particularly more 
effective in polarizing opinions, more so than generic political party signals. This raises concerns 
about the particular candidates running in the 2008 and 2012 elections, and the unique effect they 
might have had in mobilizing political action. Petty and Cacioppo (1996, Ch. 3), in their studies 
on persuasive source characteristics, also suggest that people’s opinions are shaped by their 
perceptions of the source’s credibility, trustworthiness and similarity with the recipient’s views. 
Perhaps this could also be applied to a focus on political behavior.  
Furthermore, the Latino samples are collected at a time during the historical presidential 
election of the first black president, Barack Obama. The mobilizing effect of hope and fear may 
have been especially driven by hope, particularly as Obama’s 2008 campaign ran on a promise of 
“hope” and “change.” Perhaps there was less room for fear of political threat to catalyze people 
to take action; thus, my analyses might be understating the effect of fear than what we might 
have seen in previous elections. However, I am not too worried about this concern because if fear 
and hope were not working hand-in-hand in a unique way, we would see that experiencing fear 
alone or hope alone would be sufficient to catalyze a significant effect in talking about politics, 
and this is not the case. 
As seen with the talking outcome in the independently designed survey experiment in 
Chapters 3 and 4, my experiment and the ANES contain similar outcome measures to capture 
whether a participant is engaged in talking about politics with friends and/or family. Though the 
subtle differences involve engaging in conversation about immigration politics versus talking 
with someone about why they should vote for a particular candidate or party, the two capture a 
social form of political participation. The two measures are expressive and involve a political 
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dialogue with someone they know.  Overall, when predicting whether people will talk about 
politics, the logit models presented in this chapter reveal that the behavior of Latino samples in 
the 2008 and 2012 ANES does at times support the simultaneously motivating effects of 
coupling fear and hope. The participation scale models demonstrated substantive positive results 
for the 2008 ANES (in the overall sample and among women) and statistically significant and 
boosting effects in the models estimating vote intentionality (particularly among Democrats) in 
the same dataset. Interestingly, the 2012 ANES models tended to result in a dampening effect 
across all 3 political participation outcomes. The only time the 2012 ANES results indicated a 
possible positive direction for talking about politics was when combining fear towards either 
candidate and hope towards either candidate, though the result did not reach statistical 
significance (seen in Appendix D).  
The results presented in this chapter are not conclusive and still raise more questions. 
Overwhelmingly, we see that the results do not reach statistical significance.  The existing proxy 
measures I relied on for threat and opportunity were very narrow and based on a comment(s) the 
presidential candidates had said or what they had done in the past. This question does not ask 
about something the candidate intends to do in the future, particularly as part of their campaign 
goals. The nature of a looming threat or potential opportunity, as presented in the survey 
experiment vignettes in Chapter 3, are that they are based on the future. Additionally, the current 
ANES affect measures relies on a question that is not devoid of political partisanship. The survey 
experiment vignettes did not cue a specific political party reference. Thus, the respondents’ fears 
and hopes may be driven from their overall loyalty or opposition for the long-standing 2-party 
system in U.S. politics. Furthermore, respondents may be underreporting the extent to which 
they felt fear towards the candidate(s). If there is a reluctance to report fear, I suspect there may 
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also be a reluctance to report a strong sense of hope. Appearing to be as unbothered or as 
realistic as possible about the candidates at hand could be driving the dull “treatment” effects 
captured in people’s self-reported feelings of fear and hope.  
  
Summary 
As with most studies, while the current analyses answer a few immediate questions about 
the role of fear and hope in motivating political engagement, this study also raises new points to 
consider for future research. In support of previous scholarship that have shown fear and hope 
can motivate political action, I also find that these two emotions, particularly in combination, are 
associated with greater levels of political engagement.  For example, in support of this claim, 
Marcus et al.’s (2000) survey analyses demonstrate that anxiety and enthusiasm are associated 
with campaign interest and participation. Brader (2005, 2006), through the use of campaign 
experiment ads, which contained varying emotional components (music and imagery), finds that 
fear has a narrow catalyzing effect, particularly on behaviors such as the participants’ willingness 
to work for a campaign and a stronger belief in the importance of voting. He finds that 
enthusiasm evokes higher levels of campaign interest, intent to register, intent to vote and a 
greater willingness to work for a campaign. In an attempt to reconcile some of the ways in which 
scholars factor the role of emotions in predicting political participation, some methodologies 
involve manipulating emotions through an experiment, while others have used correlations from 
survey data, or a mix of both approaches (Brader 2005, 2006; Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 
2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Groenendyk 2011).  
My immediate next steps are to move beyond the correlation analyses seen in this 
chapter, and instead extend this study with an emotion-induction experiment. It is important to 
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provide this form of the emotional treatment, a bottom-up approach, which allows participants to 
write about specific aspects of a policy debate and how they make them feel (Albertson and 
Gadarian 2015). Scholars have found slightly diverging effects of anxiety depending on whether 
they rely on a combination of survey measures or if it is induced (see Groenendyk 2011; Brader 
2005, 2006). I am currently fielding a survey experiment (June 2017)—through YouGov and 
supported by the National Science Foundation—where the emotions are independently 
manipulated. By replicating these results in an experiment that induces fear and hope, I will be 
more confident that the mechanisms (potentially emotional states) I am capturing for threat and 
opportunity are not based on particular evaluations of candidates in the 2008 and 2012 
presidential elections. Admittedly, the historic election and re-election of the nation’s first black 
president might have boosted the effect of hope, particularly as the candidate ran with a very 
explicit promise of “hope in his campaign.”  Analyses of the 2016 ANES data will provide me 
with more confidence that the emotional states (or mindsets) associated with threat and 
opportunity are not particular to the unique election of President Barack Obama. However, it is 
worth noting that if hope alone were driving the results, then we would find the isolated hope 
reaction to then-candidate Obama to be statistically significant (Table 5.5). We do not see this is 
the case, and instead, it is the combined effect of both fear and hope, regardless of whether it is 
limited to Obama (Table 5.6), to be positive and statistically significant in predicting talking 
about politics. 
By using survey analyses with the ANES data, I am able to draw generalizeable claims of 
my coupled threat and opportunity theory, which I was unable to conclude from the survey 
experiment. As indicated by the data (and more strongly by the 2008 ANES), my findings 
suggest there are some boosting effects in combining a sense of urgency (or fear) with hope, 
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particularly among women (and at times among Democrats). These gendered results point to the 
gendered results seen in the survey experiment, where women were driving the catalyzing effects 






Conclusion: Implications for Contemporary Politics and Democratic Governance 
 
Summary 
To reiterate, in Chapter 2, I present the “mobilizer’s dilemma,” which holds that efforts to 
galvanize a response with crisis-oriented messages only make matters worse by undermining the 
belief in one’s ability to “make a difference.” (Vasi and Macy 2003).  Vasi and Macy (2003) 
suggest that efforts intended to overcome free-riding and override feelings of low efficacy are 
best tackled through a two-pronged message approach: a coupling of crisis and empowerment 
message frames. Aside from not accounting for alternative explanations that would be part of a 
threatening political environment, including exposure to opportunity messages, previous studies 
concluding that Latinos have felt “under attack” have not included measures at the individual 
level. Thus, without measuring threat at the individual level, it is difficult to conclude that threat alone 
motivates previously observed peaks in political activism. My project expands the range of 
potentially mobilizing messages, and challenges the idea that threat is the most successful way to 
encourage participation among Latinos. My findings also point to the ways in which women 
cope with threat and stressors in their environments through more expressive and social forms of 
political engagement.  The coupled strategy equips, or motivates, some to join in collective 
action efforts more easily. 
Some researchers have found that there are motivating effects behind a two-pronged 
approach in a few domains of health behavior and collective action (Vasi and Macy 2003; 
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Rogers and Mewborn 1976). Borrowing from this literature, I test the dynamic effects of being 
simultaneously exposed to threatening- and opportunity-based appeals on Latino political 
behavior. The experiment results in Chapter 3 point to a positive association between the 
Coupled Condition and the intent to participate in various non-electoral forms of participation 
(e.g. march, talk and volunteer). Most importantly, I find the coupled strategy of threat-and-
opportunity encourages people to send a postcard at higher rates than simply using lone 
messages emphasizing threat or opportunity appeals.  
The coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is more mobilizing because I argue that 
individuals who feel challenged, and not only threatened, are less distracted by the negativity 
stirred by the threat message (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Tomaka 
et al. 1993).  I have some indirect evidence for this, as the cognitive manipulation check 
demonstrates that subjects are less pessimistic about the future well-being of unauthorized 
immigrants in the Coupled Condition. That is, they perceive the benefits posed by the policy 
opportunity, and therefore, have something to gain for their efforts as they also ward off the 
danger from the threat (Tomaka et al. 1993). In fact, as expected, they are most pessimistic about 
how well immigrants will fare if they are exposed to the Threat alone condition.   
In Chapter 4, I explore the unexpected moderating effects of gender. In the Control 
Condition, I find that women are significantly disadvantaged relative to men when it comes to 
non-electoral forms of participation. However, as seen in the highlighted Coupled treatment 
condition in this figure, we find this gender imbalance is not only eliminated, but women are 
slightly more likely than men to participate politically.  Interestingly, men remain essentially 
unmoved by the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition.  Thus, the positive interactive 
effect of gender and the Coupled Condition is being driven almost entirely by the increase in 
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participation among women. Furthermore, it turns out that the Coupled Condition of Threat-and-
Opportunity is static for women and deters men from the intent to vote.  Thus, women are 
buffered from the demobilizing effect men experience in this condition. Again, this may be 
partly due to the “oppositional culture” men might engage in at any sign of threat. It may also be 
that women are buffered from the demobilizing effect because they engage in more wishful 
thinking, which is facilitated in the paired threat-and-opportunity condition. In terms of sending a 
postcard and any potential moderating effect by gender, the interactive gender effect fell short of 
statistical significance in the Coupled Condition for women relative to men. Thus, there is no 
substantial gender difference in this treatment. Neither men nor women experience a mobilizing 
effect when plotting one’s probability of sending a postcard.   
With the advent of the Latino samples available in the 2008 and 2012 ANES, I begin to 
scratch the surface of the causal mechanisms of a coupled threat and opportunity environment in 
Chapter 5. Given that the ANES does not rely on a convenience sample, I am also able to make 
more generalizeable claims with this dataset. I use proxy measures combining fear and hope to 
test the coupled threat and opportunity effect on nationally representative samples of Latino 
respondents. I find mixed support for the motivating effects of feeling a combination of fear and 
hope.   
Latinos in the 2016 Election 
“I’m worried that because Donald Trump is so visceral they’ll think Latinos will turn 
out because of that alone. […] Hate alone won’t motivate somebody to vote…They 
need something to vote for.” September 2, 2016. Chuck Rocha, Latino Democratic 
strategist from Solidarity Strategies in an interview with the Washington Post. 
 
In this particular case, the quote comes from a Democratic strategist concerned about the 
abundance of fear and perceived threat posed for the 2016 Latino electorate by then-candidate 
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Donald Trump (Planas 2016).  Instead of presuming that the Latino ‘sleeping giant’ would 
awaken in response to then-candidate Trump’s rhetoric, this quote sheds light on the need to look 
beyond threat if one seeks to mobilize the Latino community.  Yet, campaigns and interest 
groups seeking to mobilize the mass public often point to an impending catastrophe or looming 
enemy as a means to spark a sense of urgency and alarm (Alinsky 1971). Many political elites 
believe that appeals to threat represent an effective means of mobilization.  However, the use of 
threat might immobilize people because it diminishes the extent to which people feel equipped 
enough to respond to the crisis (Vasi and Macy 2003; Soroka and McAdams 2015).  Is it possible 
that threat cues do not mobilize certain segments of the populace?  Instead of only relying on a 
threatening message that emphasizes potentially aversive outcomes (Altheide and Michalowski 
1999), this dissertation demonstrates that it may be more effective if such appeals are coupled 
with an opportunity message that emphasizes the possibility of more desirable policy goals.  In 
order to explore this possibility, I focus on Latino reactions to threat and opportunity appeals on 
the issue of immigration. 
Previous awakenings of the Latino “sleeping giant,” thought to have been provoked primarily 
by anti-immigrant policies, led the Democratic National Convention to wrongfully err on the 
expectation that Latino voters would rise up in the 2016 election, to vote against Donald Trump and his 
draconian immigration policies (Planas 2016).  Though the share of the national electorate that is 
Latino continues to grow in each presidential election, this is partly due to population growth (Planas 
2016).  Early numbers reported in the media suggest that Latinos only made up 11 percent of the 2016 
electorate, which is about the same as turnout in 2012 (Suro 2016).   
As I explain below, relying on negative reactions to Trump to represent a sufficient incentive 
for Latino voter turnout was, perhaps, a miscalculation for the Democratic National Committee and/or 
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Hillary Clinton campaign (Planas 2016; Suro 2016).  Though some argue that a different Democratic 
strategy that relied on greater canvassing and outreach efforts would have increased Latino turnout in 
2016 (Planas 2016; Michelson and Garcia Bedolla 2012), the message content behind these mobilizing 
strategies could not have been a continuation of alarming people to stop Trump’s immigration policies.   
Based on the lessons we can draw from the experiment and ANES findings in this dissertation, 
a messaging strategy pairing the threat of Trump’s policies with the alternative, and more optimistic, 
promises of a Clinton administration would have been even more effective in driving Latinos to the 
polls.  My results suggest that Latinos would have had a better grasp of the stakes involved in the 
election and a better sense that their efforts to vote were not simply to stop Trump, but to try to improve 
the state of affairs for the Latino community with an alternative candidate.  For instance, the election of 
Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) and re-election of Senator Michael Bennet (D-CO) and their 
campaign victories are prime examples of the types of policy environments that better motivate the 
Latino electorate. In Nevada, it also took similar local policies that expand benefits to immigrants at the 
state and local level to encourage the necessary turnout from the Latino community (Summerlin 2016).  
In their efforts to register people to vote, Sophia Clark, a regional organizer for the Colorado Immigrant 
Rights Coalition put it best. She describes the dissatisfaction Latino voters faced with the presidential 
candidates and that more voters were paying attention to state policies that could impact immigrants’ 
lives more directly, including an expansion of authorized driver’s licenses to undocumented 
immigrants in Colorado (Summerlin 2016).  Thus, perhaps it was not simply the presence of an 
opposing candidate with strong restrictive immigration views or the perceived threat of Trump’s 
immigration policies that motivated many Latinos to turnout in high rates in Colorado and Nevada. 
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Limitations and Future Inquiries 
I focus on policy appeals and the competitive nature of policy frames when participants are 
simultaneously exposed to both threat and opportunity appeals (Chong and Druckman 2007; 2010; 
Druckman 2010; Druckman and Leeper 2012).  In a similar vein, a critic might argue the 
Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition is not helping people redirect their frustrations about 
looming threats toward more promising policy goals, but instead it is simply helping them feel 
there is more competition surrounding the debate and the momentum may be what is most 
motivating.  This does not take away from my overarching argument. By providing participants 
with a more complete picture of the stakes involved and the efforts championed by both sides of 
an issue, people are then more likely to feel challenged and not overwhelmed by threat alone.  
Furthermore, a coupled message approach might be reframing the issue, such that the 
opportunity offered deflects the emphasis of threat. 
As Albertson and Gadarian (2015) address in their experiments, another concern could be 
that there is no single set of stimuli that could trigger a perception of threat uniformly across an 
audience.  Thus, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) argue that it is important to use multiple types of 
treatments to manipulate anxiety across participants.  In the experiment described in chapters 3 
and 4, subjects were randomized to receive a threatening appeal or a reassuring appeal, or both.  
Equally important, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) also advocate for the use of self-generated or 
bottom-up manipulations, which accomplish greater internal validity because they allow the 
participant to tell the researcher what makes them feel anxious or threatened.  In this case, 
respondents in the treatment condition are asked to list their worries about a particular policy 
scope (immigration or public health threat) and then they compare those subjects to other 
respondents who simply listed their more generic thoughts about the same policy arena 
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(Albertson and Gadarian 2015).  In a second study, funded in part by the National Science 
Foundation, I incorporate a self-generated manipulation of threat and opportunity cues 
surrounding immigration policies.  This second experiment involves an emotion-induction 
component, allowing subjects to write about what they feel fearful and/or hopeful about when 
asked to reflect on the immigration debate. In the meantime, my current study design provides 
more realistic external political stimuli signaling threat and opportunity in the scope of 
immigration policy.  
Interestingly, my treatment’s mobilizing effects were not moderated by issue salience 
(Miller and Krosnick 2004; Valentino et al. 2008) or a primed racial group identification (Gurin, 
Miller and Gurin 1980; Garcia 2003).  With regards to issue salience, the literature would expect 
those who follow the immigration debate most closely to be the most mobilized by a call to 
action.  Furthermore, minority group members with an elevated sense of racial group and/or 
panethnic identification should be especially motivated to overcome the collective action 
problem (Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980; Garcia, 2003; Garcia Bedolla 2005).  Scholars have 
often turned to group identification as a key concept to understand how racial minorities 
overcome socioeconomic disadvantages and other forms of exclusion to participate in politics 
(Garcia 1982; Dawson 1994; Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk 1981; Omi and Winant 1993; 
Orum 1966; Olsen 1970; Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981).  For a group identity to carry 
political weight in an individual’s political decision-making process, “individuals have to 
recognize themselves as members of the group and also be conscious of the political value of 
acting as a group” (Jones-Correa and DeGraauw 2013, p. 217). This matters because while 
resources tend to be stable over time, political organizations and campaigns can more easily 
prime a group’s identity in light of one’s political environment (Michelson 2001). The 
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mobilizing effect of threatening and hopeful policies for Latinos may be most effective among 
Latinos with high levels of ethnic or racial group identification. For instance, Masuoka (2008) 
finds that Latinos who hold racialized identities are more likely to become politically engaged 
than counterparts without such identities. In fact, Valdez (2011) and Stokes-Brown (2006) find 
that Latino group consciousness significantly and positively correlates with political participation 
as well as vote choice (Sanchez 2006).  
However, neither of these moderating effects emerged as reliable explanations for the 
results presented in chapters 3 and 4.  This may in part be due to the prevalence of immigration 
topics in this presidential campaign cycle.  Thus, the lack of moderating effects for the entire 
sample based on issue salience and racial group identification in my study may be due to ceiling 
effects of both immigration issue salience and various measures of racial group consciousness.46  
On a related note, in future analyses, I plan to rely on larger sample sizes to explore differences 
across Latino national origin groups.  Garcia Bedolla, Lavariega-Monforti and Pantoja (2007) 
point to differences in the gender gap across national group origins indicating that gender has a 
differential impact on men and women in different communities (Mexican, Cuban and Puerto 
Rican) when predicting their political attitudes.  This intersection of gender and national origin is 
important to explore in subsequent analyses as some messages may be more mobilizing to some 
based on their policy priorities (Garcia Bedolla et al. 2007).  From a political mobilization 
perspective, this suggests that particular policy issues may best mobilize Latinas to engage in 
                                                
46 Some of the gendered findings in chapter 4 are partially explained by women who follow immigration 
more closely, as well as women who are more efficacious.  However, salience and efficacy are not conditioning the 
treatment’s effects for the sample as a whole.  Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976) rely on the 
moderating effect of efficacy to explain people’s responses to communication strategies involving threatening 
stimuli posing a danger.  Efficacy does not lessen the severity of the threat but it strengthens people’s belief in the 
ability to cope with danger when they confront it (Rogers and Mewborn 1976; Vasi and Macy 2003).   
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politics more than Latino men, or vice versa (Garcia Bedolla et al. 2007).  In Chapter 4, I began 
to explore these potential differences, focusing primarily on the moderating effects of gender. 
As part of my broader research agenda, I also envision a separate study that will test a 
less salient issue, such as environmental policies.  This study will be a more conservative test of 
the effect of threat and opportunity cues.  For instance, the effects in the current study may be 
due to the fact that immigration issues are highly salient as well as heavily based in Latino group 
cues.  Testing a less salient and non group-based issue, such as one focused on local environment 
policy, will help me determine if salience or a sense of racial group identity are necessary 
ingredients behind effective coupled appeals. 
Finally, I theorized but did not explicitly test the importance of the ordering of threat and 
opportunity appeals in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition of my experiment.  In 
subsequent studies, I hope to explore whether the ordering of the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity 
message has implications for political participation. For instance, the threat cue might have a longer 
lasting effect because it was the first item people read in the coupled prompt; conversely, other critics 
might expect the opportunity cue to have a stronger effect in people’s minds because it was listed last in 
the coupled prompt.  However, if one cue stood out more than the other, then the Coupled Condition 
would have looked identical to the effect of a cue on its own in the single cue treatments, but I never 
find this to be the case.  Thus, the two policies in the coupled message are working hand-in-hand to 
help people see that the effort they are exerting in taking political action will not only diffuse the danger 
posed by the threat (revoking of birthright citizenship), but it will also lead to the possibility of gains 
provided by the policy opportunity (pathway to birthright citizenship). In the current survey experiment 
I am fielding as part of an extension of this project (through YouGov and supported by National 
Science Foundation), one of my conditions randomizes the ordering of threat-and-opportunity. Thus, 
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results from the new experiment will reveal whether the ordering of the threat-and-opportunity measure 
are critical in motivating people to take action.  
Previous scholars have demonstrated the role of group consciousness may be leveraged 
as a resource for those who are appraising risk and benefits of taking political action (Sanchez, 
2006a, 2006b; Garcia Bedolla 2006), and some have found that a strong sense of Latino linked 
fate may be particularly relevant to counteract political cynicism (Monforti and Michelson 2016, 
Chap. 4). In order to have more trust in government and foster greater levels of political 
engagement, Okamoto et al. (2010) and Monforti and Michelson (2016) also point to the 
important contributing (though not sufficient) factor of acculturation and integrative policies in 
one’s environment. Those with greater group consciousness might be more optimistic as they 
contextualize the threat in terms of the group and not just as individual matter (Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985; Smith et al. 2007; Groenendyk and Banks 2014). This also influences their 
options to take political action, which are seen as a group response signaling power with 
numbers. With this strength in numbers, there is a caveat: one cannot feel as though their 
participation is less valuable or lost in a group, also known as classic collective action dilemmas 
of free-riding and social loafing (Olson 1965; Vasi and Macy 2003). Although I did not find 
moderating effects of Latino group consciousness, Latino linked fate and heightened importance 
of a Latino racial identity in the survey experiment of this project, this is not to say that group 
identity is irrelevant in the risk and opportunity appraisal process of immigration policy.  
I suspect a sense of Latino group identity was heightened and evident of ceiling effects. 
Furthermore, upon focusing solely on those of self-reported Mexican origin, it is important to 
note that the results are heightened among Mexican participants in my survey, though the results 
still hold upon analyzing the full Latino sample (which includes a wide array of people of 
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various national origins). This raises the important point of national origin and panethnic origin 
identification among Latinos (Monforti 2015, Chap. 2), a debate that has not reached consensus 
and is still changing as the diversity of Latino immigrants continues to grow beyond the larger 
Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban subgroups (Monforti 2015, Chap. 2.). Before delving into 
differences across various forms of social group identities, it was necessary to establish the 
causal link behind the threat-and-hope (or fear-and-hope) design of the project. 
Through interviews, scholars have found that recipients, or those eligible for integrative 
immigration policies, are very hopeful about the future of immigration policy (Michelson, 
LaVariega-Monforti and Sanchez 2015; Jordan-Wallace and Zepeda-Millán 2017). Some of the 
recipients of integrative policies are those who were brought to the U.S. as children—including 
those eligible for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals or Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM). Does their protected status fuel their sense of optimism? 
Is this younger set of the Latino population more naïve? Is there a millennial effect? Though this 
is speculative, perhaps some of the optimism is grounded in the socialization experiences these 
young adults have gone through, including being the children of immigrant parents. According to 
the Pew Hispanic Center, 1:4 children live in households with immigrant parents (2010). Latino 
Decisions found that nearly 64 percent of Latino adult citizens polled in 2014 report knowing 
someone who is undocumented (either a close friend or family relative). As an area for future 
study, it is worth exploring a potential moderating effect by immigrant generation status.  
We do not have a healthy democracy when people abstain from engaging within the 
political system. Furthermore, this points to the need to assess whether motivators of political 
action, including the combined effects of threat and opportunity, differ for various groups in the 
U.S. While focusing on political activism among African American and White Americans, 
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Phoenix (2015) finds there are racial differences in the motivating effects behind anger and hope. 
In fact, some are led to resignation and inaction in the face of policy threats, especially if there 
are no signals of policy change (or policy goals) that will prevent the same misstep or crisis from 
happening again (Phoenix 2015). Finally, although the mass public can be persuaded to take 
political action and be more engaged citizens, not all forms of political behavior foster 
democratic outcomes.  In other words, people can be manipulated to overestimate a perceived 
threat in their environment (Hopkins 2010; Albertson and Gadarian 2015; although see Lupia 
and Menning 2009) and misplace trust in more authoritarian political figures (Albertson and 
Gadarian 2015). 
My work provides strong support for the proposition that more nuanced and balanced 
political appeals are at least as successful at motivating Latino political behavior as more 
threatening appeals.  My research uncovers more effective strategies to spur more political action 
among Latinos in the U.S.  A democracy that consists of more effective mobilizing strategies 
will provide people with the means and motivation to participate more fully (Schattschneider 
1975), allowing them to keep our elected officials more accountable  (Hutchings 2003).  My 
dissertation project also raises questions about the health and potential challenges to our 
democracy.  The dominant use of threat and fear tactics in politics creates a more anxious 
citizenry (Valentino et al. 2008; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Anxious citizens 
overwhelmingly “support policies that deny others’ rights in times of crisis and to support 
leaders who may continually provoke fears to maintain power” for such policies (Albertson and 
Gadarian 2015).  This is particularly problematic as the nation attempts to handle its increasing 








A. Chapter 3 Appendices, Part One: Screenshots of Treatment Conditions and Control 
Condition 
 
Figure A.1: Experiment Threat Condition47 
 
 
                                                
47 Treatments screens were also available in Spanish (available upon request). These treatment designs were 
















B. Chapter 3 Appendices, Part Two: Experiment Manipulation Checks 
Table B.1: OLS Models Estimating Cognitive Perceptions of Threat (1) and Opportunity 
(0) by Treatments  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Cognitive Threat 
Manipulation 
Check, 7 cat. 
(Base = Control) 
Cognitive Threat 
Manipulation 
Check, 6 cat. 
(Base = Control) 
Cognitive Threat 
Manipulation 
Check, 6 cat. 
(Base = Threat) 
Threat Condition 0.092*** 0.119*** - 
 (0.026) (0.032) - 
Opportunity Condition -0.172*** -0.216*** -0.335*** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) 
Coupled Condition -0.003 0.003 -0.116*** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) 
Control Condition - - -0.119*** 
 - - (0.032) 
Constant 0.555*** 0.564*** 0.683*** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) 
Observations 1,001 756 756 
R-squared 0.097 0.131 0.131 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 





Table B.2: Estimating Models of Participation Scale and Sent Postcard, Controlling for 
Cognitive Manipulation Check 












(Base = Control) 
    
Threat Condition 0.057* 0.043 -0.039 -0.075 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.219) (0.223) 
Opportunity Condition 0.001 0.019 -0.050 0.018 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.228) (0.232) 
Coupled Condition 0.064** 0.063** 0.439* 0.495** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.229) (0.233) 
Highest Educ. Degree 
 (7-cat., 0-1) 
 0.059  0.152 
  (0.037)  (0.296) 
Household Income level 
(5-cat., 0-1) 
 -0.028  0.418 
  (0.041)  (0.327) 
Age  -0.324***  -0.307 
  (0.052)  (0.409) 
Immigrant Generation  
(3-cat., 0-1)(1=1st 
generation) 
 -0.128***  -0.639*** 
  (0.027)  (0.212) 
Partisanship (7-cat.) 
(1=Strong Republicans) 
 0.145***  -0.012 
  (0.035)  (0.276) 
Gender  -0.020  -0.271 
  (0.022)  (0.172) 
Cognitive Threat (6-cat.) -0.083** -0.076** -0.197 -0.129 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.257) (0.262) 
Constant 0.418*** 0.461*** 0.829*** 1.048*** 
 (0.029) (0.046) (0.213) (0.367) 
Observations 756 756 756 756 
R-squared 0.014 0.118   
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.3: OLS Models, Emotion Manipulation Check of Threat (Fear) and Opportunity 
(Hope)  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Hope Fear 
Threat Condition -0.068** 0.037 
 (0.032) (0.034) 
Opportunity Condition -0.038 0.023 
 (0.033) (0.035) 
Coupled Condition -0.049 -0.023 
 (0.032) (0.034) 
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1) 0.004 0.040 
 (0.040) (0.043) 
Household Income level (5-cat., 0-1) -0.007 0.004 
 (0.045) (0.048) 
Age -0.062 -0.081 
 (0.058) (0.061) 
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-
1)(1= 1st generation) 
-0.027 -0.001 
 (0.030) (0.032) 
Partisanship (7-cat.)(1= Strong 
Republicans) 
0.002 -0.055 
 (0.040) (0.042) 
Gender 0.009 0.028 
 (0.024) (0.026) 
Cognitive Threat (6 cat.) -0.088** 0.049 
 (0.039) (0.041) 
Constant 0.639*** 0.514*** 
 (0.053) (0.057) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.013 0.010 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.4: Estimating Participation Scale and Sent Postcard Models with Demographic 
Controls and Manipulation Checks 







Threat Condition 0.038 0.049 
 (0.025) (0.189) 
Opportunity Condition 0.011 -0.001 
 (0.025) (0.191) 
Coupled Condition 0.049** 0.482** 
 (0.024) (0.194) 
Highest Educ. Degree (7 cat., 0-1) 0.061** 0.340 
 (0.031) (0.240) 
Household Income level (5 cat., 0-1) -0.032 0.185 
 (0.034) (0.269) 
Age -0.368*** -0.523 
 (0.044) (0.341) 
Immigrant Generation (3 cat., 0-1)(1= 
1st generation) 
-0.126*** -0.502*** 
 (0.023) (0.178) 
Partisanship (7 cat.)(1= Strong 
Republicans) 
0.164*** 0.065 
 (0.030) (0.236) 
Gender -0.010 -0.200 
 (0.018) (0.143) 
Cognitive Threat (6 cat.) -0.070** -0.120 
 (0.030) (0.233) 
Hopeful 0.013 0.082 
 (0.025) (0.197) 
Afraid -0.029 -0.185 
 (0.024) (0.186) 
Constant 0.455*** 0.778** 
 (0.044) (0.344) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.135  
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.5: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms 
of Political Participation with Added Demographic Controls 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 















Threat Condition 0.039 0.029 0.021 0.029 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) 
Opportunity 
Condition 
0.023 0.032 0.013 0.023 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) 
Coupled Condition 0.051* 0.069** 0.028 0.049** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) 
Gender -0.036* 0.007 -0.006 -0.012 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) 
Highest Educ. Degree  
(7-cat., 0-1) 
0.024 0.089** 0.072** 0.062** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.031) 
Household Income 
level (5-cat., 0-1) 
-0.030 -0.016 -0.043 -0.030 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) 
Age -0.425*** -0.264*** -0.414*** -0.367*** 




-0.105*** -0.113*** -0.161*** -0.126*** 




0.164*** 0.177*** 0.150*** 0.164*** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.030) 
Constant 0.380*** 0.423*** 0.420*** 0.408*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.037) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.109 0.080 0.122 0.128 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.6: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Intent to Vote with 
Added Demographic Controls 
 Model 1 
 
Intent to Vote 
(Baseline = Control) 
Threat Condition -0.027 
 (0.024) 
Opportunity Condition -0.041* 
 (0.024) 



























Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 




Table B.7: Logit Models, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Sent Postcard with Added 
Demographic Controls 














Threat Condition 0.024  0.010 
 (0.187)  (0.187) 
Opportunity Condition 0.014 -0.010  
 (0.186) (0.187)  
Coupled Condition 0.483** 0.459** 0.469** 
 (0.194) (0.194) (0.193) 
Control Condition -0.207 -0.207 -0.207 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Gender 0.334 0.334 0.334 
 (0.240) (0.240) (0.240) 
Highest Educ. Degree 
(7-cat., 0-1) 
0.189 0.189 0.189 
 (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) 
Household Income level 
(5-cat., 0-1) 
-0.516 -0.516 -0.516 





 (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
Immigrant Generation 
(3-cat., 0-1)(1= 1st 
generation) 
0.072 0.072 0.072 
 (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) 
Partisanship (7-cat.) 
(1=Strong Republicans) 
 -0.024 -0.014 
  (0.187) (0.186) 
Constant 0.660** 0.684** 0.674** 
 (0.289) (0.291) (0.280) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 1,001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.8: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms 
of Political Participation with Opportunity Message as the Baseline 
 Model 1  
 
Talk about Politics 
(Baseline=Opportunity) 
Threat Condition 0.019 
 (0.030) 
Opportunity Condition - 
 - 
Coupled Condition 0.050* 
 (0.030) 







Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 




C. Chapter 4 Appendices: Additional Gender Moderating Effects 
Figure C.1: Sent Postcards by Treatment and Gender 
 
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for two-tailed test. Predicted probabilities derived from 
Model 3 of Table 5. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, 
Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added 





































Table C.1: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue 
Message Baselines and Added Controls 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Participation Scale Participation Scale 
 Gender Interactions 
(Baseline = Threat) 
Gender Interactions 
(Baseline = Opportunity) 
Gender = 1, Female -0.017 -0.008 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
Control Condition 0.001 0.012 
 (0.034) (0.035) 
Opportunity Condition -0.011 - 
 (0.035) - 
Coupled Condition -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
Threat Condition - 0.011 
 - (0.035) 
Control Condition X Gender -0.063 -0.072 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Opportunity Condition X Gender 0.009 - 
 (0.049) - 
Coupled Condition X Gender 0.073 0.065 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Threat Condition X Gender - -0.009 
 - (0.049) 
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1) 0.062** 0.062** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
HH Income level (5-cat., 0-1) -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Age -0.370*** -0.370*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) 
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-
1)(1= 1st generation) 
-0.127*** -0.127*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1= Strong 
Republicans) 
0.166*** 0.166*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
Constant 0.440*** 0.429*** 
 (0.041) (0.039) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.135 0.135 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.2: Estimating Sent Postcard Logit Models by Treatment and Gender with Single 
Cue Message Baselines and Added Controls 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Sent Postcard Sent Postcard 
 Gender Interactions 
(Baseline = Threat) 
Gender Interactions 
(Baseline = Opportunity) 
Gender = 1, Female 0.161 -0.019 
 (0.271) (0.265) 
Control Condition 0.441 0.369 
 (0.269) (0.275) 
Opportunity Condition 0.072  
 (0.267)  
Coupled Condition 0.650** 0.578** 
 (0.284) (0.289) 
Threat Condition - -0.072 
 - (0.267) 
Control Condition X Gender -0.918** -0.738** 
 (0.378) (0.376) 
Opportunity Condition X Gender -0.181  
 (0.373)  
Coupled Condition X Gender -0.382 -0.202 
 (0.389) (0.388) 
Threat Condition X Gender - 0.181 
 - (0.373) 
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1) 0.328 0.328 
 (0.241) (0.241) 
HH Income level (5-cat., 0-1) 0.181 0.181 
 (0.270) (0.270) 
Age -0.527 -0.527 
 (0.343) (0.343) 
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-
1)(1= 1st generation) 
-0.522*** -0.522*** 
 (0.179) (0.179) 
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1= Strong 
Republicans) 
0.089 0.089 
 (0.237) (0.237) 
Constant 0.508 0.580* 
 (0.313) (0.302) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.3: OLS Models Estimating Vote Intent by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue 
Message Baselines and Added Controls 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Vote Intent Vote Intent  
 Gender Interactions 
(Baseline = Threat) 
Gender Interactions 
(Baseline = Opportunity) 
Gender = 1, Female -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Control Condition 0.064* 0.077** 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
Opportunity Condition -0.013 - 
 (0.034) - 
Coupled Condition 0.011 0.024 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Threat Condition - 0.013 
 - (0.034) 
Control Condition X Gender -0.079* -0.076 
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Opportunity Condition X Gender -0.003 - 
 (0.048) - 
Coupled Condition X Gender 0.001 0.004 
 (0.047) (0.047) 
Threat Condition X Gender - 0.003 
 - (0.048) 
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1) 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
HH Income level (5-cat., 0-1) 0.028 0.028 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Age 0.207*** 0.207*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-
1)(1 = 1st gen) 
0.046** 0.046** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Partisanship (7-cat.)(1= Strong 
Republicans) 
0.112*** 0.112*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant 0.613*** 0.600*** 
 (0.041) (0.039) 
Observations 789 789 
R-squared 0.082 0.082 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 
using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C.4:  OLS Estimates for Emotion Manipulation Check with Moderating Gender 
Effects by Treatment 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Hope Fear 




Gender = 1, Female 0.080* 0.076 
 (0.045) (0.048) 
Threat Condition  -0.029 0.048 
 (0.044) (0.047) 
Threat Condition X Gender -0.097 -0.016 
 (0.064) (0.067) 
Opportunity Condition  0.019 0.007 
 (0.045) (0.048) 
Opportunity Condition X Gender -0.089 0.011 
 (0.064) (0.067) 
Coupled Condition  0.009 0.077 
 (0.045) (0.048) 
Coupled Condition X Gender -0.12* -0.19*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant -0.116* -0.192*** 
 (0.064) (0.067) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.010 0.017 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 




Table C.5: Estimating Participation Models by Treatment Among Women 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Participation Scale Vote Intent Sent Postcard 
 Among Women Among Women Among Women 
Threat Condition 0.062* 0.015 0.474* 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.263) 
Opportunity Condition 0.042 0.001 0.330 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.255) 
Coupled Condition 0.108*** 0.030 0.712*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.262) 
Constant 0.323*** 0.815*** 0.050 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.183) 
Observations 505 393 505 
R-squared 0.018 0.002  
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values 




D. Chapter 5 Appendices: ANES Results Fully Specified 
Table D.1: Distribution of Partisanship Identification in ANES 2008 and 2012 Latino 
Samples  
 ANES 2008 ANES 2012 
 FTF Sample FTF Sample 
 (%) (%) 
Partisan Identification   
Strong/Moderate/Leaning Democrat 62 67 
Independent  15 15 
Strong/Moderate/Leaning Republican 23 19 
Observations 509 472 
 
Notes: The data are weighted. Percentages based on 2008 and 2012 ANES Latino samples. 
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Table D.2: Distribution of Partisan Strength in ANES 2008 and 2012 Latino Samples 
 ANES 2008 ANES 2012 
 FTF Sample FTF Sample 
 (%) (%) 
Partisan Strength   
Strong/Moderate Partisans 58 61 
Leaners and Independents 42 39 
Observations 509 472 
 




Table D.3: Logit Models Estimating Talking About Politics, Participating in Politics, Vote 
Intentionality with ANES Latino Subpopulations in 2008, including no controls and limited 
controls 






















 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Main Independent 
Variables 
      
Fear- Rep 0.228 0.035 0.132 -0.074 0.005 0.048 
 (0.670) (0.091) (0.092) (0.780) (0.101) (0.072) 
Hope- Dem 0.058 0.010 0.088* -0.391 -0.046* 0.016 
 (0.272) (0.024) (0.045) (0.319) (0.024) (0.042) 
Both Hope (D) X Fear 
(R):   
0.431 0.046 -0.035 0.877 0.074 0.001 
 (0.739) (0.095) (0.104) (0.823) (0.108) (0.089) 
Demographic Controls       
Family Income    0.409 0.028 -0.037 
    (0.453) (0.042) (0.083) 
Unemployed    0.447 0.033 0.104 
    (0.588) (0.072) (0.080) 
Education Indicator 
(1=College Degree) 
   0.295 0.027 0.148*** 
    (0.404) (0.044) (0.034) 
Gender (Female=1)    -0.236 -0.027 0.090*** 
    (0.282) (0.027) (0.033) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
   -0.145 0.010 0.097** 
    (0.352) (0.031) (0.047) 
Age    -0.001 0.000 0.003*** 
    (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nativity Indicator 
(1=U.S.-born) 
   -0.060 0.012 -0.058 
    (0.355) (0.031) (0.041) 
Interest in Campaign 
Politics 
   0.730 0.139*** 0.384*** 
    (0.475) (0.051) (0.047) 
Own a Home    0.143 -0.009 0.020 
    (0.291) (0.035) (0.031) 
Union Membership    0.362 0.012 -0.005 
    (0.380) (0.042) (0.061) 
Latino Linked Fate    0.717** 0.093*** -0.003 
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(1=Not Very/Some/A lot) 
    (0.291) (0.031) (0.035) 
Constant -0.897*** 0.165*** 0.623*** -1.585*** 0.045 0.249*** 
 (0.206) (0.019) (0.035) (0.546) (0.059) (0.089) 
Observations 440 440 438 355 355 353 
R-squared  0.021 0.043  0.103 0.306 
 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-
tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents 
in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey 




Table D.4: Logit Models Estimating Talking About Politics, Participating in Politics, Vote 
Intentionality with ANES Latino Subpopulations in 2012, including no controls and limited 
controls 




























       
AfraidDum- Rep 0.771 0.223* 0.005 1.770** 0.328*** 0.222 
 (0.907) (0.132) (0.306) (0.821) (0.089) (0.134) 
HopeDum- Dem -0.395 -0.043 0.044 0.158 -0.018 0.060 
 (0.500) (0.036) (0.092) (0.477) (0.034) (0.104) 
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 
HopeD and FearR, 0 All 
Else, Interaction Term 
-0.046 -0.153 0.105 -0.921 -
0.266*** 
-0.265 
 (1.067) (0.139) (0.316) (1.015) (0.097) (0.177) 
Family Income    -0.743 -0.046 0.149 
    (0.766) (0.059) (0.121) 
Unemployed    -1.027* -0.026 -0.201* 
    (0.521) (0.041) (0.102) 
Education Indicator 
(1=College Degree) 
   0.261 0.002 0.047 
    (0.567) (0.041) (0.082) 
Gender (Female=1)    0.036 0.007 0.150** 
    (0.357) (0.029) (0.068) 




   -
1.437*** 
-0.072* 0.026 
    (0.541) (0.037) (0.084) 
Age    0.013 0.002** -0.002 
    (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) 
Nativity Indicator 
(1=U.S.-born) 
   0.131 0.038 -0.023 
    (0.369) (0.026) (0.078) 
Interest in Campaign 
Politics 
   1.186 0.080 0.343*** 
    (0.723) (0.052) (0.121) 
Own a Home    0.757** 0.060** 0.069 
    (0.347) (0.025) (0.070) 
Union Membership    0.717 0.063 -0.020 
    (0.518) (0.043) (0.064) 
Latino Linked Fate 
(1=Not Very/Some/A 




    (0.256) (0.020) (0.060) 
Constant -0.565 0.155*** 0.712*** -1.523* 0.030 0.426** 
 (0.352) (0.026) (0.087) (0.791) (0.058) (0.177) 
       
Observations 424 424 202 363 363 157 
R-squared  0.053 0.028  0.176 0.246 
 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-
tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents 
in the 2012 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey 
estimates of the Latino subpopulation.  
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Table D.5: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino 
Subpopulation, fully specified 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
 2008 2008 2008 
    
AfraidDum- Rep 1.618 1.768 0.755 
 (1.904) (1.963) (5.347) 
HopeDum- Dem -0.606 -1.552 -2.440 
 (1.338) (1.070) (1.668) 
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD 
and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction 
Term 
1.590 2.632* 4.440* 
 (1.235) (1.371) (2.343) 
Family Income 3.212*** 1.552 -0.685 
 (1.083) (1.463) (2.504) 
Unemployed 0.629 0.970 2.665 
 (1.482) (1.004) (1.791) 
Education Indicator (1=College 
Degree) 
-0.431 0.133 1.572 
 (0.765) (1.040) (1.789) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.189 -0.451  
 (0.517) (0.565)  
Age -0.014 -0.003 0.062 
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.061) 
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born) -0.176 -0.168 -1.078 
 (0.748) (0.892) (1.134) 
English Interview -0.599 -0.886 -2.863 
 (0.669) (0.946) (1.929) 
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
-0.160 -0.372 3.369 
 (1.156) (1.646) (3.326) 
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
0.303 0.676 0.848 
 (0.926) (0.936) (1.082) 
Interest in Campaign Politics 0.805 1.720** -0.968 
 (0.876) (0.827) (1.564) 
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate) 1.013** 0.625 2.555*** 
 (0.455) (0.608) (0.959) 
Church Attendance Indicator 
(1=Attend outside of 




 (0.578) (0.782) (2.329) 
Union Membership 0.443 0.878 1.836 
 (0.592) (0.756) (1.345) 
Own a Home -0.187 0.564 -0.468 
 (0.415) (0.540) (0.939) 
Length of Residence - Years -0.003 -0.015 -0.046 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.035) 
Mobilization Indicator 
(1=Contacted by Political Party) 
1.681*** 1.957*** 1.084 
 (0.519) (0.621) (1.692) 
Care Who Wins Presidency 1.953** 2.104** 1.688 
 (0.781) (0.901) (1.170) 
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not 
Very/Some/A lot) 
0.914* 1.374* 4.218** 
 (0.537) (0.708) (2.094) 
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-1.644 -1.729 0.994 
 (1.431) (1.112) (2.391) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-1.118 -0.991 -1.030 
 (1.713) (0.925) (2.167) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.187 -0.343 1.671 
 (0.539) (0.540) (1.029) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
2.736** 4.405***  
 (1.175) (1.010)  
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat) 
-1.030  -0.949 
 (0.761)  (2.422) 
Gender (Female=1) = o,   - 
    
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy = o, 
  - 
    
Constant -2.687* -3.713 -6.976 
 (1.459) (2.313) (6.150) 
    
Observations 165 117 88 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table D.6: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino 
Subpopulation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
 2012 2012 2012 
    
AfraidDum- Rep 2.534 32.055 -3.740 
 (2.836) (0.000) (3.094) 
HopeDum- Dem -0.479 15.060 1.857 
 (1.035) (0.000) (2.961) 
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD 
and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction 
Term 
-3.931 -27.714 -7.829 
 (3.028) (0.000) (5.017) 
Family Income -0.448 1.333 4.035 
 (1.190) (0.000) (3.686) 
Unemployed -2.333** -3.264 -0.595 
 (1.080) (0.000) (1.767) 
Education Indicator (1=College 
Degree) 
0.927 0.917 -0.518 
 (0.932) (0.000) (1.768) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.128 -0.133  
 (0.491) (0.000)  
Age 0.035* 0.031 -0.019 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.048) 
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born) 0.764 1.559 0.135 
 (0.627) (0.000) (1.353) 
English Interview 0.615 1.065 3.808* 
 (0.770) (0.000) (2.142) 
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
-0.500 -2.109 2.119 
 (1.448) (0.000) (3.414) 
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
1.967*** 3.487 -2.532 
 (0.707) (0.000) (2.440) 
Interest in Campaign Politics 2.171 4.540 4.250* 
 (1.357) (0.000) (2.337) 
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate) -0.563 -1.702 -0.566 
 (0.647) (0.000) (1.439) 
Church Attendance Indicator 
(1=Attend outside of 




 (0.565) (0.000) (2.290) 
Union Membership 0.214 -0.237 1.068 
 (0.622) (0.000) (1.511) 
Own a Home 0.875 0.897 2.948 
 (0.575) (0.000) (2.101) 
Length of Residence - Years -0.012 -0.010 -0.149* 
 (0.021) (0.000) (0.083) 
Mobilization Indicator 
(1=Contacted by Political Party) 
0.005 0.167 1.193 
 (0.697) (0.000) (1.049) 
Care Who Wins Presidency 2.261** -0.898 3.462 
 (1.011) (0.000) (2.146) 
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not 
Very/Some/A lot) 
-0.446 -1.750 -0.669 
 (0.522) (0.000) (1.079) 
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
2.969* -2.151 7.981* 
 (1.577) (0.000) (4.103) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
2.792 -11.537 6.784* 
 (1.686) (0.000) (3.959) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-1.414 -1.498 -6.621** 
 (1.482) (0.000) (2.968) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.449 0.294 4.123** 
 (0.656) (0.000) (1.882) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat) 
-1.284  -0.762 
 (1.066)  (1.657) 
Gender (Female=1) = o,   - 
    
Constant -9.361*** -10.673 -20.353* 
 (2.842) (0.000) (11.729) 
    
Observations 160 112 88 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table D.7: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2008 Latino 
Subpopulation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
 2008 2008 2008 
    
AfraidDum- Rep 0.106 0.071 -0.019 
 (0.097) (0.109) (0.153) 
HopeDum- Dem -0.081 -0.041 -0.095* 
 (0.056) (0.070) (0.048) 
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD 
and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction 
Term 
0.131* 0.132 0.235* 
 (0.076) (0.108) (0.124) 
Family Income 0.180*** 0.045 -0.124 
 (0.066) (0.106) (0.113) 
Unemployed -0.018 0.007 0.003 
 (0.085) (0.078) (0.059) 
Education Indicator (1=College 
Degree) 
-0.091** -0.033 -0.010 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.072) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.053* -0.073*  
 (0.029) (0.037)  
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born) -0.067 -0.091 -0.125* 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.064) 
English Interview 0.035 0.053 0.086 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.065) 
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
0.099 0.163 0.209* 
 (0.076) (0.111) (0.120) 
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
0.059 0.113* 0.144* 
 (0.046) (0.059) (0.084) 
Interest in Campaign Politics 0.068 0.159** 0.050 
 (0.054) (0.066) (0.076) 
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate) 0.126*** 0.100** 0.110** 
 (0.032) (0.047) (0.049) 
Church Attendance Indicator 0.024 -0.009 -0.028 
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(1=Attend outside of 
weddings/baptisms/funerals) 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.056) 
Union Membership -0.035 -0.045 -0.022 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.039) 
Own a Home -0.018 0.020 0.012 
 (0.028) (0.041) (0.054) 
Length of Residence - Years 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mobilization Indicator 
(1=Contacted by Political Party) 
0.179*** 0.224*** 0.094** 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.042) 
Care Who Wins Presidency 0.049 0.029 0.070 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.048) 
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not 
Very/Some/A lot) 
0.075** 0.094** 0.124*** 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.036) 
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.153** -0.085 -0.064 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.050) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.041 0.036 0.081 
 (0.058) (0.079) (0.055) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.068 -0.100** -0.009 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.075) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.152* 0.139* 0.189* 
 (0.084) (0.076) (0.098) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat) 
0.004  -0.068 
 (0.034)  (0.052) 
Gender (Female=1) = o,   - 
    
Constant -0.072 -0.186 -0.150 
 (0.100) (0.157) (0.152) 
    
Observations 165 117 93 
R-squared 0.381 0.426 0.452 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table D.8: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2012 Latino 
Subpopulation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
 2012 2012 2012 
    
AfraidDum- Rep 0.265** 0.351** 0.293 
 (0.107) (0.145) (0.240) 
HopeDum- Dem -0.105 -0.129 -0.060 
 (0.071) (0.150) (0.073) 
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD 
and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction 
Term 
-0.318*** -0.151 -0.506** 
 (0.115) (0.174) (0.245) 
Family Income 0.054 0.119 0.055 
 (0.074) (0.099) (0.088) 
Unemployed -0.062 -0.036 0.051 
 (0.042) (0.064) (0.049) 
Education Indicator (1=College 
Degree) 
-0.006 -0.009 -0.005 
 (0.059) (0.048) (0.074) 
Gender (Female=1) -0.028 -0.069*  
 (0.034) (0.040)  
Age 0.002* 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born) 0.040 0.079** -0.018 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.041) 
English Interview -0.018 -0.041 0.061 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.059) 
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
0.094 0.003 0.002 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.112) 
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
0.067 0.168*** -0.033 
 (0.043) (0.058) (0.089) 
Interest in Campaign Politics 0.080 0.167** 0.186** 
 (0.073) (0.078) (0.082) 
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate) -0.028 -0.078 0.008 
 (0.045) (0.051) (0.059) 
Church Attendance Indicator 0.025 0.077** 0.019 
 
 190 
(1=Attend outside of 
weddings/baptisms/funerals) 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.043) 
Union Membership 0.035 0.039 -0.005 
 (0.049) (0.058) (0.081) 
Own a Home 0.024 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.052) 
Length of Residence - Years 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mobilization Indicator 
(1=Contacted by Political Party) 
0.005 0.016 0.140*** 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.052) 
Care Who Wins Presidency 0.023 -0.102** 0.036 
 (0.039) (0.050) (0.034) 
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not 
Very/Some/A lot) 
-0.003 -0.073* 0.020 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.038) 
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.107** -0.124** 0.166** 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.081) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.130 0.223 0.213** 
 (0.082) (0.150) (0.090) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.061 -0.074 -0.038 
 (0.068) (0.087) (0.099) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.031 -0.003 0.118 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.071) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat) 
-0.032  -0.002 
 (0.059)  (0.075) 
Gender (Female=1) = o,   - 
    
Constant -0.161* -0.089 -0.295** 
 (0.086) (0.075) (0.148) 
    
Observations 160 112 88 
R-squared 0.373 0.424 0.463 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table D.9: OLS Models Estimating Voting about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino 
Subpopulation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
 2008 2008 2008 
    
AfraidDum- Rep -0.019 -0.093 -0.332* 
 (0.206) (0.180) (0.179) 
HopeDum- Dem -0.172* -0.223** -0.072 
 (0.090) (0.103) (0.120) 
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD 
and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction 
Term 
0.169 0.295* 0.246 
 (0.215) (0.155) (0.189) 
Family Income 0.043 -0.025 -0.280** 
 (0.117) (0.094) (0.131) 
Unemployed 0.060 0.141* 0.216** 
 (0.132) (0.082) (0.090) 
Education Indicator (1=College 
Degree) 
0.118*** 0.144*** 0.222** 
 (0.041) (0.028) (0.098) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.153*** 0.107*  
 (0.057) (0.062)  
Age 0.003* 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born) -0.059 -0.045 -0.193** 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.080) 
English Interview 0.066 0.026 0.045 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.083) 
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
0.136 0.202* 0.223* 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.130) 
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
-0.024 -0.011 -0.022 
 (0.064) (0.051) (0.108) 
Interest in Campaign Politics 0.186* 0.212** 0.021 
 (0.096) (0.087) (0.112) 
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate) 0.131*** 0.050 0.148* 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.081) 
Church Attendance Indicator 0.039 -0.017 -0.030 
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(1=Attend outside of 
weddings/baptisms/funerals) 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.053) 
Union Membership -0.053 -0.084 -0.072 
 (0.077) (0.079) (0.153) 
Own a Home -0.034 0.053 -0.034 
 (0.042) (0.052) (0.068) 
Length of Residence - Years -0.002 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mobilization Indicator 
(1=Contacted by Political Party) 
0.073* 0.086 0.028 
 (0.042) (0.059) (0.048) 
Care Who Wins Presidency 0.156* 0.252** 0.203 
 (0.085) (0.118) (0.123) 
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not 
Very/Some/A lot) 
-0.103** -0.145** -0.038 
 (0.049) (0.063) (0.047) 
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.137 -0.134 0.169 
 (0.090) (0.116) (0.114) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.185** 0.132 0.000 
 (0.088) (0.119) (0.102) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.073 0.082** 0.148** 
 (0.052) (0.041) (0.060) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.138 -0.016 0.073 
 (0.099) (0.067) (0.076) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat) 
0.080  0.058 
 (0.064)  (0.124) 
Constant 0.066 0.240 0.517** 
 (0.148) (0.162) (0.250) 
Observations 163 115 92 
R-squared 0.453 0.440 0.437 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table D.10: OLS Models Estimating Voting about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino 
Subpopulation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 













  Dems Women 
VARIABLES 2012 2012 2012 
AfraidDum- Rep 0.320 0.464* 0.809 
 (0.288) (0.270) (0.491) 
HopeDum- Dem -0.147 -0.311*** 0.024 
 (0.117) (0.111) (0.156) 
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD 
and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction 
Term 
-0.232 -0.526* -0.310 
 (0.252) (0.270) (0.369) 
Family Income 0.155 -0.601*** -0.191 
 (0.139) (0.188) (0.265) 
Unemployed -0.034 -0.163* -0.011 
 (0.109) (0.094) (0.128) 
Education Indicator (1=College 
Degree) 
0.202** 0.319*** 0.234 
 (0.094) (0.090) (0.197) 
Gender (Female=1) 0.015 0.130**  
 (0.063) (0.059)  
Age -0.003 -0.011** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born) -0.041 0.026 -0.055 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.095) 
English Interview -0.050 -0.117 -0.009 
 (0.109) (0.139) (0.231) 
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
0.154 0.030 0.705** 
 (0.214) (0.256) (0.291) 
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, 
v1 
-0.232** -0.540*** -0.415** 
 (0.115) (0.124) (0.185) 
Interest in Campaign Politics -0.235 -0.146 -0.295 
 (0.157) (0.222) (0.220) 
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate) 0.066 -0.081 0.069 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.134) 
Church Attendance Indicator 
(1=Attend outside of 




 (0.061) (0.061) (0.085) 
Union Membership 0.079 0.295*** 0.168 
 (0.109) (0.098) (0.115) 
Own a Home -0.024 0.089 0.319*** 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.098) 
Length of Residence - Years -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mobilization Indicator 
(1=Contacted by Political Party) 
0.261*** 0.207*** 0.194* 
 (0.070) (0.065) (0.111) 
Care Who Wins Presidency 0.481*** 0.559*** 0.509*** 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.082) 
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not 
Very/Some/A lot) 
-0.170*** -0.125* -0.149*** 
 (0.043) (0.064) (0.042) 
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.106 0.213 -0.570*** 
 (0.201) (0.287) (0.209) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.255* 0.425*** -0.051 
 (0.143) (0.153) (0.207) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
0.058 0.283 0.448*** 
 (0.146) (0.191) (0.164) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-0.255*** -0.279*** -0.281* 
 (0.084) (0.104) (0.160) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat) 
-0.063  -0.153 
 (0.165)  (0.134) 
Constant 0.431** 0.985** 0.350 
 (0.186) (0.424) (0.576) 
Observations 71 51 37 
R-squared 0.720 0.780 0.854 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table D.11: OLS Models Estimating Talking and Participation Scale with ANES 2008 and 
2012 Latino Respondents Focusing Exclusively on Women  






















 Women Women Women Women 
 2008 2008 2012 2012 
Afraid Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-3.446* -0.299*** 3.569 0.250 
 (2.050) (0.110) (4.419) (0.201) 
Hope Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
-1.030 0.081 4.163 0.187* 
 (2.167) (0.055) (4.474) (0.111) 
Both Hope and Fear towards 
Either Interacted 
4.440* 0.235* 0.363 -0.189 
 (2.343) (0.124) (3.671) (0.206) 
Family Income -0.685 -0.124 3.905* 0.089 
 (2.504) (0.113) (2.286) (0.089) 
Unemployed 2.665 0.003 -1.542 0.037 
 (1.791) (0.059) (1.687) (0.054) 
Education Indicator 
(1=College Degree) 
1.572 -0.010 -0.997 -0.031 
 (1.789) (0.072) (1.477) (0.083) 
Age 0.062 -0.000 -0.023 0.000 
 (0.061) (0.002) (0.037) (0.002) 
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-
born) 
-1.078 -0.125* 0.255 -0.030 
 (1.134) (0.064) (1.139) (0.043) 
English Interview -2.863 0.086 3.658** 0.081 
 (1.929) (0.065) (1.697) (0.060) 
Internal Efficacy Scaled 
Measures, v1 
3.369 0.209* 0.883 -0.033 
 (3.326) (0.120) (3.488) (0.123) 
External Efficacy Scaled 
Measures, v1 
0.848 0.144* -4.066* -0.111 
 (1.082) (0.084) (2.405) (0.104) 
Interest in Campaign 
Politics 
-0.968 0.050 4.035* 0.191** 
 (1.564) (0.076) (2.050) (0.090) 
Partisans 
(1=Strong/Moderate) 
2.555*** 0.110** -0.650 0.004 
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 (0.959) (0.049) (1.643) (0.063) 
Church Attendance 
Indicator (1=Attend outside 
of 
weddings/baptisms/funerals) 
-0.743 -0.028 3.326** 0.021 
 (2.329) (0.056) (1.429) (0.045) 
Union Membership 1.836 -0.022 -0.001 -0.016 
 (1.345) (0.039) (1.471) (0.083) 
Own a Home -0.468 0.012 2.084 -0.014 
 (0.939) (0.054) (1.709) (0.056) 
Length of Residence - Years -0.046 -0.001 -0.120* 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.001) (0.061) (0.002) 
Mobilization Indicator 
(1=Contacted by Political 
Party) 
1.084 0.094** 1.132 0.108** 
 (1.692) (0.042) (1.140) (0.052) 
Care Who Wins Presidency 1.688 0.070 4.700* 0.055 
 (1.170) (0.048) (2.445) (0.036) 
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not 
Very/Some/A lot) 
4.218** 0.124*** -0.343 0.030 
 (2.094) (0.036) (0.733) (0.040) 
AfraidDum- Rep 5.196 0.217*** -6.852** -0.110 
 (3.978) (0.069) (2.958) (0.116) 
HopeDum- Dem -2.440 -0.095* 0.021 -0.071 
 (1.668) (0.048) (2.347) (0.075) 
Pride Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
1.671 -0.009 -4.819** -0.024 
 (1.029) (0.075) (2.235) (0.110) 
Angry Towards Either 
Candidate_dummy 
 0.189* 4.733*** 0.168** 
  (0.098) (1.465) (0.072) 
Party Identification, 3 cat. 
(1=Strong/Mod/Lean 
Democrat) 
-0.949 -0.068 -1.353 -0.042 
 (2.422) (0.052) (2.092) (0.081) 
Constant -6.976 -0.150 -14.230** -0.210 
 (6.150) (0.152) (6.327) (0.162) 
Observations 88 93 88 93 
R-squared  0.452  0.415 
Standard errors in parentheses 





E. Survey Experiment Questionnaire  
English and Spanish Translations of Survey Instrument48 
 
S2: Would you prefer to take the survey in English or in Spanish?  
! English (1) 
! Spanish (2) 
 
S3 Are you 18 years of age or older? [SKIP TO END OF SURVEY IF RESPONSE TO S3=2)] 
! Yes (1) 
! No (2) 
 
S4 Please indicate your gender. 
! Male (1) 
! Female (2) 
! Other (3) ____________________ 
 
S5 Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? [SKIP TO END OF SURVEY IF 
RESPONSE TO S5=1)] 
! No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (1) 
! Yes, of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (2) 
 
S6 What racial group best describes you? (select all that apply) 
" White (1) 
" Black or African American (2) 
" American Indian or Alaska Native (3) 
" Asian (4) 
" Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5) 
" Other (6) ______[force text entry] 
 
[INSERT Informed Consent Form (English/Spanish options)] 
 
Q1 [DISPLAY IF S5=1] Families of Hispanic/Latino/Spanish origin or background in the United 
States come from many different countries. From which country do you trace your Latino 
heritage? (select all that apply) [Respondents chose from a drop-down menu of response options, 
which listed Latin American countries in alphabetical order and provided an “other” category 
with a textbox option.] 
                                                
48 This is an abbreviated version of the survey questionnaire. I did not include all the pre-test and post-test 
measures in this appendix, but they are available upon request. This appendix includes the items analyzed in the 
empirical chapters and appendices. To avoid acquiescence bias in the responses, the survey randomized reverse-





Q2 Were you born in the mainland United States, Puerto Rico, other U.S. territory or some other 
country? 
! United States (1) 
! Puerto Rico (2) 
! Other U.S. Territory (3) 
! Some other country (4) ___________________________ 
 
Q3 [IF Q2= 4, then DISPLAY Q3. SKIP OTHERWISE.] How old were you when you arrived 
to the U.S.?  _____ (open-ended) 
 
Q5 Where were your PARENTS born, were they born in the U.S., was one born in the U.S., or 
were both born in another country?  
! One parent born in the U.S. (1) 
! Both parents born in the U.S. (2) 
! Neither parent born in the U.S. (3) 
! Don't know (4) 
 
Q6 How many of your GRANDPARENTS, if any, were born OUTSIDE the U.S.? 
! None (1) 
! One (2) 
! Two (3) 
! Three (4) 
! All (5) 
! Don't Know (6) 
 
Q7 How old were you on your last birthday? [Textbox ] 
 
Q11 How important is being Hispanic or Latino/a to your identity?  
! Extremely important (1) 
! Very important (2) 
! Moderately important (3) 
! A little important (4) 
! Not at all important (5) 
 
Q12 Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward 
unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? Should the government… 
! Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country.  
! Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United 
States in order to work, but only for a limited amount of time.  
! Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for 
U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, 
learning English, and passing background checks. 
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! Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for 
U.S. citizenship, without penalties. 
 
Q13 How much attention do you pay to the following policy debates that have recently taken 
place in the news? Would you say NONE AT ALL, A LITTLE, A MODERATE AMOUNT, A 




Immigration  Climate 
change Terrorism 
None at 
all (1) !  !  !  !  
A little 
(2) 





!  !  !  !  
A lot (4) !  !  !  !  
A great 
deal (5) 
!  !  !  !  
 
Q13b - Do you think that what happens generally to HISPANIC/LATINO PEOPLE in this 
country will have something to do with what happens in your life?  
! Yes (1) 
! No (2) 
 
Q13c -  [DISPLAY IF Q13B=1] Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?  
! A lot 
! Some 
! Not very much 
 
Q16 How important is your gender to your identity?  
! Extremely important (1) 
! Very important (2) 
! Moderately important (3) 
! A little important (4) 
! Not at all important (5) 
 





Q17a Would you describe [insert STATE]’s laws as welcoming or unwelcoming towards 
unauthorized immigrants?  
! Very welcoming  
! Welcoming 
! Somewhat welcoming 
! Neither welcoming nor unwelcoming 
! Somewhat unwelcoming  
! Unwelcoming 
! Very unwelcoming  
 
Q24 Would you say you have been VERY MUCH interested, SOMEWHAT interested, or NOT 
much interested in the U.S. presidential political campaigns this year?  
! Very much interested 
! Somewhat interested 
! Not much interested 
  
Q9 About how many hours per week do you spend sending and answering electronic mail or e-
mail? 
! ____hour(s) per week 
! Less than an hour per week 
! Don’t know 
 
Q21S Now we have a set of questions concerning various public figures. We want to see how 
much information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like. 
 
Q21 What job or political office does Paul Ryan now hold? ____________ 
 
Q22 What job or political office does Joe Biden now hold? ___________  
 
Q23 Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the House of 




Q25 In general, what language do you read and speak?  
! Only Spanish (1) 
! Spanish better than English (2) 
! Both equally (3) 
! English better than Spanish (4) 
! Only English (5) 
! Other (6) ____________________ 
 
Q26 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... 
! Strong Republican (1) 
! Moderate Republican (2) 
! Independent, but closer to the Republican Party (3) 
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! Independent, but closer to the Democratic Party (4) 
! Moderate Democrat (5) 
! Strong Democrat (6) 
! Another party, please specify: (7) ____________________ 
! No preference (8) 
 
Q27 Was your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months... 
! 0 - 16,999 (1) 
! 17,000 - 34,999 (2) 
! 35,000 - 69,000 (3) 
! 70,000 - 119,000 (4) 
! 120,000+ (5) 
 
Q28 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? 
! Did not graduate from high school (1) 
! Graduated from high school, did not attend college at all (2) 
! Attended college some, did not graduate (3) 
! Still enrolled in college 
! Graduated from college, did not attend graduate school (4) 
! Attended graduate school (5) 
! Other (7) ____________________ 
 
TREATMENT RANDOMIZATION  
In a moment, we will show you a screenshot about a current topic. We would like you to read the 
information carefully and answer a few questions afterwards. Finally, if you are on a mobile 
device, FLIP your screen HORIZONTALLY so that you can see the text more clearly. Please 
click the next arrow button to continue.   
 




Q31 What kind of emotional response did you have, if any, based on what you read or saw in the 
previous screen? For each of the 10 emotions shown below, do you feel that emotion A GREAT 
DEAL, A LOT, A MODERATE AMOUNT, A LITTLE or NOT AT ALL? (Respondents saw 
one emotion at a time in a carousel format and the ordering was randomized) 
 A great deal 
(1) 
A lot (2) A moderate 
amount (3) 
A little (4) Not at all (5) 
ANXIOUS 
(1)      
PROUD (2)      
ANGRY (3)      




AFRAID (5)      
EXCITED 
(6)      
HAPPY (7)      
SAD (8)      
UNEASY (9)      
HOPELESS 
(10)      
 
COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT 
Q39 Do you think current immigration proposals will make the lives for unauthorized 
immigrants currently living in the U.S. easier or harder? 
! A great deal easier 
! Somewhat easier 
! Slightly easier 
! Neither easier nor harder   
! Slightly harder 
! Somewhat harder 
! A great deal harder 
 
Q32 If given the opportunity, we would like to know whether you are EXTREMELY LIKELY, 
VERY LIKELY, MODERATELY LIKELY, SLIGHTLY LIKELY or NOT AT ALL 


















     
VOLUNTEER 













     
 
Q33 Do you intend to register to vote before the November 6th general election, or do you NOT 
intend to register?  
! Already registered 
! Yes, intend to register 
! No, do not intend to register 
! No, not eligible to register 
 
Q34 [DISPLAY LOGIC: DO NOT DISPLAY IF REGISTRATION QUESTION Q33=3 
OR 4 “NO”] How likely is it that you will vote in the general election this November?  
! Extremely likely 
! Very likely 
! Moderately likely 
! Slightly likely 
! Not at all likely 
 
Q36 INSTRUCTIONS:  
Now you have a chance to send an electronic postcard and express your opinion about 2 current 
immigration policies with [your STATE U.S. Senators].49 Your name will not be attached to the 
postcard. Your postcard will be sent to [your senators] at the end of the survey. All electronic 
postcards will consist of the italicized text below.     
 
STANDARD POSTCARD MESSAGE: 
[Senator] [LAST NAME 1] [and Senator] [LAST NAME 2], 
As you consider your decision on immigration policy this week,  
I ask you to [YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT HOW THE SENATORS SHOULD VOTE 
WILL GO HERE].   
Thank you for your time.     
 
POLICY MESSAGES: 
Now CLICK on the policy message you wish to send to [your senators]. You may choose 
up to 2 policy messages for the postcard brackets:50 
" Support the proposal PROVIDING A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP for 
unauthorized immigrants. (1) 
                                                
49 For respondents living in D.C. or another U.S. territory (i.e. Puerto Rico) without U.S. Senators, the 
postcard option stated the postcard would be sent to the president. 
50 Due to the 2-maximum rule, I have inadvertently underestimated the number of participants who wrote a 
message. People wrote a message if they did not already select two preset messages. In a future iteration of the 
project, I would remove the 2-maximum rule. 
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" Reject the proposal PROVIDING A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP for 
unauthorized immigrants. (2) 
" Support the proposal that ENDS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP for children born of 
unauthorized immigrants. (3) 
" Reject the proposal that ENDS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP for children born of 
unauthorized immigrants. (4) 
" Reject the proposal that ENDS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP for children born  
" Create your own message: (5) ____________________ 
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